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forum

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

While the overall level of terrorist activity seems to have leveled off over the past two to three years, the terrorist threat has become increasingly deadly. Where the majority of terrorist incidents during the 1970s were directed against property, today's actions increasingly target people. Trends also suggest that terrorists are becoming more dramatic — and hence less compromising — in their efforts to maintain public attention. Where this will ultimately lead is a matter of speculation, but must be a matter of concern. The contributors to the present "ORBIS Forum" are **Martha Crenshaw,** *Associate Professor of Government at Wesleyan University;* **Daniela Salvioni** *and* **Anders Stephanson** *of Columbia University; and* **Brian M. Jenkins,** *Director of the Program on Subnational Conflict and Political Violence at the Rand Corporation.*

AN ORGANIZATIONAL APPROACH TO THE ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL TERRORISM*

by MARTHA CRENSHAW

Terrorism against the state is a specialized form of organized political violence. Terrorist acts result from decisions made by individuals who are members of identifiable organizations with distinctive characteristics.[1] As autonomous political organizations, terrorist groups share qualities with other organizations independent of the state. Yet other features — their reliance on violence, conspiratorial nature, and small size — are distinctive. Focusing on the organization as a determining factor in the process

* The original version of this paper was presented to the International Political Science Association in Paris, July 1985.

[1] Although this analysis is concerned with terrorism against the state, terrorism by the state is also a result of organizational processes. Government bureaucracies such as the Gestapo and semi-autonomous organizations directed and staffed by the state, such as the Anti-Communist Alliance in Argentina, could be analyzed in organizational terms.

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of terrorism can contribute to the development of theoretical analysis and comparison of different terrorist groups.

Political organizations that employ terrorism as a strategy are similar to other voluntary organizations: (1) the group has a defined structure and processes by which collective decisions are made; (2) members of the organization occupy roles that are functionally differentiated; (3) there are recognized leaders in positions of formal authority; and (4) the organization has collective goals which it pursues as a unit, with collective responsibility claimed for its actions. Specific groups tend to have identifiable modus operandi or standard operating procedures.

There are also features that distinguish terrorist organizations from other types of political association.[2] The goals of such organizations usually involve what Gamson in his study of social protest calls the "displacement of the antagonist."[3] Their aims are ambitious, calling for radical change in the distribution of power in society or challenging the legitimacy of existing political and social elites. Furthermore, these groups rely on violence to achieve radical change. Not all groups espousing fundamental change in the structure of society and politics wish to accomplish their aims through the forcible destruction of the existing order or the intimidation of its supporters. Moreover, the violence such organizations commonly employ is specialized, selectively directed against the institutions, officials, and symbols of the state, as well as against social classes or ethnic communities defined as the enemy. The techniques of "propaganda of the deed" and coercive intimidation are quite different from the organized collective violence that may accompany strikes, demonstrations, riots or other expressions of mass discontent. This commitment to violence as a primary method of action (rather than incidental to other purposes) condemns terrorist organizations to illegality and dictates that they organize and operate clandestinely. Terrorist organizations are predominantly underground conspiracies, and their activities are governed by the strictest rules of secrecy.

The extremism of their goals, their dedication to a provocative and shocking form of violence, and their isolation from society are factors that contribute to another distinctive feature: the extremely small size of most terrorist organizations. Even in large organizations such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army or the Palestinian organization Fatah, actual

[2] The organizations under examination are referred to as "terrorist organizations" and their members as "terrorists" for the sake of convenience and because terrorism is the subject of analysis. The terms refer, however, not just to groups practicing terrorism exclusively but to organizations for which it is one strategy among several. Nor is the usage meant to imply that all members of revolutionary organizations are actively engaged in terrorist violence.

[3] William A. Gamson, *The Strategy of Social Protest* (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1975), pp. 38-44.

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operational decision making is conducted in small, primary groups for reasons of organizational security and maximum efficiency. The focus of analysis, therefore, must be the small primary group. Most decisions are made in face to face discussions in autonomous combat units, rather than handed down through an impersonalized hierarchy. Because of the organizational constraints imposed by clandestinity and the imperative of secrecy, decentralization and "compartmentalization" are essential. Thus, terrorist organizations are not as disciplined or as tightly controlled by the top leadership as legal organizations might be, and conflict between local units and central leaderships are frequent. Maintaining security involves some sacrifice of hierarchical authority and often of efficiency as well.[4]

Generalizing about the characteristics of terrorist organizations should not lead to the false assumption that all such organizations are identical. Significant variations emerge within their common structure. A major difference exists between groups that are largely isolated from society and those that are the extremist offshoots of broader social movements or political parties. Some organizations claim to represent a communal or ethnic constituency from which they derive support. In some cases, the terrorist organization may be, in effect, a subunit of a legal organization with a large public membership. The IRA, for example, or the Basque ETA are components of broader organizational structures and possess a reservoir of support in society because the grievances of the Catholic and Basque communities, respectively, remain unresolved. The Combat Organization of the Socialist-Revolutionary-Party (SR) in Russia in the period between 1901 and 1913 was essentially the fighting unit of a legal political party with seats in the Duma. The IRA is nominally the military wing of Sinn Fein, also a legally constituted political party. These broad-based organizations are usually multifunctional, with separate divisions for propaganda, fund raising, social work, intelligence, or training. Terrorism is one activity among many, although by its nature it is autonomous and self-contained.

Being part of a larger organization can be beneficial. As Gerhard Brunn comments on the ETA, which in 1974 reorganized itself from a largely decentralized system to "democratic centralism": "This organisational structure indicates that ETA consists of more than just a small nucleus of terrorist cadres. It possesses a developed organisational network which permits it to safeguard its terrorist activities within a wider social context and to make political use of them far more effectively than

[4] J. K. Zawodny, "Infrastructures of Terrorist Organizations," in Lawrence Z. Freedman and Yonah Alexander, eds., *Perspectives on Terrorism* (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1983), pp. 61-70.

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would be the case if it commanded no more than a diffuse, unstructured circle of sympathisers."[5] This organizational encadrement provided ETA the flexibility and stable sources of recruitment it needed to survive government repression and heavy attrition of membership ranks.

At the same time, the relationship between the center and the supposedly subordinate subunit can kindle intraorganizational conflict. As emphasized earlier, barriers between the terrorist wing of the organization and the nonviolent arms are essential to preserve the legal status of the parent organization and the security of the terrorist units. Yet, this confers an independence on the terrorist group that can be troublesome. As historian Manfred Hildermeier notes, although the Socialist-Revolutionary-Party was a mass party open to anyone who supported its goals, the terrorist activities of the Combat Organization were strictly separated from aboveground agitation and propaganda. The price for this new-found efficiency — Hildermeier claims that this was the first case of a mass political organization creating a wing exclusively devoted to terrorism — was a loss of control by the party leadership. In principle, the party leaders were to select targets and timing of attacks, but in practice the Combat Organization made its own decisions. This ambiguity was a constant source of tension.[6] The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) entrusted its hijackings to the "External Operations" branch. When Israeli security measures made the PFLP's leaders cautious about continuing this tactic, "Its notorious 'External Operations' branch . . . then took on a momentum of its own whose relevance to the Palestinian cause as such became, in the view of many other members of the guerrilla movement, increasingly attenuated."[7]

Groups lacking a social base usually possess a much simpler structure. The People's Will organization in Russia, for example, active roughly from 1878 to 1881, did not have the functional differentiation or range of the later SR. Groups such as the Red Army Fraction (RAF), 2 June Movement, and Red Cells in West Germany, although they were originally the extremist factions of student movements, focused on terrorism to the exclusion of other mobilizing and organizing activities directed toward a mass constituency. The working class whose lot they aspired to improve rejected their efforts. A similar observation can be made about the Weathermen in the United States, an offshoot of a wing

[5] Gerhard Brunn, "Nationalist Violence and Terror in the Spanish Border Provinces: ETA," in Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Gerhard Hirschfeld, eds., *Social Protest, Violence and Terror in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-century Europe* (New York: St. Martin's, 1982), p. 125.

[6] Manfred Hildermeier, "The Terrorist Strategies of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party before 1914," in Mommsen and Hirschfeld, eds., pp. 80-87.

[7] Helena Cobban, *The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: People, Power and Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 146-48.

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of the Students for a Democratic Society. Such isolated groups lack the constraints and the resources conferred by membership in a larger organization.

There is also some indication that in the rare instance when a small terrorist organization gains a mass base, its organizational methods, developed during a conspiratorial period, are unsuited for mass mobilization. The Montoneros of Argentina, for example, active in the early 1970s as a Peronist organization, began terrorist activities with a membership of about a dozen people. With the return of Peron to power in 1973 (a result of events beyond their control but gratifying nonetheless) they suddenly found themselves the vanguard of a youth movement. The Montonero terrorist organization was elitist, authoritarian, and bureaucratic (despite its small size the organization was divided into functional units for logistics, documents, planning, and psychological action as well as into geographic sectors). This lack of internal democracy and "aparatismo" were serious organizational weaknesses as the conspiracy blossomed into a mass movement with Peron's accession.[8] The organization had trouble promoting the popular participation that would have made it politically effective aboveground. Nor was the Montonero organization efficient under the repressive military dictatorship that followed their brief heyday. Its leaders eventually fled the country.

It does not always follow, however, that a terrorist organization acting on the behalf of a minority community will automatically acquire a social base of support. The Front de Libération du Québec, for example, never achieved such a status, remaining isolated from society and from the political parties which supported similar political objectives. Black political activism in the United States has remained nonviolent despite the emergence of the short-lived Black Panthers organization. Yet the Montoneros, in the context of an insurrection without roots in communal or ethnic divisions, was transformed, albeit briefly, into a large-scale organization with multiple functions and a mass base.

Two models of terrorist organizational design appear to prevail. The first is a cellular structure in which decisions are made at the top of a pyramid and communicated downward to subordinate but compartmentalized units, with only the top echelon having any knowledge of the comprehensive structure or the identities of leaders. The second form resembles a wheel, with a central leadership at the hub in direct contact with the encircling units. J. K. Zawodny attributes the development of the centrifugal structure to the extremely small size of modern terrorist

[8] Richard Gillespie, *Soldiers of Peron: Argentina's Montoneros* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 84-85, 137, 239-44.

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organizations.[9] He sees it as more flexible, interactive, and innovative than the cumbersome pyramidal structure. The centrifugal organization can react quickly to events and can exist independent of society, which is convenient for groups without even minimal popular support. Members have more intimate contacts with leaders, thereby facilitating control. The contemporary Red Cells (Rote Zellen or RZ) in West Germany are an example of such a diffuse organization, with loosely connected cells in different cities.[10] However, such decentralization is not new. The most extreme example of decentralization is anarchist terrorism in nineteenth-century Europe and the United States. Like the Red Cells, each small subgroup acted independently, for the most part, in what they perceived as the common interest of the collectivity.

The degree of "underground" that characterizes terrorist organizations is also qualified. The members of some groups are professional terrorists, with no other employment or social role, who live in hiding from the authorities, under strict concealment. But other groups require only the part-time commitment of their members, who hold regular jobs or conduct their lives in society but who engage in terrorist activities in their spare time, so to speak. In West Germany, this difference was apparent in the RAF, professional terrorists, and the Red Cells, who were called "after-hours terrorists." This difference in membership requirements has consequences for organizational stability and cohesion as well as for choice of strategies. For example, part-time terrorists do not usually select actions that require extensive advance planning, such as kidnappings. On the other hand, supporting a professional terrorist organization is quite expensive and forces the organization to engage in fund-raising activities such as bank robbery, kidnapping for ransom, and expropriation. The isolation of the professional terrorist group also increases group solidarity and can lead to conflicts with a central leadership in an extended organizational structure:

> Still more damaging was the fact that members of the combat organization often lived for years in complete isolation from the party. Under the strain of an illegal existence and exposed to constant persecution by the tsarist secret police, they developed their own values and their own elitist *esprit de corps*. With few exceptions, they adopted the arrogant view that it was they who accomplished the truly revolutionary deeds. Their inclination to take orders from a "civilian" party leadership was correspondingly slight.[11]

Most explanations of terrorist activity focus on the ideological goals of terrorists, and terrorist organizations are frequently classified along

[9] J. K. Zawodny, "Infrastructures of Terrorist Organizations," in Freedman and Alexander, eds.

[10] Bonnie Cordes, et al., *Trends in International Terrorism, 1982 and 1983* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1984), pp. 37-39.

[11] Hildermeier, "Terrorist Strategies," p. 85.

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this dimension as, variously, revolutionary, anarchist, nationalist, separatist, or neo-Fascist.[12] Terrorism is interpreted as a useful means to these ends under certain conditions, such as a perceived vulnerability of the government or acquisition of resources by the terrorists. Yet the commitment of the terrorist organization to a given ideology is often weak or inconsistent. The Rand Corporation, for instance, notes that in France the group Action Directe, "in chameleon fashion, rapidly refocuses on the most attractive antigovernment issues."[13] Since 1979, the organization has opposed nuclear energy, imperialism, Israel, the Catholic Church, and French intervention in Chad. Ideological doctrines are rarely well-formulated or elaborate. Ideas are frequently borrowed loosely from other theoretical sources, the most common today being varieties of Marxism-Leninism. Organizations may shift orientation, for example, from nationalism to social revolution as the IRA and ETA have done. As Gerhard Brunn observed, "ETA has not produced any notable ideologists or theoreticians of its own, nor a consistent ideology. Its ideological evolution tends to be marked by eclecticism, heterogeneity, leaps and internal conflicts which have led to numerous splits and the hiving-off of individual groupings."[14]

The same inconsistency characterized the Montonero organization but it may have been advantageous rather than costly: "The original group contained no outstanding theoretician, yet its very pragmatism was as often a source of strength as of weakness in the early years, facilitating tactical flexibility and the forging of political alliances."[15] A study of the West German terrorist organizations commissioned by the government of the Federal Republic reveals just how controversial the causal connection between ideology and terrorism is. While the authors disagree over whether the theoretical justifications of terrorism are meaningful as motivation, given their arbitrariness and impracticality, all agree that the terrorists did not have their own theories which guided strategy. Instead, they selected fragments of doctrine from other contexts; the concept of American imperialism in the Third World was applied to West Germany, for example. Their ideas lacked coherence and realism.[16] Thus, it is difficult to use ideology as the critical variable that explains the resort to or the continuation of terrorism. The group, as selector and interpreter of ideology, is central.

[12] See, for example, Paul Wilkinson, *Political Terrorism* (New York: John Wiley, 1974).
[13] Cordes, *Trends*, p. 29.
[14] Brunn, "Nationalist Violence," pp. 118-19.
[15] Gillespie, *Soldiers of Peron*, p. 71.
[16] Federal Republic of Germany, Bundesministerium des Innern, *Analysen zum Terrorismus*, Vol. 1, *Ideologien und Strategien* by Iring Fetscher and Gunter Rohrmoser (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1981).

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On the other hand, the psychological approach considers terrorism to be expressive rather than instrumental political behavior.[17] Terrorists are seen as people acting out their emotions, not rational calculators. Yet there is no single common motivation for terrorism; the group translates individual motivation into political action.

Other theories focus on the conditions that encourage or facilitate terrorism, often mentioning socioeconomic factors such as minority grievances, social cleavages, availability of weaponry, media access, or urbanization.[18] However, terrorist organizations are composed of a small social elite. The average terrorist is a middle-class student or young professional, not a worker or peasant. Even in Peru, the significant and unusual peasant rebellion in the southern highlands is based on an alliance forged between the peasantry and the Shining Path terrorist organization of radical intellectuals, led by a philosophy professor from the local university. The terrorist organization grew out of the university and was composed mainly of students. It only subsequently sought and gained significant support from the rural populations.[19] When all members of a given group are affected by the same conditions, one is left to explain why only a small fraction reacts with calculated violence. It is through the decision making of organizations that social conditions are perceived, interpreted, and acted upon. Terrorism is not a spontaneous expression of widespread discontent.

Nevertheless, Waterman, in a study of collective political activity, rejects an organizational focus as too narrow and prefers instead to concentrate on the resources and opportunities available to the government's opponents.[20] Although one finds few studies of this dimension of terrorism,[21] focusing on organizational processes offers a way of integrating the variables of ideology, individual motivation, and social conditions into explanations of how terrorist campaigns get started and of why they continue despite the deployment of the government's superior powers of coercion against them. Organizational effectiveness also determines the outcomes of terrorist campaigns against governments. The

[17] See Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," *Comparative Politics,* July 1981, pp. 379-99.

[18] See, for example, Harry R. Targ, "Societal Structure and Revolutionary Terrorism: A Preliminary Investigation," in Michael Stohl, ed., *The Politics of Terrorism: A Reader in Theory and Practice* (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1979), pp. 119-43.

[19] Cynthia McClintock, "Why Peasants Rebel: The Case of Peru's Sendero Luminoso," *World Politics,* October 1984, pp. 48-84.

[20] Harvey Waterman, "Reasons and Reason: Collective Political Activity in Comparative and Historical Perspective," *World Politics,* July 1981, pp. 554-589.

[21] The work by J. K. Zawodny, himself a former member of the Polish underground, is an exception. See, in addition to the article cited above (footnote 4), "Internal Organizational Problems and the Sources of Tensions of Terrorist Movements as Catalysts of Violence," in *Terrorism: An International Journal* 1, Nos. 3 and 4 (1978), pp. 277-85.

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critical question is how an organization's leaders view resources, opportunities, and threats, and how they decide to react.

The following analysis is a tentative, exploratory examination of how organizational considerations may affect terrorist behavior and outcomes. References to empirical events are illustrative. In general, the analysis suggests that acts of terrorism may be motivated by the imperative of organizational survival or the requirements of competition with rival terrorist groups. Terrorism is the outcome of the internal dynamics of the organization, a decision-making process that links collectively held values and goals to perceptions of the environment. An organizational approach assumes that members may be attracted to terrorist organizations as much for nonpolitical as for political ends. Incentives to join can include comradeship, social status, excitement, or material reward. The longer a terrorist organization exists, the more likely that group solidarity will replace political purpose as the dominant incentive for members. Leaders of terrorist organizations struggle to prevent the dissolution or destruction of the group through individual defections or destructive factionalism as much as to protect it from government persecution. Such discord is often the source of new groups, as dissident members splinter off from the main organization. Other terrorist organizations are formed as extremist factions of broader social movements that renounce violence but support the same political goals. These organizational factors are especially useful in explaining how terrorist behavior can become self-sustaining regardless of objective success or failure and of changing conditions.

Organizational Maintenance and Survival

The theories of James Q. Wilson, appropriately adapted, provide a useful point of departure for an analysis of terrorist organizations. Wilson argues that the fundamental purpose of any political organization is to maintain itself.[22] Survival is the minimal goal of any organization, but the goals of the people occupying roles in an organization go beyond the minimum. Leaders, in particular, wish to enhance the organization and ensure its viability. The fact that leaders' personal ambitions are tied to the organization's success seems particularly relevant to the setting of terrorism, where alternative opportunities are limited and outside power resources scarce. The skills required for organizing violence may not be easily transferable to the other fields of endeavor. Where the security of the organization depends on organizational cohesion, leaders must maintain a certain level of cooperative activity to keep the group together in order to preserve not only their positions of authority but their lives.

[22] James Q. Wilson, *Political Organizations* (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

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Wilson views the position of organizational leadership in terms of the nature of the incentives an organization provides for its members. The relationship between actual rewards for membership — what motivates individuals to join a terrorist group — and the organization's stated political objectives or ideology is not straightforward. The organization's followers may not actually have joined the organization for the purpose of fulfilling ideological goals. Collins and Guetzkow term these nonpolitical incentives "interpersonal" as opposed to "task-environmental" rewards.[23] The constraints and opportunities these nonpolitical attractions create for the leaders who must manipulate them to maintain a loyal following will affect the organization's political position. That is, the organization has to offer more than simply its claim to work toward a more just or egalitarian society or freedom from oppression in order to attract recruits. Interpersonal rewards strongly motivate group behavior because they are more immediate than vague prospects of radical change which can only be realized in the distant future, if at all. In sum, to gain security of tenure, leaders must be able to supply adequate levels of both tangible and intangible incentives to members, which do not necessarily involve the pursuit of the organization's collective public ends but which affect these goals as well as the means of their pursuit. The individual's primary incentive for joining an organization, especially one that is already established and of known character, may have only a tenuous connection with the organization's ideology, especially if that ideology is ambiguous. The person drawn to a terrorist organization may not distinguish among motivations, mixed as they are in a complex of conscious and unconscious attractions.

Are such nonpolitical incentives relevant to terrorist behavior? The popular image of the terrorist as an individual motivated exclusively by deep and intransigent political commitment obscures a more complex reality. At least four categories of motivation can be defined distinct from the organization's ideological purpose. If not strictly personal, these rewards are nevertheless unrelated to changing the group's environment or benefiting some external collectivity. Rewards for the individual rather than the group, they can consequently be apportioned by leaders. These incentives are (1) the opportunity for action, (2) the need to belong, (3) the desire for social status, and (4) the acquisition of material reward.

A major organizing principle of terrorist groups is the priority of action over talk. Terrorists are often individuals who are impatient for action. Carlos Marighela, the Brazilian leader whose famous "Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla" profoundly influenced the modern generation of

[23] Barry E. Collins and Harold Guetzkow, *A Social Psychology of Group Processes for Decision-Making* (New York: John Wiley, 1964), pp. 74-80.

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European terrorist groups, asserted "action creates the vanguard." Further, "it is only through revolutionary action that an organization capable of carrying the revolution through to victory can be formed." "What made us grow was action: solely and exclusively revolutionary action."[24] Nathan Leites, in a study of the publicized objectives of terrorist groups, notes the importance of the theme of "escaping the words."[25] Konrad Kellen observed that "The desire for effective — or at least noticeable — action appears to be one of the prime motivations of terrorists."[26] Regardless of the specific nature of the ideology to which the organization adheres, whether left or right, nationalistic or revolutionary, the organization offers a chance to act rather than to discuss action. Terrorists scorn passivity and view endless theorizing with contempt: "Most of the 'combatants' [of the SR Combat Organization] showed a marked scepticism towards any kind of theory and hardly bothered about the party's internal political debates. For them terror had become a 'craft'. . . . What counted in the combat organisations was organising ability, daring, histrionic talent and skill in the forging of passports and construction of bombs — not socialist-revolutionary theory or ideological staying power."[27] Thus, Azef who was known for his "theoretical indifference" could rise to the leadership of the Combat Organization on the strength of his organizing abilities.

Opportunity for action and immediate pay-off distinguish the terrorist organization from other like-minded groups. Demand for action on the part of recruits may be due to diverse psychological needs, such as seeking risk, excitement, stress, or violence. For example, the establishment of the Black September organization (BSO) as an offshoot of Palestinian nationalism was a reaction to the defeat of the resistance organizations in the Jordanian civil war in 1970: "The BSO's sudden and immense popularity was due to its role as an expression of the emotions of a generation of young, highly politicized commandos. It functioned as a cathartic outlet for the feelings of utter helplessness which followed the sudden and unexpected defeat in Jordan."[28] Its purpose was action, in order to restore the Palestinian identity and to displace the tensions of defeat onto the adversary.

[24] Carlos Marighela, *For the Liberation of Brazil,* translated by John Butt and Rosemary Sheed (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971), p. 31. See, in general, Chapter 4, "On the Organizational Function of Revolutionary Violence," pp. 30-44.

[25] Nathan Leites, "Understanding the Next Act," *Terrorism: An International Journal* 3, Nos. 1 and 2 (1979), pp. 1-46, especially pp. 32-33. Words are regarded as an excuse for inaction.

[26] Konrad Kellen, *Terrorists-What Are They Like? How Some Terrorists Describe Their World and Actions* (Rand Note N-1300-SL. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1979), p. 37.

[27] Hildermeier, "Terrorist Strategies," p. 85.

[28] John W. Amos, *The Palestinian Resistance: Organization of a Nationalist Movement* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980), p. 144.

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Most voluntary organizations are cautious about undertaking commitments because they fear risking the organization's survival.[29] Terrorists, however, are denied the option of passivity. Because action is imperative, leaders must take risks in order to maintain the organizations. They must cope with a constant tension between their desire to preserve the organization (since action risks destruction by government forces) and the membership's demand for action. Nor is it easy for terrorist leaders to find a substitute for violence, since many recruits rejected other similarly motivated organizations precisely because of their nonviolence.

The action incentive also assumes some characteristics of what Wilson terms "individual solidary" incentives.[30] That is, this reward is divisible: leaders can withhold it from some and offer it to others. Not everyone who joins a terrorist organization, even the smallest, can always participate directly in acts of terrorism; others must occupy supporting roles. The individuals who engage in special kinds of violence, for instance, sharpshooters, constitute an elite into which only the most skilled and trustworthy members are admitted. To be selected as a member of the terrorist hard core is a privilege reserved for a select few.

Belonging to the group or community in itself is also a powerful incentive. Verba found in his study of small groups and political behavior that small radical groups may satisfy a need for affective ties not otherwise satisfied in society, certainly not in the wider political system or in large organizations. Cohesion, solidarity, and pressure to conform tend to be strong in all primary groups, especially those in dangerous situations and isolated from society. Leaders must devote themselves to maintaining this affective satisfaction, which often conflicts with their desire to direct group activity toward the outside. There is constant tension between the responsibilities of leading and of nurturing members' sense of belonging.[31] Even in large and diversified organizations such as the IRA or ETA the terrorist subunits form a closed community. Of the SR Combat Organization Hildermeier says "solidarity amongst themselves ranked higher than their obligation of loyalty to the party. This alienation went so far that one terrorist, during the investigations against Azef, the police agent and leader of the combat organisation, threatened to shoot the entire central committee, if it dared to prosecute him."[32] The External Operations branch of the PFLP behaved in a similar fashion. It is probable that a significant number of individuals join the terrorist organization in order

[29] Wilson, *Political Organizations,* Chapter 3, pp. 30-55. Most organizations are not combat-oriented, so violent organizations are a special case.

[30] Collins and Guetzkow, *Group Processes for Decision-Making,* pp. 22-29.

[31] Sidney Verba, *Small Groups and Political Behavior: A Study of Leadership* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 56-59, 122-23, and 146-53.

[32] Hildermeier, "Terrorist Strategies," p. 85.

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to belong to a group. They may be people who have an emotional need to find a family substitute or who seek personal identity in a collectivity.

There seem to be two patterns of group processes relating to the decision to resort to terrorism. In the first case, individuals join groups that are on the periphery of the actual terrorist organization, which is, in a sense, at the center of a concentric circle. People then move through the groups to the core, sometimes following close friends or relatives. The decision to resort to terrorism is gradual and indirect. Involvement in the terrorist organization may not, at the outset, have been a deliberate choice. In West Germany, the path to membership in the RAF or 2 June Movement was often through other nonpolitical organizations, student communes or residential cooperatives, or nonviolent but sympathetic organizations such as prisoners' aid committees.[33] Basque terrorists are often former members of youth mountain-climbing clubs who were recruited by their leaders. Recruitment is selective, as terrorist organizations are an exclusive elite: for example, "The members of these [ETA] cadres are recruited after long observation of their work in legal organisations, such as students' associations or mountaineering clubs; in a process lasting several years they are gradually selected, via discussion circles, *charlas de formacion,* and trained by being tried out in auxiliary expeditions."[34]

The second pattern of group development occurs when the existence of the group precedes the decision to turn to terrorism. The adoption of the terrorist strategy is a collective decision by the group as a whole or by a faction within the group. Such decisions are usually hotly debated. The People's Will separated itself from the revolutionary movement over the question of terrorism, for example. The person who has become extremely dependent on the group will move with it to the new activity, without necessarily having made an independent choice. The dependence of members of underground groups on the group and on its leaders — a dependence that has its roots not only in the psychological bonds of solidarity that are formed in all primary groups but in the reality of the isolation and insecurity of a clandestine existence — means that leaders can threaten expulsion for noncompliance. This threat is probably rarely necessary, however, since peer pressure is intense, and members are reluctant to risk group disapproval or rejection. It is also known that risk-taking propensity increases when decisions are made by groups, and this increases the pressure the followers may place on the leaders. The

[33] Federal Republic of Germany, Bundesministerium des Innern, *Analysen zum Terrorismus,* Vol. 3, *Gruppenprozesse,* by Wanda von Baeyer-Katte, Dieter Claessens, Hubert Feger, and Friedhelm Neidhardt (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1981).

[34] Brunn, "Nationalist Violence," p. 126. See also Robert P. Clark, *The Basque Insurgents: ETA, 1952-1980* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984).

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risk-taking propensity of the group as a whole reinforces the demand for action and can lead to an escalation of violence.

Social status is a powerful third incentive for engaging in terrorist violence. The recruit may hope to win the respect and admiration of peers and family. Joining a terrorist organization in order to enhance one's appearance in the eyes of outsiders to the group is not uncharacteristic of nationalist and separatist groups, where a popular constituency exists that may deplore the method but applaud the goals of the organization. The ETA and the IRA, for example, clearly offer status incentives. Most terrorist recruits are adolescents, susceptible to fantasies of domination and heroism. Most terrorist organizations style themselves as "armies" engaged in a "war" or at least "armed struggle" with the government's forces. The terrorist, furthermore, may be acting in terms of a nonindigenous social reference group with whom he or she identifies. The terrorist may genuinely see his or her actions as the extension of a historic struggle led by distant heroes in the Third World, winning them the respect of other revolutionaries. Many West European groups compared themselves to the Tupamaros of Uruguay, who were regarded as popular heroes despite the failure of their movement. This incentive may be difficult for leaders to manipulate short of expulsion of unsatisfactory members. However, being in the inner activist circle may be more prestigious than ordinary participation for the action-oriented recruit. Leaders may not be able to deny this reward, but they can influence it by the strategies they or the group under their direction choose. The image of the terrorist is often important to the group's self-perception as well as to their popular reception. Loss of a "Robin Hood" image can result in a loss of respect and regard from the population. For the Tupamaros, for example, killing kidnapped hostages when the government refused to comply with demands resulted in popular disaffection.

The role of the news media is essential to communicating popular reactions (as well as in interpreting terrorist actions to the public). Media attention must be gratifying to the terrorist motivated by status considerations. Again, terrorist strategies are adapted to acquiring maximum publicity in terms of timing and choice of appropriate targets of violence. In groups where status is a salient incentive, one might expect a concentration on spectacular violence. Even the most isolated of undergrounds still has access to television.

Last, terrorist organizations offer material incentives, although these are probably less important than the three described above, given the limitations life in the underground imposes on the enjoyment of wealth. Nevertheless, being a professional terrorist for a well-established organization in an area with high unemployment, such as Northern Ireland,

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means at least some income. It may be preferable to the dole. Many terrorist organizations have acquired substantial financial resources through ransoms, bank robberies, and expropriations. Some are supported by foreign governments or publics. West German terrorists have frequently been accused of enjoying an extravagant life style, preferring Porsches for their getaway cars. Kellen believes that terrorists are attracted to money and "increasing affluence" without work.[35]

Wilson finds nevertheless that purposive incentives, those related to achieving collective goals, changing the environment, and benefiting nonmembers, remain strong. Collective goals appeal to the terrorist's sense of satisfaction at contributing to what he or she considers a worthy political cause. Wilson suggests that the organization's political purpose affects its stability.[36] He distinguishes three categories of purpose: single-issue, ideological, and redemptive. Although most terrorist organizations are ideological, in the sense of being based on beliefs that comprise a systematic, comprehensive rejection of the present political world and the promise of a future replacement, some are single-issue groups. The Rand Corporation describes issue-oriented groups as common but short-lived.[37] The third incentive, redemption, is characteristic of organizations whose efforts concentrate primarily on changing the lives of their members or followers rather than changing the outside world. Groups like the nineteenth-century anarchists and the Weathermen of the 1960s, both cited by Wilson, focus on self-sacrifice, on living by stringent moral codes, or on conversion. The Russian People's Will, for example, based its actions on the concept of self-sacrifice as a moral justification for violence. In the Montonero organization, the Catholic element provided a millenarian theme, with an emphasis on self-sacrifice, life after death, and martyrdom. Fallen comrades were glorified as having joined "the people," in whose service the Montoneros imagined themselves, but whom they were barred from joining in life.[38]

In their redemptive aspects terrorist organizations resemble religious cults, which generally require the absolute commitment of members to a rigid system of belief that divides the world into the saved and the damned. Like terrorist organizations, cults totally reject society, offering instead the intimacy of a like-minded group. They generally practice severe sexual Puritanism and extreme authoritarianism.[39] Further, religious

[35] Kellen, *Terrorists — What Are They Like?* pp. 36-38.
[36] Wilson, *Political Organizations,* pp. 49-50.
[37] Cordes, *Trends,* pp. 3-4.
[38] Gillespie, *Soldiers of Peron,* pp. 58-59 and 118-19.
[39] There is a substantial literature on religious cults. See, for example, William S. Bainbridge and Rodney Stark, "Cult Formation: Three Compatible Models," *Sociological Analysis,* Winter 1979, pp. 283-95; and "Networks of Faith: Interpersonal Bonds and Recruitment to Cults and Sects," *American Journal of Sociology,* May 1980, pp. 1376-95.

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sects do not find persecution unwelcome, as it fulfills their expectations of the evil of the world. There is solidarity in adversity, and quite possibly some terrorist organizations also welcome government repression. Wilson suggests that redemptive organizations can never succeed; hence, their despair often leads to extreme destructiveness and willingness to take risks.

Religious orders sometimes practice terrorism. In a comparative analysis of three historical religious terrorist organizations — the Assassins of medieval Islam, the Hindu Thuggees of colonial India, and the Zealots or Sicarii of Hebrew origin — Rapoport emphasizes the consequences of violence meant to serve a deity rather than to change human affairs.[40] Seeing themselves as instruments of divine intervention, these terrorists usually chose ritualized or stylized forms of violence that frequently assured personal martyrdom. Their actions cannot be considered as rational or politically expedient. Extremely rigid and unable to adapt to changing circumstances, the organizations, rather than the destructiveness of despair, guaranteed their own eventual destruction.

Wilson concludes that all conspiratorial organizations tend over time to substitute group solidarity for political purpose as the dominant incentive.[41] This development is highly plausible for terrorist organizations, given the tendency toward cohesion present in all primary groups as well as the isolation and stress professional terrorists endure, thereby increasing their dependence on the group for emotional support. The group becomes simultaneously more introverted and unrealistic, as contacts with society are severed. Terrorism, thus, becomes self-sustaining, as the group acts to maintain itself rather than to instigate political change. Violence, necessary for group maintenance, cannot simply be abandoned for another purpose. This argument may explain why terrorism appears to persist despite its failure to achieve the organization's stated political objectives or despite changes in political circumstances that make its claims unrealistic. The IRA and ETA, for example, were both established as organizations at times when nonviolent alternatives appeared to be unsuccessful (the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland, for example, was met by Protestant violence), or when the regime was nondemocratic (Franco's dictatorship in Spain, and the Stormont regime under Protestant domination in Northern Ireland, respectively). Both organizations have continued operating despite changes that have satisfied many of the demands of the constituencies they claim to represent. Catholic rights in

[40] David C. Rapoport, "Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions," *American Political Science Review*, September 1984, pp. 658-77.

[41] Wilson, *Political Organization*, p. 50, and in general Chapter 3, "Organizational Maintenance and Incentives," pp. 30-55.

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Northern Ireland are now better protected under British rule, and Franco's authoritarianism has been replaced by democracy. Their persistence is explained by an intransigent refusal to compromise and by the strength of the organization itself.

Organizational analysis explains not only terrorism's staying power, but its origins. Wilson agrees that structural explanations of civil violence yield little, since the objective conditions likely to inspire grievances and, hence, incite violence are permanent, whereas violence is neither continuous nor universal.[42] Instead he finds entrepreneurship to be a critical ingredient. The founders of an organization must invent appropriate incentives to attract members, and must have an exceptional commitment to the group's purposes coupled with an exaggerated sense of its likely efficacy. Wilson further argues that there must be a demand for the organization from some actual or potential constituency and that the organization must possess a minimum threshold of readily mobilized resources. An essential condition appears to be the presence of skilled and determined leaders and some broader demand for action coinciding with "the salience of purposive incentives."[43] If potential recruits believe that matters of concern to them are being affected by a government whose behavior can be altered, a belief that is likely to emerge when a highly visible enemy appears to pose a serious threat to the values of the potential terrorists or their constituents, they are likely to organize and to act. Thus, terrorist organizations are much more responsive to the environment and to other actors during their inception than they are in their subsequent development.

The case of the Montoneros demonstrates the importance of the coincidence of ideas that legitimize violence, examples set by other terrorist organizations in similar circumstances, latent popular demand for political action, the encouragement of an outside actor, and a new threat posed by the government. The three founding leaders of the Montoneros had been students at the same school and members of a Catholic youth organization. Although two had participated in right-wing political activities, in 1967 all three, inspired by the liberation theology movement within the Catholic Church, joined the radical "Camilo Torres Command," named after the Brazilian worker-priest. Legitimizing social revolution, liberation theology was the single most important doctrinal element in the Montonero leaders' radicalization, although their desire for action seems to have been much stronger than their ideological motivation. Liberation theology was, after all, the inspiration for a large part of the Peronist youth movement in Argentina. Lending credence to revolutionary

[42] Ibid., pp. 296-301.
[43] Ibid., p. 201.

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ideologies and to the anticipation of success from a terrorist strategy was the persuasiveness of the model of the Uruguayan Tupamaros, who were exceptionally active in the late 1960s. Peron's encouragement from exile was also a catalyst. Although "the launching of the urban guerrillas was an initiative 'from above,' the decision of small groups of militants rather than a response to widespread popular demand,"[44] in the late 1960s in Argentina a general alienation and rebelliousness particularly affected the middle class. This disaffection, more political and cultural than socio-economic, was caused by the brutal but inefficient political repression of the military dictatorship. The universities were particularly threatened. The Montoneros, established in 1968, combined radical Catholicism, nationalism, Peronism, and socialism in an eclectic mixture which made them attractive to almost everybody, but the unifying focus of the organization was armed struggle. Beyond that the group did not plan for the future, as they naively believed that Peron would safeguard their interests.[45]

In general, this theoretical approach strongly suggests that the expectations of members of terrorist organizations may have only a slight connection with the organization's ideological objectives. The leaders of the organization play a critical role in balancing incentives to maintain the organization's viability. The two dominant incentives appear to be the opportunity for action and the chance to belong to a small group of sympathetic associates. From this perspective, terrorist organizations appear to be largely self-sustaining. Other theories must explain the decline from within.

Dissent and Factionalism within Organizations

Although the comparison between business firms and terrorist groups may at first seem bizarre, the resemblance has been noted by the Rand Corporation: "Organizations are dedicated to survival. They do not voluntarily go out of business. Right now, the immediate objective of many of the world's hard-pressed terrorist groups is the same as the immediate objective of many of the world's hard-pressed corporations — that is, to continue operations."[46] Albert O. Hirschman's theory of how economic firms cope with decline supports Wilson's idea that the vulnerability of an organization stems from inability to attract followers rather than to attain political purposes.[47] Yet, Hirschman's theory implies that

[44] Gillespie, *Soldiers of Peron,* p. 59.
[45] Ibid., pp. 47-88.
[46] Cordes, *Trends,* p. 50.
[47] Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).

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organizations are fragile; they struggle to prevent decline through the loss of members or constituents or divisive quarrels.

He suggests that organizations behave differently in competitive than in non-competitive environments. Unity is much more difficult to preserve when there are rivals. Often, terrorist organizations compete in the armed struggle: the Irish Republican Army vies with the Irish National Liberation Army; the Italian Red Brigades contend with Prima Linea; Fatah competes with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and a host of other groups; the Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia shares the limelight with the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide; ETA is split into two branches, and the Montoneros faced the ERP and many smaller revolutionary organizations. Other organizations monopolize violence: the contemporary Shining Path of Peru, in the 1960s the Tupamaros of Uruguay, or the People's Will organization in Tsarist Russia.

Hirschman maintains that dissatisfied followers of an organization have two options: "exit" or "voice." Each is exercised under different circumstances. "Exit" can indicate two courses of action: (1) joining an established rival organization that provides more satisfactory incentives; or (2) leaving with enough similarly discontented associates to form a new organization. The incentives that operate for the members of an organization are assumed to remain constant, so that they still wish to pursue violent action against the government in a group context. The possibility of exit to legal organizations or simply to a normal life also exists, but these alternatives are rendered unattractive and costly by the threat of pursuit — by both the government and the terrorist organization. Exit often occurs after an attempt to exercise "voice" has failed. Arguments on group direction often occur when the most extremist members chafe under the restrictions imposed by the relatively moderate and demand an escalation of violence. In order for enough members to be sufficiently dissatisfied to establish a new organization, dissent must be serious. Where established competitors are available, exit is simpler.

Although terrorist organizations usually attempt to define exit as betrayal and threaten severe punishment for treason, factionalism is not uncommon. The Provisional IRA, for example, developed from the refusal of the parent or "Official" IRA to adopt a strategy of terrorism against Protestants and the British in the wake of the civil rights movement. To prevent the departure of a subgroup, especially if it endangers the survival of the organization, former moderates may consent to collective radicalization. The Official IRA subsequently followed the Provos into terrorism — both against the British and against each other. Only if there is no possibility of exit can the organization's leaders resist the demands

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of members for change without suffering a loss of membership. Although exit may often be difficult, it is rarely impossible.

Terrorist organizations tend, however, to view "voice" as a more serious threat than exit. Most are extremely intolerant of internal dissent, thereby promoting factionalism to resolve internal conflict. The authoritarianism of the Montoneros, despite its ideological ambiguity, provoked splintering. The existence, if fleeting, of breakaway groups "at least illustrated a fundamental organizational, and basically political, weakness of the Montoneros: namely, their militaristic lack of any forms of internal democracy whereby differences could be resolved. Dissent was equated with treason, criticism with hostility; minority groups were regarded as threats to be exorcized by means of ostracism and expulsion, never through the strength of political argumentation."[48]

This rigidity has several sources. Cohesion and solidarity are important values, both to the organization (for which security is a paramount concern) and to the psychological well-being of members for whom belonging to the group is a dominant incentive. Furthermore, the organization is founded on the premise that action is preferable to discussion. The clandestine structure of a conspiracy and communications difficulties inhibit widespread participation in political debates over goals. Leaders appear to interpret any criticism as an accusation that their leadership is not representative of the organization. To enforce obedience and acceptance, leaders can rely basically on only two rational sources of authority (they also have a certain command over the group because of psychological dependencies). First, their skills at organization and strategy are known by their past record. Second, Verba suggests, generally with regard to small groups, that leaders rely on their position as an "agent of impersonal force" and as representative of group norms to legitimize their directives.[49] Any challenge to the leaders' interpretation of ideology, which is not their strong point in any case, is also a challenge to the foundations of their leadership.

The leaders of an organization with dissatisfied members try to avoid the extremes of exit and voice that will weaken the organization either through the loss of members or through internecine quarrels. They maneuver chiefly, according to Hirschman, by developing loyalty. Leaders stress commitment to group goals and try to strengthen group solidarity. Terrorist organizations often deliberately build loyalty through ideological indoctrination and through emphasizing the external threat. Loyalty is demonstrably strongest when the possibility of exit exists, but members choose to stay anyway. One can thus assume that in competitive situations

[48] Gillespie, *Soldiers of Peron*, p. 139.
[49] Verba, *Small Groups and Political Behavior*, pp. 172-75.

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it is imperative for leaders to inculcate loyalty. In a situation of monopoly, intense loyalty may be less necessary.

In addition, organizations establish what Hirschman terms "severe initiation costs" to prevent members' departures. If members have invested a lot to join an organization, they will be reluctant to leave. Terrorist organizations normally require the commission of an illegal act as the price of admission in order to eliminate the individual's option of abandoning the underground. This cost does not altogether preclude exit to a close competitor if one exists. However, by paying a high cost for entry, the terrorist has developed a stake in self-deception. Even if the terrorists believe the organization has failed to achieve its objectives, they will "fight hard to prove they were right after all in paying that high entrance fee" rather than admit defeat.[50] The higher the entrance fee paid to join the organization, the less likely that the terrorist will defect even in a competitive situation.

Terrorist organizations have also found alternative methods of dealing with the threat of exit. The Montoneros, for example, practiced what one might call an institutional merger. In moves styled as "unification of the resistance," the Montonero organization in effect absorbed smaller armed groups, whose identities were then submerged in a strengthened Montonero core. Another option was apparently selected by Fatah. In the aftermath of the Jordanian civil war and the defeat of the Palestinian forces, intense discontent among younger Fatah members resulted in the creation of the Black September organization, which was linked to Fatah in a shadowy fashion. While Fatah never openly claimed parentship of Black September, it seems likely that it did exercise some tutelage, perhaps in an attempt to prevent exit to Fatah's more radical competitors such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Eventually, however, when Fatah tried to gain a firmer hand over the BSO, its leaders did defect to form new rival groupings.[51]

Given high initiation costs and the corresponding constraints on exit they impose, discontent serious enough to surface is likely to be explosive, and it is not surprising that it often leads to bitter factionalism. Paradoxically, extreme discontent may sometimes motivate increased activity to achieve group goals rather than to dissolve the organization. The decline of the terrorist organization under government pressure may engender a psychological dynamic where initial complacency is succeeded by frenetic activism that goes beyond criticism of the leadership to desperate attempts to salvage the organization. Terrorist initiates, having paid a high price to enter the organization and facing an even greater

[50] Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty,* p. 93.
[51] Cobban, *Palestinian Liberation Organisation,* p. 148.

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penalty for exit, may react not by denying but by trying to change political reality. The response to decline, then, may be an escalation of violence.

Experimental psychological studies have in fact indicated that the person who has experienced a severe initiation will find even a low-cost exit (for example, to a similarly motivated group with its own terrorist strategy) unsatisfactory.[52] If there appears to be no alternative to exit when voice is prohibited or ineffective, then the disenchanted member will try to reduce the strain of exit by persuading others to join the defection. Once on the outside, these critics will be extremely hostile to the parent organization, fomenting bitter inter-group rivalry. Violence ostensibly directed at outside enemies may really be meant to demonstrate the superior ardor of the new organization and to provide attractive incentives to recruits in a formative period.

These psychological findings provide tentative support for the "fight harder" hypothesis. The dissatisfied but ultimately loyal terrorist who forsakes exit to change the organization's political direction may resort to "creative innovation" under pressure. The combination of high barriers to exit with discontent may thus increase the adaptability rather than hasten the destruction of the organization. When intensely loyal members of a terrorist group cannot exit, failure to achieve the organization's stated purpose may only make them work harder.[53] Especially where nonpurposive incentives are strong, as they are likely to be, terrorists may react to adversity by devoting themselves more fervently to the group. In the case of redemptive organizations, members may even feel that their commitment is being tested by fate or a deity.

The behavioral differences between terrorist groups in competitive versus noncompetitive situations may have significant implications for the intensity of violence in a terrorist campaign. Under competitive conditions, where exit is possible, there should be less internal dissent. Yet, the leaders of organizations threatened by factionalism may have to devote their efforts to distinguishing the group from its competitors, in order to prevent defection to more active rivals. Competition may inspire escalation, as each group tries to outdo the other in violence in order not only to keep their members but to attract recruits. Certainly much Palestinian terrorism against Israel has been attributed to a dynamic of outbidding in extremism. On the other hand, where exit is easy but no competitors exist, small organizations are likely to proliferate. It may signify the weakness of solidary incentives, since exit is only likely to be painless where group cohesion is weak. In either case, the result may be competition by escalating extremism. Relationships within and between ter-

[52] Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty,* Appendix, pp. 146-55.
[53] Ibid.

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rorist organizations may have an innate tendency to move from monopoly to competition.

High versus low entrance fees may also affect the organization's viability. Groups such as the West German Red Army Fraction, for example, which required the total commitment of members who become professional terrorists, might find it harder to recover from decline than less structured groups like the Revolutionary Cells. Hirschman considers all terrorist organizations to be in this doomed category, as no organization can make itself completely immune to the possibilities of exit and voice. Where both outlets for dissatisfaction are blocked, the organization cannot survive long, because when discontent does surface openly it will be enormously strong.[54] Innovative responses to decline are the exception.

Conclusions

The organizational process approach to interpreting terrorist behavior assumes a complexity of motivation well beyond the strategy of challenging governments to effect radical change. It proposes that leaders of terrorist organizations struggle to maintain a viable organization. The incentives they offer members may require actions against the government regardless of the cost, *if* that cost is short of complete destruction of the organization. Factionalism and interorganizational rivalry may encourage escalation of the conflict with the government, intensifying violence even if the terrorist organizations are disintegrating through the exercise of exit or voice.

This perspective on terrorist behavior indicates that there may be a fundamental disparity between the outside world's perception of terrorists and their own self-perceptions. What the outside world perceives as "failure" may not appear as such to the terrorist organization. Most outside observers judge that the IRA has failed dismally in its effort to drive the British out of Northern Ireland. Its violence has resulted only in direct rule from Westminster and increased determination on the part of both the British government in London and the Protestants in Ulster. Yet, the IRA persists. Both sides may suffer from illusory perspectives of the stakes of the opponent.

There are also instructive lessons for democratic governments in this approach to terrorism. Policy should aim to make the organization less destructive and less cohesive rather than to defeat it militarily. The government must try to reduce the likelihood of violence by affecting the organization's structure of incentives. Offering new, nonviolent incentives,

[54] Ibid., p. 121.

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increasing opportunities for exit, or promoting the expression of internal dissent might hold promise. At the same time, the government should try to avoid a proliferation of new organizations or competition among rivals that involves escalating violence. Policy makers should be sensitive to the possibility of producing the sort of desperation which, in the absence of exit or voice or in the presence of intense loyalty and solidarity, leads terrorists to throw themselves into renewed and violent creativity.

The Italian experience is worth noting here. The apparent "repentance" of significant numbers of terrorists in response to offers of leniency from the Italian state enabled the police to act effectively against the Red Brigades. The offer of reduced prison sentences in exchange for information leading to the apprehension of other Red Brigades members seems to have coincided, perhaps fortuitously, with a period of disarray within the terrorist organization, when numerous members were questioning the group's purposes. The successful timing of this offer suggests that offering the possibility of exit to the aboveground world can work at a time of dissatisfaction and open expression of discontent.

Similarly, with regard to rewarding rather than punishing exit, governments might reconsider the wisdom behind the severe legal penalties for membership in terrorist organizations. The immediate reaction to this suggestion will surely be that increasing the costs of joining a terrorist organization deters prospective entrants. However, even if this is the case (and there is no proof that it is), the government may actually be helping the terrorist organization to establish the high entrance fees that make it difficult for terrorists to exit. Governments, after considering the situation of terrorist organizations, especially the existence of monopoly and the prospect of dissent and factionalism, should decide whether prohibiting exit is in the interest of reducing terrorism. It was to this end that governments in colonial wars often offered amnesty to rebels who surrendered.

Where incentives for many terrorists are non-purposive, the government may be able to offer substitutes. Financial rewards may be influential, for example, where incentives are material. For example, legislation proposed by the Reagan administration in 1984 contained the inducement of a $500,000 reward for information leading to the apprehension of terrorists. Policy models developed for dealing with criminal organizations or youth gangs may also be applicable in circumstances where purposive incentives are weak. However, given the nature of terrorist goals, the government will find it difficult to find satisfactory substitutes for purposive incentives. Governments may also discover that redressing the terrorists' grievances will not necessarily reduce the or-

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ganization's effectiveness in the short run. Organizations develop an independent momentum.

Nevertheless, a social base is useful to the terrorist organization and there is no reason to adopt policies that create opponents of the regime. It would probably be easier to affect recruitment (remembering that not all terrorist organizations are equally dependent on steady supplies of new members — this depends on organizational structure and on rates of attrition) and support functions by influencing the attitudes of sympathizers than by directly undermining the loyalty of indoctrinated activists. The incentive structures for sympathizers are probably weaker than those for active members. Barriers to both entry and exit are lower, yet there is also little occasion to exercise voice. Sympathizers have little direct control over the organization's decisions. An increase in their frustration might cause the organization's support base to crumble. The problem is to identify incentives for sympathizers. Personal satisfaction or reward must be largely vicarious; there is no close-knit community of believers to belong to. It is possible that, in addition to purposive incentives, sympathizers are attracted by the status that accrues to a terrorist "connection."

The organizational approach suggests that terrorist groups are strengthened or weakened as much from their own internal dynamics as from government counteractions. "Winning" in a conventional sense may not be the actual goal of terrorists, despite the military terminology most employ. The reward is in playing the game. Simply being able to stay in is sufficient for organizational maintenance.

REFLECTIONS ON THE RED BRIGADES

by DANIELA SALVIONI AND ANDERS STEPHANSON

In no Western country has terrorism acquired such systemic importance as it did in Italy in the late 1970s, a period now generally regarded as one of the darkest in that country's recent history.[1] Diffused violence

[1] Northern Ireland (though of course not a country) was the only other place where terrorism can be said to have achieved a comparable social impact. The Baader-Meinhof group in the Federal Republic of Germany played a central political role at certain points through actions like the Schleyer affair in 1977, but the state was throughout in firm control and sympathy for armed struggle never reached anywhere near the level it did in Italy. It is noteworthy, however, that there have recently been some signs in West Germany of the sort of violent rioting and disaffection that preceded and also characterized the Italian period in question; likewise, the Red Army Faction has shown itself capable of

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plagued society, and a plethora of predominantly left-wing groups dedicated to armed struggle dominated the political stage. Most important among these groups in longevity and efficiency was, without a doubt, the Red Brigades (*Brigate rosse,* BR), best known for their spectacular kidnapping and murder in 1978 of Aldo Moro, a former premier slated to become the next president. In examining the emergence and history of the BR up to the present, in light of recent revelations, we will argue that it is highly unlikely that the BR or any similar group will again achieve as profound an effect on society. Though acts of terrorism may well continue, the issue of armed struggle no longer resonates as it did in the 1970s: the moment for armed struggle, in short, has essentially been exhausted.

Understanding the Red Brigades and its specifically Italian trajectory entails an analysis of both internal and external factors. For obvious reasons, however, our focus will be on the group; the contextual aspect, being potentially open-ended, can only be adumbrated. In examining the BR itself, two things should be borne in mind. First, the leadership during the initial decade of the group's existence changed because of deaths and arrests but, nevertheless, remained within the small circle of the founders. This continuity enhanced the capacity of the BR to survive and regroup. The character of the founding members and the early history of the group is, therefore, vital to an understanding of its subsequent decline. Second, the BR violence was not mindless. On the contrary, it resulted from careful deliberation and strategic analysis: the BR said what it did, and did what it said. Few revolutionary groups have so willingly stated at such length their intentions and their rationale. Interminable documents of seemingly impenetrable prose and concepts must, therefore, be taken seriously. In a nutshell, one cannot understand the BR without a phenomenological understanding of its original and basic project.

The following brief sketch of the larger historical background may help illuminate the Italy that spawned the Red Brigades:

(1) There is a tradition in Italy of political violence, going back at least to the early 1800s with the anti-Austrian struggles of the Carbonari and later including various anarchist currents;

(2) The more immediate wartime experience of the anti-Fascist Resistance added to the tradition;

(3) Italy is a decentralized state, combining surviving elements from the Fascist period with a strong tradition of mass democracy;

(4) The legitimacy of Italy's political system has been dubious, having largely been controlled since 1947 by the Christian Democrats

staging a fair number of attacks, primarily against NATO targets. See the *New York Times,* October 2, 1985.

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(DC), a conglomeration of factions marked by "clientelism" and laborious compromises, and, thus, scarcely a polity of effective modernization;

(5) A powerful and non-revolutionary Communist party (PCI), despite the backing of anywhere between a quarter and a third of the electorate, had consistently been excluded from government, and, by 1969, was increasingly aiming to join a coalition government for the stated purpose of strengthening the existing system;

(6) Italy had experienced the anarchic transformation of its society in the 1950s and 1960s from semi-rural to industrial, entailing a vast migration of southerners to the north, the emergence of alienated mass-production workers, and subsequent social problems with which the state was singularly unfit to cope.

While all of the above is subject to dispute, it serves here to clarify our contextual premises.

The BR, founded in Milan in 1970, was an outgrowth of the radical student movement of 1968-69.[2] A complex series of organizational permutations lay behind it, but the most important elements stemmed from two groups of (former) northern Italian students: one (mainly sociologists) from Trento led by Renato Curcio, and the other from Reggio Emelia in which Alberto Franceschini was the most prominent. In 1969, they became part of the Metropolitan Political Collective in Milan, and it was from this experience that the Red Brigades was most directly to emerge. On the whole, these were students of middle-class or working-class background who had become part of the enormous expansion of the university system in the 1960s. There were notably few upper-class or upper-middle-class members.[3] But whatever their social roots, they were clearly not "marginal" people, social outcasts, as would often be the case with subsequent forms of left-wing terrorism. Nor, as is sometimes done, can their background simply be described as predominantly left-wing Catholic.[4] The Trento group contained a fair number of old Cath-

[2] The best accounts of the early BR are Alessandro Silj, *Never Again Without Rifles* (New York: Karz Publishers, 1979); Soccorso Rosso, *Brigate Rosse,* contains some early documents (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1976); Giorgio Bocca, *Il terrorismo italiano, 1970-1978* (Milan: Rizzoli, 1978); and idem. *Noi Terroristi* (Milan: Garzanti, 1985). The latter is an invaluable source, since Bocca has managed to correspond with and interview on a level of trust most of the significant members. For shorter but useful historical surveys, see Giorgio Galli, "Dietro Quei Delitti," *Panorama,* November 12, 1984; Paul Furlong, "Political Terrorism in Italy: Responses, Reactions and Immobilism," in J. Lodge, ed., *Terrorism: A Challenge to the State* (Oxford: M. Robertson, 1981); and Richard Drake, "The Red Brigades and the Italian Political Tradition," in Y. Alexander, K. A. Myers, eds., *Terrorism in Europe* (London: Croom Helm, 1982).

[3] On the social origins, see Silj, *Never Again,* passim, but particularly p. 20f.; and Bocca, *Il terrorismo,* p. 9f. To our knowledge, there has never been any extensive sociological study of the subject, but it is obvious that the founding members of the BR, with a few exceptions, were not at all bored sons and daughters of the rich, which was sometimes thought at the time.

[4] See Drake, "The Red Brigades," for an example of the Catholic argument. Silj, *Never Again,* ch. 14, is an effective refutation of this argument, of which the Communist Party [PCI], wishing to disassociate itself to the utmost from groups like the BR, was particularly fond.

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olics — some still practicing — but the Emelia group was chiefly of Communist parentage. Neither fact is surprising. Catholicism and the Communist party have traditionally been the two outlets for personal activism in Italy, and the BR's founders had an extensive history of such efforts.

Their ideological matrix was generally not very different from the large number of other extra-parliamentary left-wing groups in Europe at the time: revolutionary Marxism influenced by various Third World struggles and by Maoism, especially as perceived through the Cultural Revolution. Two things, however, should be noted here.

First, while the Metropolitan Political Collective, like other groups, considered itself an avant-garde, it did not define its primary task as the intervention into, and eventual leadership of, various spontaneous social and economic struggles; its objective, rather, was "the creation of organizational nuclei that place themselves on the level of the social problems as a whole" which might then "arrive at the unification" and "generalization of the clash . . ."[5] Having postulated an objective salient area for a "generalizing" avant-garde, the Collective consequently thought that space should be occupied "directly," by-passing the traditional Marxist-Leninist concept of an organically grown party mediating between the immediate needs of the working class and the struggle for power. The aim, in other words, was to create a relatively *separate* formation with the capacity to intervene independently.[6] This was to become and remain (to this day) a basic tenet in the strategic outlook of the Red Brigades, in a way the origin of both its strength and weakness.

Second, it is noteworthy that until this point Curcio had looked askance at guerrilla warfare in Italy, considering it unrealistic and a sign of petit-bourgeois delusion.[7] However, from late 1969 through to the spring of 1971, there was a gradual move towards clandestinity and reliance on preponderantly illegal means. The so-called Hot Autumn of 1969 was the catalyst that made the BR — as opposed to almost all their

[5] Quoted in Silj, *Never Again,* p. 105.

[6] This did not mean that the BR refused to engage in ordinary social struggles. On the contrary, at first they did precisely that. But it was always with the fundamental assumption that the primary aims were not in this sphere. Curcio, in a striking formulation of 1979, called the position of the BR vis-à-vis their constituency that of an "intern," "inside of real class movements" but condensing a general political program; that is, not concerned with the more immediate issues but with "those real, strategic interests which the *power positions* gained allow to place on the agenda." What these real interests happened to be was a problem which thus fell under the jurisdiction of the self-appointed avant-garde. See Renato Curcio, "Who is a Traitor?" *Semiotext(e),* 9, (1980).

[7] It can indeed be debated whether the subsequent attack on the state was ever truly conceived of as guerrilla warfare in any meaningful sense, even if one considers the urban setting, the original influence of the Tupamaros, and the fact that the BR themselves later used the term.

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European counterparts[8] — take this crucial step. That autumn was marked by ferocious strikes and occupations in the northern factories, partial judicial suppression of the extra-parliamentary groups through the resuscitation of certain penal codes emanating from Mussolini's time, and, above all, the presence of right-wing terrorism and the simultaneous threat of a right-wing coup — a threat the Italian public considered very real. Indeed, it was more than a figment of the imagination. There was no doubt on the part of the BR that a revolutionary and/or counter-revolutionary situation was imminent.

Right-wing terrorism dominated illegal politics in Italy during this early period: *Avanguardia Nazionale,* for example, committed fifty acts of terrorism in 1970 alone.[9] At the same time, the neo-Fascist movement gained some popularity, particularly in the impoverished south. In the election of 1972, Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI), the neo-Fascist party, pulled almost 9 percent of the vote. Rumors of a coup and of the involvement of the secret services with right-wing terrorism circulated widely and were partially substantiated as time went on.[10]

The BR participated at the outset in social questions like the Milanese campaign for free mass transportation, but, slipping further into the underground, they soon moved on to "justificational" violence; that is, retribution for what they considered injustices against the working class. In essence, this type of action was similar to occurrences inside and outside the northern factories ever since the 1960s: burning some executive's car, various forms of vandalism, not much personal violence. As Franceschini puts it now: "We, the children of the PCI, had already taken up the armed struggle in the 1960s: nightly eruptions into the factories, spray-paint slogans on walls, an odd gun, a couple of Molotovs, a war song for the dead of Reggio Emelia . . ." [11] Their numbers were exceedingly small. At the Pirelli factories in Milan, for instance, there were perhaps ten members who were generally known among the work force. By 1972, when the organization began to distinguish between

[8] Curcio met with the French neo-Maoist group *La Gauche Proletarienne* (whose direction was similar to the embryonic BR) and with Andreas Baader in Paris in 1970. While Baader and Curcio were convinced of the necessity for clandestinity and armed struggle, the French were opposed, arguing that it would never be successful. This is somewhat ironic since the GP was then in the process of being outlawed by the French government and thus had more immediate cause than the others to resort to arms. See Bocca, *Il terrorismo,* p. 19. On the GP, see A. Belden Fields, "French Maoism," in S. Sayres et al., eds., *The Sixties Without Apology* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).

[9] Bocca, *Il terrorismo,* p. 52.

[10] See Silj, *Never Again,* introduction; Bocca *Il terrorismo,* ch. 4. For an example of the sort of scenario anticipated, in this case inspired by the Greek colonels, see the *New York Times,* December 7, 8, 10, 1969. Various figures within the security apparatus were eventually shown to have been connected with plans for a coup, and the relation with right-wing terrorism was also proved. The PCI, during the period 1969-1974, called a national alert (signalling to its cadres to expect an immediate right-wing coup) at least three times.

[11] Quoted in Bocca, *Noi Terroristi,* p. 17.

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regulars and non-regulars, there were about fifteen regulars in Milan, Turin, and Padua; at FIAT in Turin, there were no more than ten regulars and non-regulars altogether.

The first abduction took place that year. A manager of the Sit Siemens factory in Milan was taken away for half an hour to be photographed and interrogated. Other similarly ephemeral actions followed. A lengthier, more serious action in December 1973 targeted a personnel director of FIAT, who was kidnapped for the purpose of highlighting the firing of workers. Yet, there seemed to be a limit to the potential success of this sort of thing. While the workers tended to sympathize with certain actions of the BR, there was no mass movement to speak of. Facing that fact, the BR broadened its horizon. Defining the enemy as the "Multinational Imperialist State" (*Stato Imperialista Multinazionale,* "SIM" in BR terminology), or more precisely, the Italian incarnation of this structure, the group concluded that the problem of state power was the real issue. Tactically, the idea was to show the working class by example that armed struggle was feasible and the only means by which to achieve a Socialist revolution.

Though half a world away, the Chilean coup of 1973 had a profound impact on Italian politics. The situation was deemed from left to right to bear striking similarity to Italy: both Chile and Italy, for example, had big Christian Democratic parties and manifested the potential, realized in the latter case, of a right-wing coup.[12] The BR, for its part, saw this as an opportunity to create an opening to the PCI, which it still considered, as it stated in a contemporary document, a "great democratic force."[13] There were hopes of becoming the Italian version of "MIR," that is, the most radical part of Allende's Popular Front. The PCI, meanwhile, read the Chilean experience in opposite fashion: instead of aiming for any putative leftist unity, the party decided to step up qualitatively its efforts to court the Christian Democrats, thereby creating a unified coalition for the defense of the existing system. Indeed, in the measured opinion of the PCI, the BR were, if not actually agents of the right, at least serving that objective function. Thus, the Red Brigades found themselves completely separated from the left-wing of the legitimate political spectrum. At this point, they began to move from local violence with its immediate and specific targets to what would become their hallmark, the attempt to destroy "the military-bureaucratic machine of the state" and the existing political power.

The notion of a "SIM," the Multinational Imperialist State that the BR had anointed their fundamental enemy, may strike the neutral

[12] See the *New York Times,* September 15, 1973.
[13] Quoted in Bocca, *Il terrorismo,* p. 57.

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observer today like a pronounced case of demonology, but, semantics aside, events at the time seemed, at least to the *Brigatisti,* to lend credence to this apparently meaningless abstraction. The oil crisis of 1973 had ignited the worst economic crisis in the West since the war, and it descended on Italy with greater force than elsewhere. The state and many municipalities came close to bankruptcy, the annual inflation rate reached 25 percent, and the ensuing unemployment was widespread. Italian politicians found themselves, hat in hand, having to ask the United States, West Germany, and the IMF for emergency loans. Conditions were laid down, above all that the PCI be barred from any role in government. Meanwhile, a long row of scandals involving leading public figures was beginning to unravel, ironically to no small degree the by-product of congressional hearings in Washington. It was disclosed, for example, that the United States had pumped large funds into, primarily, the Christian Democratic party ever since the war; the investment during the election campaign of 1972 alone had amounted to some ten million dollars. Similar payments had been made by some of the more notable multinationals such as Exxon, Shell, and ITT. Finally, the Lockheed scandal featured direct personal bribery of prominent politicians (and eventually led to the resignation of the country's president). In sum, this was not one of the better moments for the political establishment in Italy.[14]

Given the outlook and the circumstances, it is not wholly incomprehensible, therefore, that the BR should have concluded that the Italian government was little more than an agent of powerful international forces. Perhaps more significant, it was believed, along the lines of classical Leninist theory, that Italy had become the weakest link in the international system and would, in the retrospective words of BR-founder Roberto Ognibene, "go the way of Lebanon, the dissolution of national power."[15]

The kidnapping of Mario Sossi initiated the attack on the state. Sossi, the state prosecutor in Genoa, was held for a month and then released after certain Maoist prisoners had been granted passports and the right to go to Algeria, North Korea, or Cuba. Eventually, this deal was thwarted, because the government, with the assistance of the PCI, managed to make the appointed countries refuse the prisoners' entry.

[14] On the economic problems, see the *New York Times,* June 10; September 1, 1974; March 8, 14, 1975. While the West Germans officially seemed to have been more concerned with the level of Italian public expenditure, the Americans made no bones about the central issue, namely, the exclusion of the PCI. On the financial support, governmental and corporate, of Italian parties and politicians, see ibid., February 12, 1975, May 16, 17, June 2, December 30, 1975. There was even a report that Exxon had given the PCI US$ 86,000 but this could never be confirmed. The beginning of these disclosures lay in Senator Fulbright's interrogation of the former US ambassador to Italy, G. A. Martin, during the latter's confirmation hearings in May 1973 for the post in South Vietnam (ibid., May 9, 13, 1973). Later, it transpired that Martin, against the express views of the CIA, had funnelled large funds to General Miceli, then head of military intelligence but arrested in 1975 for having planned a coup in 1970.

[15] Quoted in Bocca, *Noi Terroristi,* p. 70.

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This mixed success earned the BR national attention for the first time, and its membership, including non-regulars, grew to about 300. One result was a certain inevitable bureaucratization: a strategic command was instituted, the individual Brigades were organized into city columns, while control was kept firmly in the hands of the regulars via an ingenious form of secret service. However, it also made the notoriously lackadaisical and inefficient state[16] pursue them with greater force and energy, pre-eminently in the formidable shape of General Dalla Chiesa. In his first anti-BR campaign in 1974, Dalla Chiesa managed to capture both Curcio and Franceschini. Several other important leaders, among them Ognibene, met with a similar fate soon afterwards. A year later, Mara Cagol — Curcio's wife and a column commander — was shot to death.[17] By the end of 1975, there were no more than fifteen regulars left in the Red Brigades.

This, clearly, was a critical juncture. Leadership now devolved onto a second tier of founding members: Mario Moretti, Lauro Azzolini, Franco Bonisoli and Barbara Balzarani. As Azzolini now sees this moment:

> . . . after the fall of so many comrades, our regular force reduced to 15 people, Moretti, Bonisoli and I reflected at length and we arrived at the following alternative which to you will seem crass but which we necessarily had to face: either we conduct this war seriously, or we might as well stop here. Either we decide to win, or we are already defeated. Having taken the military and strategic decision to make war against the state, seriously, to win, all else followed: the political analysis, including SIM, became a corollary and a justification for the military machine . . . The logistical front became the true center of the organization, and that was where we were, Moretti, Bonisoli and myself.[18]

Less interested (partly by necessity) in ideology than Curcio and Franceschini, the new leaders were primarily organizational people. Though his real role did not become known until 1980, Moretti was the key person among them.[19] It was Moretti who later masterminded the Moro kidnapping. Originally an electronics worker at the Sit Siemens factory in Milan, he had been arguing for organization and efficiency from the beginning and the BR under his leadership became precisely that, organized and efficient. As a minor but indicative example, his detailed bookkeeping of the operation included expenses for five-cent payphone calls.[20]

[16] Not only were the police (then and now) organized into various competing and badly coordinated structures; they had also followed a policy, as Franceschini pithily puts it, of "letting boiling pots cool off by themselves" (quoted in Bocca, *Noi Terroristi,* p. 58).

[17] Curcio had indeed been freed from his dilapidated prison in February 1975 by a BR-contingent led by Cagol; however, her death sent him into a debilitating depression, and he was recaptured in 1976.

[18] Quoted in Bocca, *Noi Terroristi,* p. 132.

[19] Moretti was known as a leading member, but not as the organizational head. It was only after Fabrizio Peci's capture in 1980 and his ensuing accounts that this was properly understood.

[20] *New York Times,* March 17, 1978.

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More important, the BR became a military force of considerable striking power; even while Moro was held hostage, the BR executed no fewer than forty terrorist acts in a month.

Emphasis, as Azzolini pointed out above, thus lay less on the politico-strategic problems and more on the logistic side of things. At the outset, there was, in addition to the expanded logistical apparatus, a political front directed towards selected social sectors on the outside. In 1976, however, Moretti, without consulting the old imprisoned leaders, eliminated this last external link. Meanwhile, every aspect of the organization — armament, training, finances — was compartmentalized, and contacts with the outside, such as the reliance on the criminal world for weapons, were cut to an absolute minimum. For this self-imposed isolation from the external world, Moretti was highly criticized; but he had understood that if there was to be, according to his concept, a war on the state, the organization had to be rigid and virtually closed to outsiders. Even at the height of their notoriety in the late 1970s, therefore, the BR tried, if not always successfully, to avoid extensive contacts with sympathizers and to keep recruitment exceptionally limited and selective. This made the organization hard to infiltrate and, thereby, also made intelligence-gathering, the most significant factor in combating terrorist groups, exceptionally difficult for a long time.

It soon became evident that the BR had raised the stakes in no uncertain manner. In 1976, Francesco Coco, a Genovese judge who had taken a hard line during the Sossi affair and actively worked to undo the deal for his liberation, was shot to death along with his escort.[21] Apart from the unintended murder of two neo-Fascists in 1974, this was the first time the BR shot to kill. Knee-capping was otherwise the favored method of attack. Targets centered on magistrates, industrialists and managers, but included journalists and eventually the police as well. Equally important, in order to hit the "heart of the state," the BR moved south and, for the first time, established themselves in the nation's capital. Here they found themselves faced not only with the hated center of party power, but also, much to their surprise, with a growing and enormously vigorous countercultural movement, which "hit us like a landslide of savage youth," as Curcio recently put it.[22] This movement was to have a profound effect on the BR, but the primary confrontation in Rome was with the party structure of government, which the BR seemed to confuse with the "heart of the state."

The PCI had been the chief beneficiary of the various political scandals and began to appear, without exaggeration, as the party of good

[21] Ibid., June 9, 1976.
[22] Quoted in Bocca, *Noi Terroristi*, p. 186.

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government.[23] In the local and general elections of, respectively, 1975 and 1976, it registered unprecedented gains, peaking in the latter with more than 34 percent of the popular vote. The party read this as a vindication of its vigorous push for the "Historical Compromise," i.e., to govern with the DC. The putative partner resisted, although a faction within the party thought such a solution was necessary to rehabilitate the economy and retain order. On the other hand, the 1976 elections had earned the PCI a crucial number of parliamentary seats, thus making government virtually impossible without some kind of agreement. While the Communists were never allowed formally to enter the government, a de facto alliance was erected. National Unity — as the PCI termed its support of the DC's emergency government in July 1977 — took the form of Communist abstention, or actual support, on parliamentary votes in exchange for concessions on certain policies and wider freedom at the local level. (This arrangement was to last until the elections of 1979 when the PCI lost a great number of votes and returned to opposition. The entire experiment was somewhat of a failure in that the party received far less in terms of specific policy requests than expected.) At any rate, the regime came to represent almost 95 percent of the established political forces, not to be confused with the public itself.[24] There was, thus, virtually no viable opposition, rendering official politics somewhat a closed chapter.

This picture was clear enough to the BR; what complicated things was the emergence, outside it, of a set of exceptionally amorphous social movements. The "Movement," as it became known, included students with no job prospects, a mass of unemployed, underemployed or illegally employed, frustrated intellectuals, feminists, workers opposed to their unions, and a growing number of generally marginalized people. The unifying characteristic, insofar as it existed, was youth.[25]

[23] *New York Times,* March 24, 1976.

[24] Mass protests against austerity and other problems were an indication that the public were not as unified in its support of the *partitocrazia.*

[25] The best account of this amorphous movement can be found in *Semiotexte(e),* 9, (1980). Though heavily nihilistic, the Movement also had its creative side to the point that when participants now speak about it they often take recourse to poetry. For instance, they practiced autonomous price setting of electricity in entire neighborhoods, and they experimented with countercultural life styles. The Movement did not have one philosophy nor a leader. Those who attempted to give it both, such as the infamous Tony Negri, had to resign themselves to making ex post facto conceptualizations. However, a broad perspective may be pieced together for the sake of underlining the demarcation between the BR and the Movement. The latter did not aim to take over the state; nor did it have any long-range project. Rather, it focused on immediate needs, but with a twist, as evident from their slogans: "to exit from irrelevance"; "satisfaction of needs and the right to luxury"; "Discourse, language must be eradicated from the fetishism of normality, from the prison of no sense spoken, to recompose itself as delight, as a desiring machine *against* power" (emphasis added, Bocca, *Noi Terroristi* p. 129). The BR were morally disturbed by this bewildering eruption.

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The roots of this ferment were obvious: economic crisis, unemployment, horrendously malfunctional universities, and lack of a legitimate outlet for political protest. At the same time, the parties, including the PCI, had been slow to understand the cultural changes in society — changes manifested with great clarity in the national referendum on divorce in 1974 where the presumed conservatism of the electorate had been thoroughly disproven.[26]

There was a dialectic of violence in this protest movement of 1976-77. While the government instituted increasingly repressive laws — eliminating search and arrest warrants, investing the police with extensive freedom in the use of firearms, allowing years of imprisonment without trial for certain charges — the Movement responded with very violent demonstrations, Molotov cocktails, occupations, "expropriations" in department stores, and shootings of right-wing figures. The PCI did not escape: its union leader was chased out of the University of Rome. Bloody street battles became common between the Movement and the police, and between right- and left-wing youths.

The BR regarded this eruption ambivalently. On the one hand, the Movement clearly opened terrain for further confrontations. On the other hand, it was equally clearly a volatile and "spontaneist" lot of people, who could not easily be harnessed into a tightly organized army. To the ascetic BR, they seemed eminently decadent. Moreover, as a result of the dialectic of violence and polarization in society, by late 1977 parts of the Movement had evolved into groups whose violence was indistinguishable from that of the BR. The most prominent among these was Prima Linea (PL), a group of countercultural marginals who in due course became far more ferocious and less discriminate in their operations than the BR. True to its origins, however, the PL was not nearly as well organized and accordingly suffered a sharp demise when state suppression increased. In the meantime, there was a good deal of violence: in 1975, there had been 475 acts of terrorism; in 1977, the figure reached 1,806 and the year after 2,725.[27]

In other words, the BR now faced competition. For a while, the relentless attack on magistrates, industrialists, managers, journalists, political and social figures continued, either in the form of knee-capping or murder.[28] Even a Communist union official was knee-capped. A vicious cycle had thus taken hold of the Brigades: the more they perfected their apparatus, the more isolated they became, and the more isolated they

[26] The PCI had opposed not only legalized abortion but also, at the outset, making an issue of divorce. The reason was that the party was making a heavy effort to court the Catholic vote.

[27] Drake, "The Red Brigades."

[28] The BR committed an estimated sixty-eight knee-cappings between 1975 and 1980; Prima Linea, during the same period, committed twenty-three. Ibid.

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became, the more they had to prove themselves through military means as the true guide of the "incipient revolution." After a year of preparation, the Brigades abducted and murdered Aldo Moro.

The Moro operation on March 16, 1978, was executed with such military precision that it was rumored to have been done by foreigners. Moro's five bodyguards were killed and for the ensuing fifty-five days he was imprisoned in a Rome apartment while the combined police forces of Italy searched everywhere.[29] What the BR wanted, above all, was public recognition from the keepers of the state, the DC, in order to consolidate their status as a revolutionary force.

The state as a whole did not respond to the event; the parties and the other institutions, from the Pope to the unions, did. True to its nature, the state reflected the parties rather than the other way around. Along with the PCI, the DC absolutely refused to negotiate, which, in view of its many factions and conflicting interests, was surprising. Even a group of self-proclaimed "friends of Moro" publicly dismissed him upon his writing from captivity in an attempt to arrange a deal for his release. Only the Socialists made a futile attempt at compromise.

Eight days prior to the kidnapping, Curcio, Franceschini, and forty-seven other *Brigatisti,* chained and caged in an army barracks, were finally put on trial in Turin. Delayed for two years because of BR intimidation both inside and outside prison, the trial only took place upon the insistence of the magistrates and the PCI — both had a stake in it, the former because so many of their colleagues had been targets and the latter because it felt its legitimacy threatened by association. Lengthy prison sentences, the longest for Curcio and Franceschini, were eventually passed.

No state recognition being forthcoming, the BR killed Moro and symbolically left the body in Via Caetani between the party headquarters of the DC and the PCI. The organization was now at its peak with seven functional columns and more than 300 regulars and nonregulars.[30] A considerable number of revolutionary youths began to seek entry into BR or the other clandestine groups like Prima Linea. Again, this was a mixed blessing, for, as one original BR member states today with some degree of dismay, ". . . after Moro, there arrived the residuals of disastrous schools, the children of nobody."[31] Despite Moretti's circumspection, there was an inevitable decline in discipline and efficiency.

[29] On the Moro affair, see G. Selva, E. Marcucci, *Il Martiro di Aldo Moro* (Bologna: Capelli, 1978), a chronology; Giorgio Bocca, *Moro: Una Tragedia Italiana* (Milan: V. Bompiano, 1978), a good selection of documents; and Leonardo Sciascia, *L'affair Moro* (Palermo: Celerio, 1978).

[30] Bocca, *Noi Terroristi,* p. 216.

[31] Ibid., p. 231.

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More important, nothing much of substance had been achieved, and the BR found itself, in Franceschini's words, "without prospects." The system of party government had not come apart; on the contrary, it had solidified precisely around the necessity of preserving the existing regime against terrorism. The "heart of the state," which the BR conceived itself to be attacking, had proved an elusive enemy. Moro had impressed upon Moretti that the SIM really did not exist and thereby caused a certain ideological confusion among his captors. Moreover, it was far from clear what could be done to top the Moro affair: lesser acts would seem ineffective. As a member of the PL said, "occupying houses didn't make sense anymore."[32] Both the PL and the BR continued to carry out their usual sorts of attacks at a steady pace, but these now seemed mechanical, not to say senseless even in their own terms. The BR, in addition, proved incapable of ideological reorientation at this point. Not an ideologue, Moretti had essentially functioned since 1975 in a framework established by others. The strategic resolution attached to the Moro operation had to be composed by the imprisoned members, though they had not been informed about it beforehand.

Throughout the latter half of the 1970s, the BR had also rapidly lost what ground it had within the northern factories. Workers, while sometimes critical of the unions for their cooperation with the employers, were put on the defensive by industrial restructuring and the economic crisis. Knee-capping managers had no effect. In 1979, for example, FIAT fired workers suspected of extremism, although before it had been exceptionally difficult to fire anyone. A year later, the Genoa column of the BR, too, had definitely been beaten, at the very moment when it had finally made some inroads among unionists. Only the newly reformed column in Milan had any relations with the factory, but this group proved unable to accept Moretti's hierarchy, and by 1980 it broke away.

At that time, Moretti's leadership was challenged by a fairly new member, Giorgio Senzani, a professor of criminology, who had risen quickly in the ranks because he was one of the few capable of writing theoretical documents. His conflict with Moretti concerned a question that always plagued the BR in one form or another: how exactly to relate to external spontaneous struggles. While Moretti liked the idea of a connection in theory, on organizational grounds he was deeply apprehensive; Senzani, on the other hand, believed it was central. By 1980, Senzani had moved on to Naples where he created a column of his own in accordance with his concept. This group, conceived as a guerrilla party, intervened in various immediate social issues. Disorderly and risky activ-

[32] Ibid., p. 240.

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ism, acts of "proletarian justice," and involvement with prison struggles came to mark Senzani's operation. All of this was anathema to Moretti, though several imprisoned leaders, who had done some political work in prison themselves, actually sided with Senzani.[33]

Moretti himself was apprehended in April 1981, in a manner so simple that it would seem to indicate an irremediable pessimism: he no longer cared. By then there were signs that effective central control had broken down. Factors other than internal conflicts, however, had been more instrumental in damaging the organization. Dalla Chiesa, with the support of all parties, had been appointed anti-terrorist czar in 1979 and immediately had begun a wide-ranging campaign, a campaign partly reflected in the statistical decline in terrorist acts from 2,139 that year to 833 in 1980. His ultimate success resulted largely from the capture of one man, Fabrizio Peci of the Turin column, in February 1980.[34] Peci, unlike all previously arrested *Brigatisti,* chose to talk in return for a lighter sentence.[35] His information led to the capture of countless others, many of whom actually followed his example of *pentitismo* (recanting), now that it had been set. Acute losses in personnel and severe pressure in this situation forced the BR to rely on untrained youth, which only rendered the organization more porous than it already had become. In a last-ditch attempt to stem the tide, the Brigades killed Peci's brother, but to little avail.

Setbacks notwithstanding, on December 14, 1980, Senzani's group kidnapped Giovanni D'Urso, a high-ranking magistrate of the Ministry of Justice, and held him for slightly over a month.[36] Revolts erupted in various prisons where the BR were incarcerated, and the outside organization demanded that the most infamous high-security prison be shut. Ironically the state accepted the exchange: this for someone who had revealed important secrets to his captors, while Moro, who had divulged very little, had not been saved. The BR then assassinated General Galvagli, whose secret role had been described in minute detail by the hostage. Though this was probably the last unified operation of the BR in its traditional form, it was also a means by which Senzani could assert his authority; it had been devised in part to attract the favor of the BR prison population. Clearly, however, it was far from the high aims of the Moro affair.

[33] In 1979, on the other hand, Curcio and the other "historicals" had supported Moretti against similar charges launched by Valerio Morucci and Adriana Faranda, leading members of Roman origin, who were caught that year and wrote a public attack on the orthodox position from an angle not too different from what Senzani would later advocate. See *Semiotexte(e),* 9, (1980).

[34] Drake, "The Red Brigades."

[35] Peci wrote a book about his experiences, *Io, L'infame* (Milan: Mondadori, 1983).

[36] *New York Times,* December 14, 15, 16, 1980; January 14, 15, 1981.

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Neo-Fascists bombed the Bologna train station in the summer of 1980, and eighty-five people lost their lives. Public opinion tended then to believe that leftist terrorism was being superseded by its right-wing counterpart. Kidnapping D'Urso dispelled much of this illusion; and about a year later an unprecedented action showed beyond doubt that there was still some life in the BR. On December 18, 1981, the American NATO General James L. Dozier was kidnapped by the Venetian column, headed by Antonio Savasta.[37] The communiqué released two days later did not, symptomatically, contain any demands: it merely stressed world issues. The fairly haphazard manner of execution and the obvious lack of a conceptual framework for the act indicated that the BR was in a state of relative confusion and crisis. While Dozier was still captive, Senzani and ten others were arrested. Aside from Barbara Balzarani, about whose position nothing much is known at this point, there was no one left in the organization who could assume leadership. Nine days later Dozier's prison was discovered, the general freed, and the culprits apprehended.

For two years after this dual setback in January 1982, the BR maintained a very low profile. In February 1984, they resurfaced through the murder of an American, Leamon Hunt. The target was highly uncharacteristic — a diplomat connected with the supervision of the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement — and so was the ensuing announcement, cosigned with a Lebanese group, and issued both in Genoa and Beirut. The BR had always had good contacts with the Palestinians, but the Hunt murder has never been cleared up. There is still some doubt whether this was a BR action proper or something conceived and perhaps carried out by Middle Eastern forces.[38]

This new international aspect, though sinister, was probably yet another sign of a thorough-going crisis for the BR. In a domestic situation of ideological and organizational confusion, it would have been natural to seek support and renewed conviction outside Italy. Whatever the efforts in this direction, they remained, nevertheless, half-hearted and subject to internal criticism. Indeed, the BR never became integrated into the so-called Euro-terrorist framework of 1984-85.[39] Perhaps the best evidence of this was their only act of spectacular violence after the Hunt affair, namely, the shooting of Professor Ezio Tarantelli in March 1985. The murder marked a return to more traditional targets — so did the two strategic resolutions connected with it — and, therefore, demands some detailed attention.

[37] Ibid., December 19, 20, 1981.
[38] See John Newhouse, "A Freemasonry of Terrorism," *The New Yorker*, July 8, 1985.
[39] S. Acciari, M. Scialoja, "L'Alleanza del Terrore," *L'Espresso*, February 17, 1985.

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In the eighteen months after the Hunt assassination, the actions of the BR were few and unimpressive: four bank robberies, two of them unsuccessful, and an unplanned police shooting.[40] Then, on March 26, 1985, Professor Tarantelli was shot and killed while leaving this office at the University of Rome. The weapon used was typical of the Red Brigades, a Czech Skorpion submachine gun, and they claimed responsibility for the deed in a document of some seventy pages. The identikit portraits of the two assailants, pieced together from reports by the forty student witnesses, did not correspond to any known terrorists. The act was as unexpected as the target was intelligently selected: with one stroke, the BR was back on the front pages and at the center of the Italian political debate.

Tarantelli was a paradoxical figure, in the Italian context a "reform intellectual." Attached to no particular party, he was known, as many like him, to vote for the Communist party; yet he also ran a research center partly financed by the Employers' Association, served as adviser to the Catholic union CISL, and was connected to the Bank of Italy. He was married to an American and had a connection with MIT. Most important, he was closely associated with the idea to modify the *scala mobile,* the system of wage indexation that continually correlates wages with the inflation rate.[41]

The Craxi government unilaterally had decreed changes in this system in 1984. The PCI, in response, called for a referendum on the matter. By choosing Tarantelli as a target, the BR not only put itself back on the map, but also instantly heated up what till then had not been a particularly vigorous political campaign. Craxi, for instance, immediately declared this to be an attack on his program of reconciliation and progress, and suggested that those opposed to it (meaning the PCI) were in essence on the side of the terrorists. Many public figures, in a reversal of their long-held distancing from both the state and terrorism, condemned this politicizing of the murder — saying that it only played into the hands of the subversives — but also engaged in some of the most outspoken attacks against the deed itself.[42]

The target need not have been such a surprise. The BR had issued a strategic resolution (#19) a year earlier on account of the Craxi decree, which, it was claimed, would provide an opportunity for recruitment of new cadres among workers and the unemployed. One aim was

[40] Sue Moran, "The Red Brigades' Assassination of Economist Ezio Tarantelli," *TVI Journal,* Spring 1985.

[41] This sketch of Tarantelli is based on conversations with three different people, who knew him reasonably well. See also S. Acciari, P.V. Buffa, "Contro Chi?" *L'Espresso,* April 7, 1985.

[42] *Antigone,* 2, April-May 1985.

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thus "to hit certain trade union spheres."[43] Subsequent documents specified the unions and targets below the very top who did not enjoy armed protection. *Resolution #19* also contained a detailed analysis of the internal BR conflict, which had resulted in the victory of the "militarist" line (advocating "the intensification of the armed struggle as part of a long-term war," in other words, a straightforward reiteration of the original neo-Maoist standpoint of the BR) over the "movementist" minority, which stood for a less militarized and more political type of strategy. The resolution also castigated the most recent phase in the organization's history, particularly with respect to the Dozier defeat, for being based on a "strategy of retreat."

The "new BR," as they dubbed themselves here, specifically attacked elements seeking to "revise and liquidate the political conquests of the last 15 years." Although references to the problem of the imprisoned were curiously absent, the document suggestively emphasized things Italian such as the aforementioned unions, in contrast to any number of conceivable international issues.

The Tarantelli document, *Strategic Resolution #20,* further elucidated the points of the previous tract. It targeted people and institutions that make possible the functioning of "the equilibrium of forces" and "the new social pact," for which one may read the reform-minded middle in particular. In their possible future targets, they consequently include: "Those who work in politico-economic projects, the unions, the *Confindustria* (Employers' Association), and even the Communist Party. . . ." The BR clearly believe that Italy is in a revolutionary situation, and that they are implementing the beginning of the armed insurrection. What is particularly striking about all this — the widening target and references to recruitment notwithstanding — is how faithful it is to the orthodox BR precepts of earlier periods.

Though some BR leaflets have recently appeared inside FIAT, the Brigades remain isolated, but not without striking force. No one knows very much about their present form. During the post-1981 decline, they suffered least damage in Rome, where an estimated fifty regulars and non-regulars were believed to live at the time of the Hunt assassination.[44] In view of the handful of bank robberies, the group presumably has something of a logistic base, money, and weapons. But it is becoming increasingly difficult to gather information about BR activities since, as a

[43] Quotes from *Strategic Resolutions* 19 and 20 are mainly from *La Stampa,* March 29, 30, April 1, 1985; *Corriere della Sera,* March 30, 1985; *L'Unita,* March 30, 1985; *L'Espresso,* April 7, 1985. For a general survey of later Italian terrorism, see Vittorfranco Pisano, "Terrorism and Security: the Italian experience," U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee of the Judiciary, *Report of the Subcommittee on Terrorism and Security,* 98th Congr. 2nd Sess. November 1984.

[44] Sandro Acciari, "I prossimi anni di piombo," *L'Espresso,* April 15, 1984.

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result of the *pentiti,* the compartmentalization of the organization has been driven to an extreme. In 1984, for example, around thirty BR members were arrested but even those who chose to talk actually knew very little. Furthermore, their clandestinity no longer relies on physical isolation but seems mainly to take the form of camouflage within a wide circle of extreme leftists.

The last known leader of the "historic" BR, Barbara Balzarani, was finally captured in the summer of 1985. Her role since the time of Moretti's demise has not been clear, and the effects of her arrest are not readily predictable. Nonetheless, we have stressed that the systemic resonance of the BR exhausted itself rapidly after the Moro operation. There were, as we have outlined, several internal reasons for the decline: theoretical dilapidation, military problems, and, above all, the imprisonment the entire historic leadership. But while the BR now cannot have the same overall force they commanded in the 1970s, there is no reason to believe that they will have a diminished capacity for violence. After all, terrorism can be a fairly economical way of making oneself heard; it only took two persons on a motorbike with a machine gun to kill Tarantelli.

Yet, there are contextual conditions that diminish the prospects of another rise in the political importance of the BR. The inspiring international liberation struggles have both declined precipitously in numbers and ceased to be models. Concomitantly, the economic and social conditions of Italy today no longer produce such great popular dissatisfaction. On the political level, moreover, the state emerged from the 1970s in strengthened form. It gained a measure of legitimacy both through its triumph over terrorism and by apparently becoming more representative. The smaller parties were given a larger say and the state ceased to seem like the property of the DC. Likewise, the PCI moved back into opposition, became more open to new issues, and absorbed much of the previously vociferous extra-parliamentary left. There is a wide consensus within this left now, as opposed to 1977, that armed struggle is absolutely a dead end. Perhaps worst of all for the BR, however, people got used to terrorism: it lost its shock value and became business as usual. The absence of terrorism, ironically, achieved greater media coverage than the isolated attacks themselves.

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WILL TERRORISTS GO NUCLEAR?*

by BRIAN M. JENKINS

Several cities, including my own, have been destroyed by terrorists with nuclear weapons. Others have been held hostage to the whims of political and religious fanatics. Vigilant government agents, sometimes armed only with luck, have foiled schemes of mass destruction on dozens of occasions; there have been numerous close calls. We live on borrowed time. All on the pages of fiction. For novelists and screenwriters, the possibility of nuclear terrorism has provided a potent source of inspiration. It combines the two darkest fears of our era: fear of nuclear destruction and fear of increasing terrorism.

The speculation is not confined to fiction. Others besides novelists have warned of the dangers of nuclear terrorism. Some of these warnings are based upon sober analysis; much of the popular speculation falls within the realm of sensationalism.

The motives of the authors also vary. Some are concerned with the adequacy of security measures surrounding nuclear facilities. Some worry that an adequate level of security cannot be attained without authoritarian methods of social control that are incompatible with a free society; if not for the public at large, at least for the employees of the nuclear industry, whose lives are increasingly subjected to close scrutiny and irritating security measures as attention focuses on the potential threat posed by "insiders." Others, who oppose nuclear programs to begin with, see the threat of nuclear terrorism as one way to increase public anxiety and resistance to nuclear programs.

As is often the case in our media-rich society, the line between fact and fiction blurs. In one case, the co-author of a best-selling novel about nuclear terrorism narrated a segment about the subject on a popular television news show. At the end, the viewer was not sure which part of the broadcast was fiction and which part was fact.

Whether their opinions are molded by paperback potboilers or the dried fruit of research, many people believe that nuclear terrorism of some sort is likely, and may be inevitable. Reflecting the results of a poll conducted among 1,346 opinion leaders in the United States, George Gallup, Jr., in his recent book *Forecast 2000* wrote that "while a war between the superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, is a

* This paper was prepared for the Conference on International Terrorism: The Nuclear Dimension sponsored by the Nuclear Control Institute, at the Sheraton-Carlton, Washington, D.C. on June 24-26, 1985. A number of my colleagues and friends provided comments and advice in the preparation of my previous essays on the topic as well as this one. I would like especially to thank Konrad Kellen, Victor Gilinsky, Ariel Merari, and Paul Leventhal.

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real cause for concern, [a disastrous nuclear incident involving terrorists in this country] seems to me to be the most imminent danger."

But will terrorists go nuclear? Ten years ago I was asked to tackle this question. The essay I wrote was unabashedly speculative.[1] Fortunately for society (although a problem for the researcher), there was little to go on. The historical record provided no evidence that any terrorist group had ever made any attempt to acquire nuclear material for use in an explosive or dispersal device. Apart from a few incidents of sabotage in France and the brief seizure of a nuclear reactor under construction in Argentina, political extremists had not attacked nuclear facilities. No criminal or terrorist group had demonstrated or claimed that it possessed nuclear material. If members of any such group had ever seriously discussed the option of going nuclear, I knew of no such discussion.

There had been bomb threats against nuclear facilities, vandalism, token acts of violence, low-level sabotage, minor thefts of nonfissionable material. There had been nuclear threats, most of which could easily be dismissed as puerile hoaxes. In sum, the history of nuclear incidents up to 1975 provided no convincing evidence that more serious incidents were likely. As the nuclear industry expanded, we could anticipate that the number of low-level incidents would increase proportionately, but there was no basis for predicting escalation. From this tiny platform of actual history, one could only take a breathtaking inferential leap into a future based on the little we knew about the behavior of those we call terrorists.

In the intervening years, we have witnessed additional incidents of crime and violence in the nuclear domain, and a slight escalating trend in the late 1970s. However, the number of nuclear-related incidents has declined sharply in the last two years. Nuclear hoaxes, which occurred with increasing frequency during the last decade, also have virtually ceased. We have no explanation for this. At the same time, however, terrorism has increased in volume and has become bloodier. And we have learned more about how terrorists decide to do what they do.

Nuclear terrorism can take many forms. Terrorists may attack or try to seize nuclear facilities. They may attempt to steal a nuclear weapon or nuclear material and offer to return it for ransom. They may contaminate some target with radioactive material. They may fabricate a

[1] Brian Jenkins, *Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?* California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, paper No. 64. Los Angeles: Crescent Publications, 1975. I returned to this topic in several subsequent essays and have drawn on these freely in the preparation of this article. Anyone interested in the evolution of my own thinking on various aspects of the issue may examine *The Potential for Nuclear Terrorism,* P-5876, Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, May 1977; and *The Consequences of Nuclear Terrorism,* P-6373, Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, August 1979 (also in John Kerry King, ed., *International Political Effects of the Spread of Nuclear Weapons,* Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979).

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nuclear threat. If they have somehow obtained an actual nuclear explosive device, they may detonate it or threaten to detonate it.

The consequences of the potential actions also vary. A nuclear hoax poses no direct danger to human life, but if the threat is publicized and believed, panic could cause casualties. Sabotage of a nuclear reactor may result in a mere shutdown, or it could spread radioactive fallout the equivalent of many atomic weapons. The detonation of even a crude nuclear device could cause thousands of deaths.

While we are likely to label anybody who does any of these things a "terrorist," in fact, potential nuclear adversaries encompass a broad range: common criminals, individual lunatics, antinuclear extremists, as well as authentic political terrorists. We can speak of political terrorists only as we know them today, that is, as the groups that have carried out the campaigns of terrorist violence since the late 1960s, although we realize that nuclear terrorists of the future may not arise from those sources currently identified. New kinds of groups may appear that might be more likely to use nuclear means to achieve their objectives. I will focus here on the motives of political terrorists who might detonate or threaten to detonate a nuclear explosion. In order to do so, they must first acquire a nuclear weapon. Can they do it?

There are several ways a terrorist group might acquire a nuclear weapon for its own use: They could steal one from a military arsenal, attempt to by-pass the elaborate devices that are designed to prevent tampering, and rearm it or use its components to construct a new weapon. Or, they might steal weapons-grade nuclear material and use it to fabricate an improvised nuclear device. Either way would require attacking defended targets, something terrorists generally have not done. To avoid encountering defenses, terrorists could attempt to obtain the material surreptitiously by other means. These might include enlisting confederates within nuclear facilities who can then supply the material or purchasing it on the black market, if such a market develops for nuclear material.

Assuming they had the necessary nuclear material, could terrorists make a nuclear bomb? This question remains a topic of debate within the nuclear community. I am not qualified to offer a judgment, so let me instead offer the consensus. Although the ease with which a bomb could be made has been greatly exaggerated in the popular press, the notion that some group outside of government programs can design and build a crude nuclear bomb is certainly more plausible now than it was thirty or forty years ago. At that time, the secrets of nuclear fission were closely guarded. However, much of the requisite technical knowledge has since gradually entered the public domain. There are a growing number of technically trained people who understand these basic prin-

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ciples, and who, without detailed knowledge of nuclear weapons design, theoretically could design such a weapon.

Actually building even a crude nuclear bomb poses a greater obstacle. Experts argue about the number of persons needed, the mix of specialized skills, and the probability of success. They agree that it would involve considerable risks for its builders. Its detonation and performance would be uncertain. Its yield would be low, probably in tenths of a kiloton.

Few terrorists, as we know them today, possess the requisite technical skills identified by experts. There are a few engineers and a handful of scientists within the ranks of contemporary terrorist groups, but most terrorists come from the departments of social sciences or the humanities, which may help to explain why terrorists, thus far, have not carried out more technically demanding operations. One recent development, however, is changing this picture, and that is the increasing direct involvement of governments in the business of terrorism, not merely as political or financial supporters, but as participants in the direction, planning, and execution of terrorist attacks. State sponsorship puts more resources at the disposal of the terrorists: intelligence, money, sophisticated munitions, and technical expertise. It also reduces the constraints on the terrorists, permitting them to operate at a higher level of violence.

It seems that the real arguments arise not so much in the area of theoretical capabilities as in the area of intentions. The public utterances of terrorists include very few references to nuclear activity. Terrorist groups in Western Europe have demonstrated their opposition to the deployment of new nuclear missiles, but they have done so with the traditional terrorist tactics of bombings and assassinations. Basque separatists have carried on a very effective terrorist campaign against the construction of a nuclear power facility in northern Spain, again with traditional tactics.

In the late 1970s, the Red Brigades, in one of their strategic directives, reportedly urged action against nuclear power facilities in Italy, but the press account of this particular document could not be verified by Italian authorities. Puerto Rican separatists have also reportedly threatened action against nuclear facilities in the United States. Recognition that nuclear facilities may be attention-getting targets, however, does not readily translate into nuclear bomb threats.

Our insights into terrorists' contemplation of the use of nuclear weapons are limited to a few casual remarks, such as that of a former German terrorist who said that with a nuclear weapon, terrorists could make the chancellor of Germany dance on top of his desk in front of television cameras. This statement provides evidence that terrorists recognize the enormous coercive power a nuclear capability would give

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them. More recently, an "Armenian Scientific Group" warned that Turkey's largest cities would be destroyed by three small nuclear devices the group claimed to have at its disposal.[2] This raises an important point regarding motivation: Convinced that more than a million Armenians were the victims of Turkish genocide seventy years ago, some Armenians might now feel justified in using weapons of mass destruction in revenge, which is always a potent motive.

The obvious attraction to terrorists in going nuclear, however, is not that possession of a nuclear weapon capability would enable them to kill a lot of people. Simply killing a lot of people has seldom been a terrorist objective. As I have said on numerous occasions, terrorists want a lot of people *watching,* not a lot of people *dead.* Terrorists operate on the principle of the minimum force necessary. They find it unnecessary to kill many, as long as killing a few suffices for their purposes.

Statistics bear this out. Only 15 to 20 percent of all terrorist incidents involve fatalities, and of those, two-thirds involve only one death. Less than 1 percent of the thousands of terrorist incidents that have occurred in the last two decades involves ten or more fatalities, and incidents of mass murder are rare.

We have to pause for a moment to define terms. By mass murder, I mean attempts to kill large numbers of persons in a single action outside of war. Let me set aside cases where governments have deliberately pursued genocidal policies, the cumulative body counts of terrorist campaigns, or the scores of serial murderers, not because I consider any of these things less reprehensible, but because they are not what we are talking about here.

Arbitrarily taking 100 deaths as the criterion, it appears that only a handful of incidents of this scale have occurred since the beginning of the century: a 1921 bombing in Bessarabia; a 1925 bombing of a cathedral in Sofia; a little-known attempt to poison German SS POWs just after World War II; the crash of a hijacked Malaysian jet airliner in 1977; the 1978 bombing of an apartment building in Beirut; a deliberately set fire that killed more than 400 in Teheran; the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut which killed 241. If indeed it was a terrorist bomb that destroyed the Air India jumbo jet earlier this year, then its 539 victims certainly would fall into this category. Lowering the criterion to fifty deaths produces a dozen or more additional incidents. To get even a meaningful sample, the criterion has to be lowered to twenty-five. This in itself suggests that it is either very hard to kill large numbers of persons or very rarely tried.

[2] *Marmara,* Istanbul, January 14, 1985.

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Unfortunately, things are changing. Terrorist activity over the last twenty years has escalated, both in volume and in bloodshed. At the beginning of the 1970s, terrorists concentrated their attacks on property. In the 1980s, according to U.S. government statistics, half of all terrorist attacks have been directed against people. The number of incidents with fatalities and multiple fatalities has increased. A more alarming trend in the 1980s has been the growing number of incidents of large-scale indiscriminate violence: huge car bombs detonated on city streets, bombs planted in airline terminals, railroad stations, and hotel lobbies.

These incidents make it clear that terrorists have the means to kill greater numbers of people than they do now, if they wanted to. Since the constraints are not technological, we must search for other reasons. For years, I have been convinced that the actions of even those we call terrorists are limited by self-imposed constraints that derive from moral considerations or political calculations. The growing volume of testimony from terrorists interviewed while still at large, interrogated in prison, or testifying at trials has, I believe, borne out that notion.

Many terrorists consider indiscriminate violence to be immoral. They regard a government as their opponent, not the people. They may also wish to behave like a government themselves. They use the language of government to justify their actions: robberies are "expropriations"; kidnap victims are subjected to a "people's trial"; and enemies of the people are "condemned" and "executed." Wanton violence, in their view, would imperil this image.

There are also political considerations. The capability to kill on a grand scale must be balanced against the fear of alienating perceived constituents (a population that terrorists invariably overestimate), provoking widespread revulsion, and unleashing government crackdowns that have public approval. The practical consideration of maintaining group cohesion also tends to impose limits on terrorist violence.

Attitudes toward the use of violence not only vary from group to group but also may vary within the same group. We know now that within any terrorist group there are latent defectors who have lost faith in the cause or in the efficacy of terrorist tactics, or who find themselves repelled by escalating violence, and would drop out or defect if the group goes too far. A proposal to kill indiscriminately on a grand scale might provoke sharp divisions among the terrorists, exposing the operation and the group itself to betrayal.

Obviously, not all groups share the same operational code. Subscribing, or at least paying lip service, to the philosophy that power comes from the people, left-wing terrorists generally target their violence against the symbols and representatives of the state, taking care to avoid

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civilian casualties. However, not all left-wing terrorists share this caution — Marxist ideology, for example, did not prevent the Japanese Red Army from carrying out the Lod Airport massacre in 1972.

Right-wing terrorists generally regard the people as a disorganized, despicable mass that requires strong authoritarian leadership. These terrorist groups have shown themselves capable of "pure terrorism" — indiscriminate violence calculated to create panic and a popular clamor for a political strongman who will be able to impose order.

Certain conditions or circumstances also may erode the constraints. Like soldiers in war, terrorists who have been in the field for many years may be brutalized by the long struggle; killing becomes easier. A group may seek to avenge members who have been killed or a population that has been wiped out. Terrorists may feel compelled to escalate their violence in order to keep the attention of a public that has become desensitized by the growing volume of terrorism, or to recover coercive power lost as government resistance increases. The composition of a terrorist group may change as the faint-hearted drop out or are shoved aside by more ruthless elements. The lack of success or the imminence of defeat may call for desperate measures.

The threshold against mass murder may be lowered if the terrorists' perceived enemies and victims are members of a different ethnic group. As we have seen throughout history, the presumed approval of God for the killing of pagans, heathens, or infidels can permit acts of great destruction and self-destruction. In addition, state sponsors might covertly use terrorists to carry out a nuclear threat (although it is hard to imagine the scenario in which a state would relinquish a nuclear capability to terrorists without retaining direct control over its use). Some suggest that terrorists might overcome taboos against weapons of mass destruction by targeting a large industrial target; for example, an oil refinery where the loss of life would be minimal but the destruction of property and consequent disruption could be enormous. The annals of modern terrorism provide ample precedents for such targeting.

Several changes in the environment might increase the possibility of terrorists going nuclear. As nuclear programs expand, nuclear material suitable for use in weapons could become more widely available than it is now. Expanding commercial traffic in explosive nuclear fuel will increase the opportunities for diversion, which in turn could lead to a nuclear gray or black market where terrorists could acquire nuclear material as they now acquire conventional weapons. As knowledge of nuclear weapons design increases, so do the chances of terrorists gaining access to it.

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Some developments could also alter incentives. A sudden rush by governments to acquire or to announce that they already possess nuclear weapons might persuade terrorists to attempt to do likewise. In one generation, China advanced from a guerrilla army to a nuclear power. Terrorists could try to take a short cut. The use of a nuclear weapon in war would somehow seem to lower constraints against terrorists moving toward nuclear weapons, although I am not quite sure why. Certainly, it would depend very much on the circumstances and the results. Finally, an incident of nuclear terrorism, perhaps even an alarming hoax, would almost certainly increase the probability of other terrorists going nuclear.

The question often arises: Why would terrorists choose nuclear weapons over chemical or biological weapons, which evoke great fear and are technically less demanding? In several ways, these weapons also are less attractive. Terrorists imitate governments, and nuclear weapons are in the arsenals of the world's major powers. That makes them "legitimate." Chemical and biological weapons also may be found in the arsenals of many nations, but their use has been widely condemned by public opinion and proscribed by treaty, although in recent years the constraints against their use seem to be eroding.

But neither chemical nor biological warfare seems to fit the pattern of terrorist behavior. Terrorist attacks are generally intended to produce immediate, dramatic effects. Terrorist incidents have a finite quality — an assassination, a bombing, a handful of deaths, and that is the end of the episode. And the terrorists retain control. This is quite different from initiating an event that offers no bang but instead produces indiscriminate death and lingering illness, over which the terrorists would have little control.

If terrorists had a nuclear capability, they would be more likely to brandish it as a threat than detonate it, although one can scarcely conceive of a more emotional use of a nuclear weapon by a desperate group than as the ultimate instrument of revenge or as a "Doomsday Machine." Translating the enormous coercive power of a nuclear weapon into concrete political gains, however, would pose some difficulty for terrorists. First, they would have to establish the credibility of the threat. The scenarists solve this problem by having them get away with a military weapon, thus removing the uncertainty of their possession, or by providing the terrorists with two weapons, one to be used as a demonstration.

Second, the terrorists would have to persuade the government that it has an incentive to negotiate. That may sound odd, given that they could threaten to cause thousands of casualties, but the "rules" of bargaining that have evolved from dealing with ordinary hostage incidents may not apply to nuclear blackmail. For one thing, we may assume that

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the terrorists' demands would be commensurate with the magnitude of the threat. Governments facing the threat of nuclear terrorism would paradoxically find it more difficult to refuse, yet more difficult to yield. Impossible demands — for example, that a government liquidate itself — could not be met even under a nuclear threat. Nor could terrorists enforce permanent policy changes unless they maintained the threat indefinitely. And if a government could not be assured that the threat would be dismantled once the demands were met, it would have little incentive to negotiate. Thus, it becomes a matter not of concessions, but of governance. I am not suggesting that armchair extortionists cannot come up with solutions to these dilemmas — finite, irrevocable demands that governments could meet with adequate assurances that the threat would end once the demands are met. I *am* suggesting that it is not easy for terrorists, even if they are armed with nuclear weapons, to achieve lasting political results. They might find nuclear weapons to be as useless as they are powerful.

In my 1975 essay, I concluded that "Terrorists may not be interested in or capable of building a nuclear bomb. The point is, they do not have to. Within their range of resources and technical proficiency, they may carry out nuclear actions that will give them almost as much publicity and leverage, with less risk to themselves and less risk of alienation or retaliation. As the industry expands during the next few years, we will probably witness a growing number of low-level nuclear incidents. . . . There will be moments of alarm, but the inconvenience and political repercussions that these incidents produce will probably exceed the actual danger to public safety." We did, in fact, witness more low-level incidents.

With regard to the possibility of serious nuclear incidents, I concluded that it would increase "at a far more gradual rate" if only because the opportunities for diversion and technical know-how would increase. "At some point in the future, the opportunity and capacity for serious nuclear terrorism could reach those willing to take advantage of it." But I did not see this as an inevitable development. Before then, the development of more effective safeguards could push that "point indefinitely into the future."

What do I conclude now? Despite the theoretical increase in opportunities as nuclear programs have grown, and the demonstrable escalation in terrorism, going nuclear still represents a quantum jump for terrorists, and one that is not impossible but by no means imminent or inevitable.

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ANNOUNCEMENT

William C. Foster Fellows Program, 1986-87

The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) has announced that it is accepting applications for visiting scholars, under the William C. Foster Fellows Program for 1986-87. This program is designed to give specialists in the physical sciences and other disciplines relevant to ACDA's activities an opportunity to participate actively in the arms control and disarmament activities of the Agency and to give the Agency the perspective and expertise such persons can offer.

William C. Foster Fellows for 1986-87 will be appointed for twelve months beginning in the summer or early fall of 1986. They will be compensated in accordance with the Intergovernmental Personnel Act which allows the Agency to reimburse a university for the services of its employees. Fellows must be citizens or nationals of the United States and on the faculty of a recognized institution of higher learning. Prior to appointment they will be subject to a full-field background security and loyalty investigation for a top secret clearance.

Applications should be made in the form of a letter indicating the perspective and expertise which the applicant offers accompanied by a curriculum vitae and any other materials such as letters of reference and samples of published articles which the applicant believes should be considered in the selection process. **The deadline date for applications is January 31, 1986.** Applications and requests for information on available assignments should be sent to William C. Foster Fellow Program, Attention: Personnel Officer, room 5722, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 320 21st Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20451, telephone (202) 632-2034.

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BURDEN-SHARING IN NATO: ASPECTS OF U.S. POLICY

by Klaus Knorr

According to a widespread view in the United States, including the Congress, the question of burden-sharing among military allies is quite simple: The burden to focus on is the economic. It is easy to define, measure, and compare. Sharing is fair when it approximates burdens that are equal in relation to differences in economic capacity. If actual shares deviate substantially from this standard, the United States — should it be the victim of discrepancy — has the right and possesses the means (especially by threatening withdrawal of American troops from Europe) to force the balance to be redressed. Actually, the concept of burden-sharing in alliances is not simple, and its application encounters several serious difficulties. After clarifying concept, analysis, and measurement, this article will review the historical record and the present situation.

Why Burden-Sharing is an Object of Interest and Policy

Burdens and their distribution tend to become a problem in alliances for two reasons. First, problems arise when defensive alliances obligate their members not only to come to one another's aid in the event of attack, but also to mount — at all times — large efforts for military deterrence and defense in order to discourage aggression. This is precisely NATO's purpose. Hence the heavy deployment of forces in the Federal Republic of Germany and the highly integrated command structure in time of peace, and hence the importance each member attaches to the level of defense effort maintained by the others.

Second, although relations by the allied governments may be shaped in large part by mutual intentions of cooperation, and even be graced occasionally by notions of loyalty and fair play, these governments, to the extent they behave rationally, may also try to manipulate the net utility they derive from the alliance by deliberately shifting the flow of burdens and benefits. They can do so by means of unilateral acts, e.g.,

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cutting defense expenditures, or of hard bargaining, e.g., by threatening to withdraw from the alliance unless other members contribute more to common defense. Systematic analysis, focusing on the theory of public goods, shows the conditions under which members can enjoy a completely "free ride," i.e., share in the benefits while avoiding any costs.[1] By providing for effective military deterrence, some allies will provide not only for their security but also for that of other allies who contribute little or nothing to the effort and who may deliberately get a free or "cheap" ride. There are, however, problems with applying this concept. First, absolutely free rides would be hard to engineer outside the theoretical model. In real life, the manipulating member lacks the necessary information about the adequacy of the "public good" and is subject to incentives that negate or lower the desirability of a "free ride."[2] For instance, if the United States raises its defense budget, the allies may interpret this as signalling an increase in East-West tensions requiring a larger effort at military deterrence and defense rather than as an opportunity for taking advantage of free protection supplied by the United States and cutting their own contributions. Second, as will be shown below, the relevance of the concept is reduced because allied countries create benefits other than military security and participate in a variety of disadvantages as well. And they look at these benefits and costs not only as collective, that is, fully shared, but also as private, that is, specifically associated with particular members. For example, to the extent that NATO helps to keep West Berlin a free city, the West Germans benefit more than the other allies. For another example, only the United States can enjoy the role of leader in the Atlantic alliance.

Nevertheless, a free-rider problem may characterize an alliance if the term refers loosely to attempts to modify, if only marginally for the most part, the intra-alliance distribution of costs and gains. Thus, the smaller allies in NATO spend less on defense as a proportion of national income than do the larger members. They may do so in part because their military security is relatively insensitive to their own military preparations. Luxemburg's security would not improve if it doubled its military expenditures. At the same time, big allies may tolerate the smaller's deficiency because its contribution to the military performance of the alliance is marginal. Yet, it is also possible that large publics in some of the smaller countries in NATO are uncertain whether neutrality would

[1] G. Mancur Olsen and Richard Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," *Review of Economics and Statistics,* August 1966, pp. 266-74.

[2] Lee Gavin Kennedy, *The Economics of Defense* (Totowa, N.J., Rowman and Littlefield, 1975), pp. 49-57; J. C. Murdoch and T. Sandler, "Complementarity, Free Riding, and the Military Expenditures of NATO Allies," *Journal of Public Economics,* November 1984, pp. 83-101; and R.P. Smith, "The Demand for Military Expenditure," *Economic Journal,* December 1980, pp. 814-18.

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not have given them more security than does participation in the Alliance. This evaluation would diminish the utility derived from membership, and the lesser contributions would thus be balanced by a lesser expected benefit.

The Advantages and Disadvantages of Alliance

While burden-sharing can become a problem in an alliance, exclusive attention to the economic load reflects too narrow and, at bottom, an arbitrary focus for comparison. An alliance like NATO tends to impose a plurality of costs or disadvantages to be borne by the members as, on the other hand, it can also confer a number of benefits. Realistic and fair comparison, therefore, calls for a larger frame of reference than one that cleaves to defense budgets.

As the following examples indicate, the kinds of burdens — in addition to defense outlays — that allies shoulder can vary a great deal. First, an alliance may carry the risk of involvement in a war generated by an ally's aggressive policy. Thus, the European allies sometimes fear that the United States, in hard pursuit of its national interests, might start or blunder into a war with the Soviet Union outside Europe, and that this conflict would then spread to the European continent. Second, membership in an alliance is apt to curtail national freedom in the making of foreign and defense policies. This cost of concerted effort is especially onerous in an alliance headed by a superpower that naturally expects to dominate in the formulation of alliance policies. Sensitivity to this effect was a major factor in France's decision to divorce itself from the integrated activities carried on at NATO's military headquarters. Third, some allies may find it necessary to aid a poorer ally either through loans or direct assistance, as some NATO countries have done with Turkey. Fourth, some members may be burdened by having to host the troops and arms of allies on their territory in time of peace. As the West Germans point out from time to time, this burden is not only economic in the form of land made available to the forces of allies; it also includes the world's densest deployment of nuclear weapons that, in the event of war, might become targets for a foe's devastating pre-emptive strikes. Fifth, there may be psychological costs when an alliance compels association with a despised country, as the Greeks feel about Turkey.

Given the multiplicity of disadvantages associated with an alliance, it is clear in principle that if burdens are to be shared equally, the prescription must apply to the sum of all costs. To take an extreme case, the fact that Iceland has no defense budget at all does not mean that the Icelanders are getting a free ride. They tolerate an American

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military base on their territory — a foreign military presence that most of them dislike.

The costs, furthermore, must be evaluated with reference to the gains. The achievement of greater military security than a nation can actually afford, or of a given measure of security at lesser national costs, is not the only possible advantage of membership in an alliance. Some of the very examples furnished to explain the variety of burdens illuminate the spectrum of benefits because what is a cost to one ally may be a gain to another. Thus, one member may profit from its ability to manipulate the involvement of allies when threatening an opponent on its own account. A powerful member may enjoy the role of alliance leadership that tends to abridge the freedom of action of its allies. Some allies may benefit from receiving economic aid or from association with nations that are highly respected or admired.

Within this larger framework for evaluating the national consequences of external alliance, we can understand that a relatively heavy burden imposed on one ally may be matched by a relatively large benefit. Therefore, an ally that carries a larger economic burden than others is not necessarily subject to exploitation, for the excess in the economic load may be compensated by a larger net benefit derived from the balance of the other costs and gains. For instance, the ally who devotes an exceptionally large proportion of its GNP to defense may also be exceptionally dependent on the security provided by the total defense effort. We can understand, further, that — whatever the composition of advantages and disadvantages — the net utility of alliance need not be equal among the members. Membership is valuable as long as the overall payoff remains positive. Although different patterns of costs and benefits cannot be quantified for precise measurement, leaders and analysts can arrive at conclusions that rank and integrate various benefits and disadvantages.[3] Such evaluations are necessarily subjective. Thus, the opportunity costs of allocating an additional percentage of GNP to military defense depend on several varying factors in which countries can differ, e.g., the existing percentage of GNP already devoted to defense, GNP per capita, fiscal balance or imbalance, and the political strength of groups demanding increased expenditures on other things.

None of these complexities in the distribution of costs and benefits will prevent alliance members from keeping a watchful eye on what each contributes to the common effort. Yet, the very notion of fair burden-sharing is highly sensitive to agreement on the magnitude (and

[3] For an interesting example, see the following analysis of the costs and benefits of West Germany's membership in the Economic Community: Bernhard May, *Kosten und Nutzen der deutschen EG- Mitgliedschaft,"* (Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1982).

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quality) of the required effort. Such assessment naturally hinges on the level of acuity and severity of the perceived external threat. These perceptions are national estimates based on fragmentary, obsolescent, and ambiguous information. The predispositions guiding their interpretation vary among allies as a result of differences in historical experience, diverging trends in domestic politics, quality of statecraft, and geographic exposure. Thus, of two allies, A may see a greater external threat than B, boost his military spending, and accuse B of not contributing enough to the common effort. However, B is not at fault as long as his lower estimate of the threat is honest. (Indeed B might complain that A, by behaving provocatively toward the source of the external threat, is diminishing rather than increasing the security of the allies). The picture becomes further complicated if the two allies misrepresent their estimates of the external danger for purposes of manipulation. A might overstate his perception of the threat in order to put pressure on B whom he suspects of withholding a fair share of the joint military effort. On the other hand, B might understate his estimate of the threat in order to justify cutting his burden on alliance account. Other complications are possible. B's government, suffering from a weak position in domestic politics, may agree that its defense effort is below what it owes to the allies and welcomes A's criticism and pressure as a means of strengthening its hands domestically for demanding more resources for defense.

How questions of burden-sharing are answered depends on agreement not only on the nature and severity of the threat to security but also on coping with this threat. Even though the NATO allies have managed a rough consensus on the nature of the external threat, they may be unable to agree fully on the general mode of meeting it, in particular on the exact mixture of military and political deterrence on which they should rely. In 1967, NATO adopted the Harmel Report that emphasized the political track (e.g., détente) along with the military one, a dual strategy more vigorously and steadily supported in Europe than in the United States. The difference in approach may affect notions of burden-sharing because the ally more oriented toward military means may call for greater contributions to military forces that other members regard as unnecessary. They are not, in that case, free riders. Indeed, they might well take the complaining ally to task for being unwilling to share in the burden (i.e., disadvantages) peculiar to cultivating deterrence by political means.

If the allies do not differ on the magnitude of the required military task, they may still be at odds on the mechanics of this task, that is, on military strategy and force structures. In the past, the European allies have favored more reliance on strategic nuclear deterrence by the

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United States and less on defense by conventional forces in Europe than American governments have proposed. The resulting reluctance of European members to build up conventional capabilities did not reflect a propensity to evade a fair share of the burden — as many American observers concluded — as much as a difference in strategic preference that was rooted in a different set of national vulnerabilities. Conventional war in Europe would cause great destruction in the European countries while the American homeland might escape unscathed. The notion that fair burden-sharing in an alliance must mean equal sharing — with allowance for differences in size and wealth — is logically uncompelling. It is normatively appealing only when allies derive equal benefit from the alliance. This condition does not obtain when one member or some members have a greater need for military security than do the others. If so, why should such allies not be expected to contribute more?

Conceptually, none of these difficulties need prevent members of an alliance from agreeing that sharing the economic burden of common defense fairly is desirable. If they cannot agree, fairness in a larger sense would demand that they be aware of, and make allowance for, the complications already discussed. Members may agree to focus on the distribution of the economic burden because other costs and the benefits of alliance are in approximate balance; governments are highly sensitive to the economic load; or, this burden apparently can be quantified and, hence, more rigorously compared than the other advantages and disadvantages.

Focus On Military Contributions

If the military contributions of allies toward the security goal of the alliance are to be compared, the focus should logically be on the value of each national contribution in terms of the joint power to deter and defend. This value or "real worth" — itself impossible to measure before international conflict puts it to the test in specific scenarios — is the joint product of qualitative as well as quantitative factors. An ally who maintains smaller military forces than another could nevertheless contribute more because its troops are superior in training, morale, and leadership; its military equipment is in superior shape; available reserves and stocks give it more staying power; or its forces are located exactly where they would be most needed in the event of war.[4] Should this ally be penalized because its military forces are smaller in some numerical sense? Obviously not. Unfortunately, it is impossible to measure these

[4] These less tangible or intangible factors in military strength have played a crucial role in most of military history. Cf. Jeffrey Record, "Military History," *Military Review,* August 1985, pp. 27-39.

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qualitative elements, or to reduce them to a common denominator for overall measurement. Moreover, some of them — such as quality of leadership and troop morale — are taboo in inter-allied discussion. Even if true, it would not do for the Belgians to say that their military leadership is superior to that of the French, Americans, or Germans.

It also makes only limited sense to compare the number of such things as infantry divisions, war ships, bomber planes, tanks, and artillery pieces, as all can differ greatly in size, cost, and quality. Nor can it be expected that national force structures will combine these ingredients in uniform proportions. If only for geographic reasons, some allies will concentrate on land and others on naval forces. And the distribution within NATO of national nuclear arms is limited to three members, and presumably frozen.

Comparing National Defense Budgets

Once one is resigned to using national inputs for comparisons that reflect differences in national efforts, and to considering their outputs only imperfectly and perhaps quite misleadingly, attention is inevitably drawn to national defense budgets. Money seems to be more homogeneous than force structures and their capabilities. However, another dimension of qualitative difference obtrudes. Suppose we could determine with absolute certainty that two countries maintained equal defense budgets; these equal financial inputs could yield military force standings of different value because the relevant public authorities and producing firms differ in their efficiency.[5] Despite equal financial effort, the country that is relatively wasteful in using resources contributes less to the security of the alliance than does the more efficient member. Fairness, it could be argued, would require the less efficient ally to raise its defense expenditures until the consequences of inferior efficiency have been offset. Similarly, if one of two countries with equal defense budgets is subject to appreciable inflation while the other is not, its expenditures are likely to buy a lesser output of real military assets. Again, one might question whether this difference should not be considered when the contributions of allies are compared. Comparisons that focus on national outlays for defense must be used with full awareness of how much of real relevance to the security performance of the alliance has been excluded. Ignoring the consequences of these omissions is like assuming that two people investing equal amounts of money in Wall Street will witness equal results,

[5] This is far from an academic consideration. In 1985, for example, the American defense effort was widely questioned on grounds of efficiency. Cf. Richard Stubbing, "The Defense Program: Building or Binge?" *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1985, pp. 848-72.

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or that two students paying equal amounts of money on tuition will emerge equally educated.

National defense budgets also show qualitative differences that reduce their comparability. Expenditures on military research are included in some defense budgets, but not in others. So are costs of domestic security. The value of West German land made available for the stationing and exercises of allied forces escapes full budgetary expression. But these are minor flaws and NATO governments have sufficiently standardized their calculations of military expenditures to eliminate some of these problems. A more critical difference among NATO allies reflects the mode of recruiting military manpower. Most European members rely primarily on conscripts while the United States, Britain, and Canada maintain volunteer forces. These latter countries must offer pay that is sufficiently competitive in the labor market. Conscripts, required to donate their labor in large part, get paid very little. This means that a higher proportion of the defense budgets in countries with volunteer forces is claimed for wages than is the case with countries with systems of conscription, leaving in the former a correspondingly lesser proportion for the acquisition of weaponry and other military goods than in the latter. The difference, though not as large as it seems when the wage components of the budget are contrasted,[6] remains substantial. Ignoring it when prescribing equal burdens would, in effect, amount to allies with conscripts subsidizing (to a degree) the defense effort of those with voluntary forces.

A comparison of national military outlays reveals yet another formidable qualitative difference. Differences of size of nations, in particular, must be taken into account. Simple calculations of budget expenditures per capita would do this. But if fairness in burden-sharing must relate also to differences in the capacity to bear burdens — as all modern states acknowledge in levying income taxes — then differences in economic development or, more specifically, in national income per capita must also be factored into the analysis. These differences may be trivial, and hence can be ignored, where analyses concern NATO countries of similar wealth and income, such as France and Germany. But it is more significant when Britain and Italy are also included, and especially when it comes to Portugal, Greece, and Turkey.

The most serious difficulty with comparing national defense efforts by way of military expenditures results from the need to convert

[6] Conscripted men serving shorter periods of time than volunteers, spend a larger share of their time of service in training and require more cadres to administer the training. To that extent, the conscript is not quite the equivalent of the volunteer and more of the former are needed to match the capability of the latter, and this entails more military housing, clothing, etc. However, this difference will be offset more or less, or perhaps more than offset, if volunteer systems fail to attract a satisfactory cross section of the nation's youth in terms of innate abilities, education, and motivation to work.

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budgets expressed in national currencies into equivalents of one currency, for instance U.S. dollars. When foreign exchange rates are fixed by governments, they may of course present highly arbitrary values, quite remote from international differences in real purchasing power. However, even when exchange rates are settled by the market and emerge uninfluenced by international capital movements, i.e., are determined by reciprocal demand arising from the flow of goods and services, their use for conversion from one currency to another may not express real differences in national purchasing power because of differing domestic price structures. Capital movements can create further disparities; we need only refer to the highly overvalued dollar in recent years. As this overvaluation occurred, the conversion of European defense outlays from local currency to dollars would have shown sharply falling European defense expenditures even if they had remained unchanged.

Some of the qualitative factors that block the quantitative comparisons of defense budgets can fortunately be by-passed by comparing percentages of the GNP devoted to military efforts. A comparison of percentages automatically allows for differences between allies of size, level of wealth, and inflation. Above all, it does not call for conversions of currencies into one another. However, this method is vulnerable to falsifying tendencies of its own that may be released by autonomous changes in the GNP: with defense expenditures remaining constant, they will decrease as a percentage of the GNP when the latter rises during a period of economic growth, and they will mount as a percentage when the GNP contracts as a result of economic recession. As long as fluctuations in the GNP in all countries are closely parallel, they will not affect comparisons. Where this is not the case, analysts should make the necessary corrections. And to re-emphasize, although defense expenditures expressed as a percentage of the GNP may be the least unsatisfactory indicators of burden-sharing in an alliance, they are not good indicators because they ignore a number of qualitative differences, such as that conscript armies are a better bargain than volunteer forces, or that defense funds can be spent with grossly varying efficiency.

Statistical Comparisons

As table I reveals, the NATO allies divide into three classes when defense outlays, expressed as proportions of GNP, are compared; thus apparently confirming the view of many Americans that their country is carrying an unduly heavy share. Certainly, the smaller countries contribute least. Italy — economically less developed than Western Europe as a whole — is also persistently low. The second class is composed of

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Britain, France, and West Germany — nations that were great military powers not long ago. The United States can be said to be in a class by itself, especially when one focuses on the Reagan administration's dramatic increases in defense expenditures in 1983 and 1984. High American figures for 1967 and 1970 reflect the temporary bulge in expenditures occasioned by the war in Vietnam. However, this high level of effort did not increase military strength for benefit of the NATO alliance vis-à-vis the USSR. On the contrary, the high operational costs of fighting in southeast Asia — another qualitative factor — caused the United States to neglect improvement in armaments and to deplete its forces stationed in Europe of high-quality military personnel. Moreover, the progressive demoralization of American troops (e.g., increasing use of drugs) spread from Asia to Europe. When the war in Vietnam ended, American military expenditures naturally contracted. As a percentage of GNP from the mid-1970s to 1982, they barely exceeded those of the United Kingdom, the highest spender in the second class.

Because of the budgetary impact of the American War in Vietnam, comparisons over time can be misleading, making them sensitive to the peculiarities of selected years and periods. Stung by American reproaches of unfairly low contributions to the Alliance, Europeans have been quick to remonstrate that American defense spending declined during the 1970s while West European outlays increased. Thus, Sir Geoffrey Howe, British foreign secretary, noted that, from 1971 to 1982, European defense budgets grew by 25 percent in real terms whereas American spending decreased slightly. As a result, the European share in total NATO expenditures rose from 23 percent in 1969 to 40 percent in 1982.[7] But this comparison is also deceptive because it reflects the fall of American defense expenditures from the very high level required by the war in Vietnam.

The European performance during the 1970s and 1980s was nevertheless impressive when developments in GNPs are highlighted. There is no reason defense budgets should rise automatically just because the GNP is growing. But while European GNPs were expanding, their defense expenditures did remain roughly constant as a proportion of GNP, and were, thus, actually rising. According to a study by the U.S. Department of Defense, the West European allies increased their military spending from 1971 to 1982 by 2 percent a year after inflation, or by a cumulative 25 percent in real terms.[8]

In December 1976 — when American military spending was rather low — the Defense Planning Committee of NATO adopted an

[7] Sir Geoffrey Howe, "The European Pillar," *Foreign Affairs,* Winter 1984/85, pp. 333-34.
[8] *Christian Science Monitor,* May 20, 1985.

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American proposal to raise defense budgets by 3 percent per annum for a period of five years. The additional funds were to support an effort at balancing the expanding conventional capabilities of the Soviet Union. The decision was not regarded as onerous, partly because governments expected a continuation of past rates of national economic growth, and because the 3 percent figure, to serve as a guide, did not constitute a rigidly fixed obligation. It was, however, made when West European military budgets had been rising while American spending had been low relative to United States performance after World War II. In that sense, the agreement asked more of the European allies than of the United States.

With the benefit of hindsight, however, this decision was to prove troublesome.[9] The effect of intervening qualitative factors involved in the defense contribution of allies is bound to render a mechanical formula artificial and arbitrary over time, and therefore, to stimulate a great deal of bickering. The main qualitative factor here proved to be inter-alliance differences in the political feasibility of increased defense budgets. The 1976 decision was an agreement by national ministers of finance to assume an external obligation to raise defense budgets, partly to help governments extract additional funds from reluctant democratic publics.[10] But what if these publics become unequally reluctant, as actually happened? In that case, the allied governments would have accepted unequal political burdens — an inequality of potentially serious consequence in democratic societies. On this perspective, it would seem that fair burden-sharing requires no more than that allied governments expend equal political capital in imposing defense burdens on usually unenthusiastic electorates. Allies cannot, after all, expect domestic political change in their countries to yield exactly parallel public dispositions in the area of defense. If pressure on a domestically weak government to raise defense spending led to its fall, the successor government might be less ready in principle to contribute to the cause of the Alliance. Given this internal political factor, forbearance will sometimes be better for burden-sharing than insistence on less unequal numbers.

In addition, rates of national economic growth slumped unexpectedly after 1978, and the first half of the 1980s witnessed a serious economic depression, with rising rates of unemployment and the appearance of budget deficits throughout the world of the Atlantic Alliance. The social opportunity costs — and the associated political opportunity costs — of maintaining, let alone increasing, national defense expenditures

[9] David Greenwood, "NATO'S Three Percent Solution," *Survival*, November/December 1981, pp. 252-60.

[10] Ibid.

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rose sharply. The effort of most European allies, nevertheless, to raise these expenditures somewhat, even if by less than 3 percent, and — as economic conditions worsened — to maintain them is remarkable under the circumstances. In May 1981, the NATO partners reconfirmed the 1976 formula. At present, the European allies can look with pride on the real military contributions they are making to the defense of Western Europe. In Europe and the adjacent seas, they are supplying 70 percent of the men-of-war, 80 percent of the combat aircraft, 85 percent of the tanks, 95 percent of the artillery, and 95 percent of the divisions.[11] And rumor has it that some of the European troops are qualitatively superior to their American counterparts.

Does the United States Carry an Unfair Burden?

We are now analytically prepared to entertain the question voiced by persistent critics who complain that the West European allies are exploiting American largesse by contributing too little to military deterrence and defense vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. (Canada, although a very low spender on defense, is usually ignored in this context.) To be precise, the complaint comes in two versions. Either it is assumed that the aggregate effort of the allies is adequate, but that unfair burden-sharing makes the United States contribute too much and the European members too little; or it is assumed that while the United States is doing enough, insufficient European contributions keep the total effort — and in particular conventional capabilities — from being large enough to avoid undue dependence of West European security on the American threat of escalation to nuclear war in the event defense fails to stop a Soviet attack.

Three preliminary points are in order before addressing the charge. First, in terms of time, this paper will concentrate on what happened during the past fifteen years. Second, in terms of analytical approach, it must go beyond the quantitative comparison of budgets and other burdens in addition to benefits. Third, the consideration of qualitative factors makes any conclusion a matter of judgment. No particular verdict will be compelling. If we were to conclude that the West European countries are contributing too little, their governments and citizens could go on arguing the opposite. And so might American critics, were we to conclude that the West Europeans are contributing a fair share. This inescapable limitation does not, however, make the following discussion academic or worthless, for neither side will be able, after proper analysis, to argue without a degree of elaboration that should appreciably restrain preconceived opinion and prejudice. No objective analyst, assuming there is such a thing, would claim that his conclusion was more than tentative.

[11] Howe, "The European Pillar," p. 334.

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TABLE 1

DEFENSE EXPENDITURES AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
SELECTED NATO COUNTRIES IN SELECTED YEARS

	1967	1970	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
Belgium	3.1	2.9	2.8	3.0	3.0	3.4	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.4
Britain	5.6	4.8	5.1	4.9	5.2	5.0	4.6	4.6	5.1	5.4	5.3
Canada	2.0	2.5	2.1	2.2	1.8	1.8	2.0	1.8	1.7	1.7	2.1
Denmark	2.7	2.4	2.2	2.2	2.5	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.5
France	5.1	4.2	3.6	3.9	3.7	3.6	4.0	3.9	3.9	4.1	4.2
West Germany	4.3	4.8	3.6	3.7	3.5	3.4	4.2	4.1	3.2	4.3	4.1
Italy	3.1	2.7	2.9	2.6	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.5	2.6
Luxemburg	1.1	0.8	0.9	1.1	1.0	1.1	0.8	0.8	1.0	1.2	1.2
Turkey	4.5	4.3	3.7	5.0	5.5	5.7	5.2	4.3	4.2	4.5	5.2
U.S.A.	9.4	7.8	6.1	5.8	5.4	5.4	5.1	5.1	5.5	6.1	6.5

SOURCE: Data for 1967 and 1970 from U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1967-1976* (Washington, D.C., U.S. GPO), Table 1. Data for the other years from the annual *The Military Balance* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies), Tables, Comparison of Defense Expenditures.

Regarding national costs attributable to the alliance enterprise, we begin with the observation that, as table I shows, U.S. defense spending expressed as a percentage of GNP, and making allowance for the special effects of the war in Vietnam, was substantially higher during the 1970s than the average of all the allies' or even that of the allies in class II, and that these differences widened markedly under the Reagan administration. It is on this isolated observation that American opinion about unfair burden-sharing mostly rests.

Yet, most of the pre-Reagan range of differences between the United States and Britain was quite small; and that between the United States and Germany and France collapses as soon as national variations in recruitment of the military are considered. To compute these differences precisely is technically impossible. But rough estimates have been made. When the United States debated the abolition of the unpopular draft, it was officially estimated that going to a volunteer system would add 1 percent to the defense share of GNP. An official German estimate concluded that changing to a volunteer army would increase the German defense share of GNP by about 1.5 percent.[12] On this basis, the West German proportion of GNP devoted to defense in 1974 would have risen

[12] International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1975-1976*, London, 1975, p. 103.

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from 3.6 to 5.1 percent in comparison with 6 percent for the United States.[13]

Even though the United States allots more to defense as a percentage of GNP than do its European allies, are all American outlays to be attributed to the NATO account? Clearly, proper allowance has to be made if some proportion is not. According to the North Atlantic Treaty, the Alliance aims at maintaining security in Europe.[14] The United States has evident other military commitments in the Far East, the Middle East and in the western hemisphere — indeed, potentially throughout the extra-European world. Aside from specific commitments as in Japan and South Korea, it is organized to take up the option of countering the military expansion of the Soviet empire anywhere, and of intervening militarily in Third World conflicts that threaten vital American interests. According to an assessment by the Department of Defense, 58 percent of the military budget for fiscal year 1985 was allocated to the defense of the other members of NATO, and a study by the General Accounting Office estimated this amount at 56 percent for 1982.[15] On the other hand, with a small exception in the case of France and an even slighter one for Britain — countries that maintain minor commitments in Africa and elsewhere outside Europe — West European defense budgets exclusively serve NATO's purpose. It is worth noting in this connection that the huge expansion of defense spending under the Reagan administration has chiefly benefited the strategic nuclear and naval forces of the United States. Disproportionately little has been done to strengthen conventional capabilities in Europe, although Washington has stated repeatedly that these capabilities badly need improvement in order to make military deterrence of a Soviet attack less dependent on the American nuclear threat.

These calculations do not mean that almost 40 percent of the American defense effort must be deducted before burdens in NATO are compared — a deduction that by itself would reduce NATO-connected spending to or below the level of many European allies. In the event that hostilities with the Soviet Union break out in Europe, some of the American forces earmarked for use elsewhere might well be redeployed to serve West European security directly, or might do so indirectly by engaging or tying up Soviet forces outside Europe. Nonetheless, some substantial

[13] Ibid., p. 76.

[14] We are not concerned here with the fact that the United States would no doubt maintain large forces for deterrence and defense in the absence of the North Atlantic Alliance. There is no way to estimate how much this country would have spent on defense, what would have happened in Europe, and how much security the United States could have achieved on this hypothetical assumption.

[15] *New York Times,* July 20, 1984.

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proportion of American defense spending must be disregarded in comparing burdens within the Alliance.

It could be argued, and has been argued, that American military commitments and efforts outside Europe are in defense of a world order that benefits not only the United States itself but the entire Western world, including the European allies. In this view, all military spending by this country could be said to merit inclusion in the comparison of burdens. Yet, although not per se unreasonable, the contention is hard to sustain in the face of counter-arguments. First, by formal agreement these extra-European concerns lie outside NATO's scope. Second, the United States could become involved outside Europe in fighting that is, wholly or overwhelmingly, of local or regional significance. And even if it had global implications of international order, did these justify a military response? Would we argue that the European allies should have helped to pay for the American military effort in Vietnam? Third, the militant rhetoric sometimes employed by the Reagan administration has aroused European fears that the United States might decide on its own to risk, outside Europe, a military encounter with the Soviets that would probably spread to Europe. Some West Europeans wish that the United States would de-emphasize the use of military force in other parts of the world.

If we make allowance for the relatively high costs of military manpower in the United States and the assignment of a part of its military forces to other objectives than NATO's, the American spending on defense expressed as a proportion of GNP, may be regarded to have been in approximate balance with that of the majority of European allies during the last twelve years or so.

The European partners have not, to be sure, matched the steep increases in defense expenditures effected by the Reagan administration. In part, this shortfall has been caused by adverse economic conditions that kept them from reaching the budgetary increase of 3 percent, after inflation, to which they were collectively pledged. However, it also confirms that European governments shared neither the alarmist perception of the Soviet threat entertained by the Reagan administration nor that administration's rigid emphasis on arms buildups for deterring the Soviet Union from attacking or from exerting undue military pressure on the West European allies. The West European allies do not find the Soviet Union to be as strong and aggressive as the Reagan administration does. And they favor more of a political effort, and more of an effort on arms control, than has been Washington's recent bent in coping with the Soviet Union. Whether the threat estimates of Washington or those of the West European governments are more nearly right we cannot now know. They all represent inferences derived from ambiguous data. In any case, if one

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member of an alliance perceives a more acute external threat to it than does another, and if both are honest in expressing their perceptions, the more alarmed ally cannot expect the other to match additional outlays in defense and should not accuse him of unfairness in burden-sharing.[16] Yet, acting on its conviction, it may nevertheless do so.

The most consequential burden assumed by the United States in support of West European security is the commitment to initiate intercontinental nuclear war with the USSR in the event a Soviet attack in Europe overcame NATO's defenses. Given the balance of capabilities, a nuclear war has a high probability of ending with the utter destruction of both sides. Several discounts must be applied to the expectation of such large-scale disaster. It is hoped that the threat will deter the Soviet Union, if deterrence is needed. It is also hoped, though with less confidence, that NATO's defenses can repel a Soviet attack. If both hopes have been dashed, the United States might fail to honor its commitment. And, even if it is honored and strategic nuclear war erupts, the United States may urge the belligerents to terminate hostilities before escalation has run its course to the level of all-around disaster. Even if we allow these deductions, all beset with uncertainty, the remaining risk is stark enough to transcend the fiscal burden of recent levels of defense expenditures. Beside such a risk, budgetary considerations simply pale into insignificance. The nuclear is the crucial burden, and it is being shared by the allies only in that they do their utmost to make their security less dependent on the nuclear retaliatory threat of the United States by maintaining sufficient conventional defenses in central Europe.

The magnitude of the nuclear risk does not make it a burden that necessarily merits rejection. The choice depends on whether membership and national effort in the Alliance do or do not impose disadvantages exceeding the benefits. The answer hinges principally on the importance the United States attaches to West European nations that remain free and can prosper uncoerced by the Soviet Union, while remaining at peace among themselves. Indeed, the preservation of this condition might be more important to the United States, despite the nuclear risk, than to the West European countries themselves where small minorities are attracted to neutrality or even to the acceptance of Soviet hegemony as an alternative to NATO for minimizing the possibility of war in Europe.

[16] Such unfairness would arise if the apparently less alarmed ally is in fact only pretending that the threat is low in the hope that the alarmed member will take on more than its fair share of required deterrence and defense. Such subterfuge is improbable and infeasible in a coalition of open democratic societies. There are, however, predispositions that subconsciously condition acts of threat perception, and it is possible that the governments of countries desirous of spending less on defense will wishfully recognize a lesser external threat, as happens commonly within nations when one political party, wishing to spend more on domestic welfare at the expense of defense conveniently perceives an external threat to have declined. It is in the nature of the problem that we cannot be sure if and when this happens.

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Any comparison of contributions by the members of NATO is lacking without consideration of the qualitative factors that determine the transformation of defense money into usable military capabilities. This requirement draws attention to the efficiency — both in manufacturing enterprise and in government bureaucracy — with which money is made to yield things of military value, and also makes qualitative differences in the fighting capacity of men and machines a matter of keen interest.

Thus, an inquiry into national differences in converting defense money into effective military strength would be relevant. Inefficiency of American management has received lively criticism in the Congress and the press. Unfortunately, no one is able to measure the actual magnitude of the resulting waste, and we do not know to what extent the defense efforts of our allies suffer from similar deficiencies. Even if it were wanted, rigorous comparison would be prevented by lack of hard data. But allied governments are also reluctant to question comparative inefficiencies. These governments similarly refrain from comment on the comparative *quality* of their armed forces although rumors occasionally reach the press. Yet these qualitative matters cannot be quietly dropped in any serious exploration of who gets and pays what in an alliance. These important lacunae must be noted, and any comparative conclusions that are advanced must be considered incomplete.

Finally, another matter defying quantification, do substantial benefits unshared by its allies accrue to the United States as a result of its leadership in NATO? While it is probably true that American leaders have been enjoying the role of leadership per se — though it has also been burdensome at times — this again concerns a benefit virtually impossible to trace and evaluate.

But the prominent role that the United States has been playing in the world since World War II, including its ability to establish and maintain a desirable international economic order, has undoubtedly depended in no small part on the cooperation of its allies. Without this support, and without NATO's capacity to deny the Soviet Union the dominant influence to which its superior military strength would have given rise in Europe, the United States would have been less of a superpower. It would have exerted much less influence over the direction of events in the world at large. The role of alliance leader has increased U.S. influence on the non-security policies, e.g., economic, of its allies than it would have enjoyed otherwise.

Critics[17] representing political minorities in Western Europe have charged that the United States has been abusing its leadership in

[17] These critics in West Germany, Britain, and some of the smaller countries question or deny the value of NATO to their societies and have evinced a strong interest in alternative security arrangements, especially a neutral or unaligned status between East and West.

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NATO by using alliance resources, or threats based thereon, to pursue a game of superpower rivalry that not only does not serve West European interests but creates unnecessary risks of East-West war. If true, this would be an example of a disadvantage the United States has imposed on the other members of NATO. Again, this allegation is difficult to evaluate inasmuch as the United States regards its endeavor to contain the expansion of Soviet rule and power globally as serving the interests of its allies as well as its own. It is nevertheless plausible to assert as a matter of judgment that the United States — as alliance leader — has been able to bring about a favorable balance of costs and benefits flowing from NATO.[18]

It is also plausible that to be a follower of the United States has not been without special costs that originate in the idiosyncrasies of the alliance leader. In this country, public moods, the ideological and moralist predispositions of presidents and parties often changing swiftly (as under Presidents Carter and Reagan), and the peculiar and extravagant exigencies of presidential election campaigns are allowed to encumber foreign policy with a stupefying lack of steadiness.[19] To a degree unknown in Europe this high changeability, often involving sudden and substantial shifts, makes American policy rather undependable and unpredictable, and places a heavy strain on the capacity of allies to adjust, i.e., to support these vagaries as they emerge and support them before their publics.

Conclusion on the American Burden

With one exception, any careful analysis will find it hard to conclude that the United States has been carrying, relative to national economic capacity, an inequitable share of the burdens that the major members of NATO (Class I and II) have assumed for purposes of military deterrence and defense vis-à-vis the USSR. Even a comparison limited to budgetary data cannot show inequity once allowance is made for the high cost of military manpower in the United States, and for the proportion of American forces earmarked for missions outside Europe and the Atlantic. Nor does the inclusion of a larger range of national costs and gains on alliance account argue for a different conclusion. The conclusion is, however, based in part on judgment and to that extent permits controversy.

The exception mentioned above refers to the U.S. commitment to protect its European allies by means of nuclear threats that raise an

[18] Lee Bruce Russett, "The Mysterious Use of Vanishing Hegemony; or, Is Mark Twain Really Dead?" *International Organization,* Spring 1985, p. 228.

[19] See James Schlesinger, "The Eagle and the Bear," *Foreign Affairs,* Summer 1985, pp. 951-58.

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appreciable risk of its own annihilation. Whether or not this grave risk tilts the intra-alliance sharing of burdens appreciably or even decisively against this country depends on an estimate of how great the risk actually is and on how vital the freedom of Western Europe is to the American interest. Neither the risk nor the stake are constants. Both will vary in response to changes, first in the international environment (e.g., the relative military capabilities of the two superpowers) and, second, in national environments that affect the evaluation of risk and stake (e.g., a spread of neutralist sentiment in Western Europe could reduce the value of the stake). Only Americans can decide on whether the nuclear commitment is worth maintaining. Washington has grown sufficiently uneasy to plead for stronger conventional forces in Europe in order to make Western security less dependent on the strategic nuclear threat. But it has not, so far, determined that NATO has become a net disability to the United States.

General Conclusions on Burden-Sharing

If we want to examine burden-sharing in a defensive alliance from a normative point of view, equality (with allowance for the different size of nations) is not a fruitful concept because nations differ in their ability to share burdens. Such ability may be circumscribed economically, by a relatively low level of economic development, and politically, as when strong domestic opposition imperils continued membership in the alliance. To distribute burdens "equitably" appears a more feasible norm, but only at the cost of prescriptive vagueness. Exclusive concentration on economic burdens, as expressed in military budgets, besides encountering technical difficulties, is unjustified in view of the presence of non-economic burdens. Indeed, any approach to approximate fairness in the distribution of costs is unrealistic without also considering national differences in the receipt of various benefits. Appreciable differences in the distribution of burdens mainly reflect differences in the degree that members believe their welfare depends on the alliance. The intra-alliance distribution of costs and gains is not as important as the national balance of advantages and disadvantages. To the extent a country behaves rationally, it will join or stay in an alliance as long as the benefits exceed the disadvantages, even if it bears more burdens in proportion to size and wealth, than do other members. By means of negotiating alliance business, and also by unilateral acts (e.g., modifying defense expenditures), members may attempt to manipulate the net balance of costs and gains, and thereby also the distribution of these within the alliance, or they will end up effecting such changes even when deliberate manipulation is

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absent. Regarding outcomes of intra-alliance bargaining on matters affecting the balance of benefits and disadvantages, bargaining power tends to be determined in the manner of the strength of reciprocal demand in microeconomic situations. The more a member wants the alliance or particular alliance programs, the more he will have to pay, in one form or another compared with less eager members. If X is more afraid than Y of external aggression, and sees no better alternative to improved security, then X is ready to make concessions in exchange for Y's full cooperation.

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A NEW DIMENSION TO SOVIET THEATER STRATEGY*

by Dennis M. Gormley

Conventional wisdom holds that the Soviet Union trails the West in modern warfare technology. But the Soviet Union has already deployed its first highly accurate dual-capable missiles in Eastern Europe. Tied to an offensive strategy emphasizing the pre-emptive employment of massive numbers of high-performance aircraft, these new short-range missiles (SS-21, SS-22, and SS-23) presage an emerging set of Soviet attack options that promise, by the start of the next decade, to turn currently debatable shortcomings in NATO's defenses into clearly dangerous deficiencies.[1]

Belated recognition of this emerging short-range missile threat stems only in part from the West's preoccupation with longer-range SS-20 missiles, which threaten all of Western Europe, the Middle East, China, and Japan from sites within the Soviet Union. NATO also de-emphasized Moscow's retaliation for the Alliance's deployment of Pershing and cruise missiles. The Kremlin's retaliation included the deployment of enhanced-range operational-tactical missiles in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. Rather than worrying aloud about the serious import of these developments and granting Moscow political capital, Western officials represented the new generation of Soviet short-range missiles as a long overdue,

* I am indebted to the late Gary Lang for his encouragement and support of research for this article, and to Richard Brody, Douglas Hart, Albert Wohlstetter, and David Yost for their comments on an earlier draft. This article will appear as a chapter in a forthcoming book *Swords and Shields: Options for Long-Range Offense and Defense,* edited by Fred S. Hoffman, Albert Wohlstetter, and Davis S. Yost.

[1] Although a wide variety of different Soviet delivery systems are referred to in this article, primary attention focuses on Soviet dual-capable (nuclear and nonnuclear) delivery systems with a range no greater than 1,000 kilometers. This restriction necessarily includes "tactical" missiles (e.g., SS-21) organic to Soviet (and Warsaw Pact) divisions; "operational-tactical" missiles (e.g., SS-22 and SS-23) organic to armies and fronts; and dual-capable aircraft organic to theater or regional commands. By way of distinction, Soviet longer-range theater nuclear missiles (e.g., SS-20) are subordinate to the Strategic Rocket Forces, which claim responsibility for nuclear missile systems with ranges greater than 1000 kilometers. The term "short-range missiles" is meant to include tactical and operational-tactical ballistic missiles organic to Warsaw Pact ground formations. The author first drew attention to the implications of new Soviet short-range conventional missiles in Dennis Gormley, "Peace and War: Narrowing the Gap," *The Times* (London), August 7, 1984.

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routine modernization of Soviet tactical nuclear missiles which have been in Eastern Europe for years.[2]

But the Soviet Union's new missiles have a far more serious dimension. NATO has little strategic depth. Most of its highest value military installations (nuclear weapon sites, airfields, air defense sites, and storage depots), a few hundred in number, are within 500 kilometers of the inter-German border. Based in Eastern Europe, new enhanced-range Soviet missiles could easily cover most of these targets. More important, major improvements in missile accuracy and conventional warhead effectiveness suggest that, once the new generation of short-range missiles is fully deployed, such attacks could be conducted without the immense escalatory risks of a nuclear attack.

The Soviet Union is by no means invulnerable. Several prominent weaknesses, among them the questionable reliability of the USSR's reluctant allies, command and control inflexibility under rapidly changing circumstances, and shortcomings in theater reconnaissance capabilities, would probably combine to render any Soviet prospects for a sustained offensive highly uncertain. Ironically, the convergence of these vulnerabilities with the Soviet Union's emerging attack options makes the Warsaw Pact more — not less — ominous an adversary, especially in uncertain crisis situations. Perhaps the best way for Soviet planners to reconcile Warsaw Pact weaknesses is through the achievement of decisive results pre-emptively in the first campaign of a future war, before events can get out of hand.[3]

These developments raise a host of questions, and their answers will undoubtedly influence NATO force planning at least over the next decade. What role will new short-range missiles play in Soviet theater strategy? How have Soviet planners modified their operational concepts of war to exploit the advent of new dual-capable missiles? Given the projected capabilities of dual-capable missiles, what specific NATO vulnerabilities are of prime interest to Warsaw Pact attack planners? Appraising the implications of this new dimension for Soviet theater strategy seems unequivocally compelling. NATO faces hard choices over whether active, passive, or a combination of defensive measures would best cope with the threat of new short-range missiles. This article offers an opera-

[2] See, for example, Hedrick Smith, "U.S. Arms Official Offers View on Talks," *New York Times,* December 7, 1983.

[3] Joshua M. Epstein has observed that pre-emption offers the Soviets a way of accommodating their weaknesses because "a successful preemption nips uncertainty in the bud." See Epstein's *Measuring Military Power: The Soviet Air Threat to Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 185-88. Epstein's work, however, only analyzes the role and effectiveness of Soviet tactical aviation; it does not consider the synergistic benefits that would flow from the combined use of conventionally armed missiles and tactical aircraft especially in a pre-emptive role. Benjamin S. Lambeth has also cautioned that Soviet uncertainties can either foster hesitancy or forceful action, depending on the stakes. ("Uncertainties for the Soviet War Planner," *International Security,* Winter 1982/83, pp. 139-66).

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tional context within which these choices must be considered: that of emerging Soviet nuclear and nonnuclear attack options that exploit inviting NATO vulnerabilities.

Historical Antecedents

Any discussion of emerging Warsaw Pact attack options must be viewed against the broader historical backdrop of a persistent Soviet effort to develop military instruments for deep operations. Attention to the changing nature of Soviet views on modern warfare is especially important in appraising the role of emerging technologies in Soviet theater warfare strategy. All too frequently, Western views of Soviet concepts of warfare are harnessed exclusively to the role of nuclear weapons as developed under Nikita Khrushchev in the late 1950s. It is not the purpose here to argue that the historical antecedents to contemporary expressions of Soviet military thought hold no relevance to the subject of this article; on the contrary, Soviet military theoreticians are loath to discard anything that has stood the test of time. Nevertheless, the Soviet predilection to retain traditions should not lead us to ignore Moscow's acceptance of new military options.

A consistent set of Soviet views about the most probable theater warfare contingencies has emerged from the last three and a half decades of military thought and force development. Broadly outlined, they include three major courses of conflict.

(1) Massive use of nuclear strikes at the outset of conflict to the full depth of involved theaters of military operations (TVDs).[4] Such a contingency would immediately involve the use of Soviet homeland-based strategic nuclear forces against European targets, with follow-up exploitation by Warsaw Pact ground and air forces.

(2) An escalating conflict in which an initial (and relatively short) period of conventional operations precedes an increasingly more widespread use of nuclear weapons. The nuclear phase of such a conflict could proceed immediately to the use of Soviet homeland-based forces, or more likely would begin with tactical nuclear weapons and thereupon escalate rapidly to general nuclear warfare. A different version of such an escalatory conflict might include nuclear operations in one TVD during which only conventional operations were conducted in another TVD.

[4] Soviet military authors define the TVD as a large geographic area that "permits the concentration and deployment of strategic groupings of forces and the carrying out by them of military operations in accomplishment of strategic missions." (This definition is cited and discussed in Dennis M. Gormley, "Understanding Soviet Motivations for Deploying Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces," *Military Review*, Vol. LXI, No. 9, September 1981, pp. 20-34.)

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(3) A conventional-only conflict, in which major strategic operations are successfully carried out within one or more TVDs without recourse to nuclear weapons.

Naturally, each major contingency calls for a different mix of nuclear and conventional forces. Under the first contingency, short-range nuclear forces organic to Warsaw Pact ground force commanders would play only a secondary role to strategic nuclear forces. Indeed, severe limits in short-range missiles, rockets, and aircraft compelled Soviet planners throughout the 1960s to depend heavily on strategic missiles and aircraft to support front targeting.[5]

The second contingency, in contrast, would require greater numbers and vastly more flexible short-range forces to contend with more varied circumstances. To be sure, the Soviet force development process was already contributing improved military instruments by the mid-1960s; the product-improved Scud-B missile demonstrated an 87 percent increase in range over its predecessor, while the Frog-7 rocket showed a 40 percent increase. The most substantial improvement in front-organic nuclear delivery came in tactical aviation. What had been in the 1960s a force limited in both numbers and range became in the 1970s a force of considerable means. Over the period 1965 to 1977, the offensive load capacity of Soviet frontal aviation in Eastern Europe grew by 90 percent.[6] In about a decade, the Soviet inventory of short-range nuclear delivery systems (Frogs, Scuds, dual-capable aircraft, and nuclear artillery) doubled in size to represent roughly a two and one-half to one advantage over equivalent NATO systems by the mid-1970s.[7]

Surely, Soviet military planners could not hope to succeed in the third contingency — the focus of the balance of this article — without substantial support from highly accurate dual-capable fire support.

There appears to be a relationship between the changing nature of Soviet doctrinal views and the acquisition of supporting short-range forces. It is difficult to discern precisely what factors most influence the development of new Soviet doctrine and supporting military instruments. Nonetheless, the general outlines of the reciprocal relationship between doctrine and technology are evident in the Soviet force development process. In this regard, the force development process reflects a complex, interactive association between doctrine and technology in which, as David Holloway writes, "technological change exerts a determining in-

[5] Joseph Douglass, *The Soviet Theater Nuclear Offensive* (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1976), pp. 73-74.

[6] Robert P. Berman, *Soviet Air Power in Transition* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1978), p. 54.

[7] J. J. Martin, "How the Soviet Union Came to Gain Escalation Dominance — Trends and Asymmetries in the Theater Nuclear Balance," in *The Soviet Asset, Military Power in the Competition over Europe*, edited by Uwe Nerlich (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1983), pp. 110-11, 114-15.

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fluence on the methods of warfare, but doctrine has a significant role in adapting those methods to new weapons."[8]

Within this interdependent relationship, other factors impinge upon the force development process.[9] Soviet perceptions of potential adversary doctrinal and technological challenges surely play an important role. Doctrinally, the Soviet Union has witnessed several abrupt postwar shifts in U.S. military policy — Eisenhower's "massive retaliation" and Kennedy's "flexible response" are only the most glaring examples. Technologically, the Soviet military must cope with high levels of innovation and technical virtuosity in Western military developments. Finally, the bureaucratic politics of the Soviet military-industrial complex obviously affect the force development process. Khrushchev used military doctrine to divert resources from the military into the civilian sector of the Soviet economy. And numerous struggles for power and resources have occurred between and within the branches of the Soviet armed forces — all these condition the process of force development.[10]

Former Chief of the General Staff Marshal Nikolai V. Ogarkov views the creation and production of sufficient quantities of new weapons as the starting point of the force development process.[11] Once these quantities are achieved, this "new qualitative condition" influences the development of new forms and methods of combat, as well as the organizational structure of the armed forces. Thus, quantitative and qualitative improvements in short-range forces have occasioned a radical shift in Soviet views on the use of these weapons as instruments of theater strategy. No longer are they seen as just a follow-up force to strategic and long-range theater forces. Instead, especially with the mass introduction of highly accurate conventional missiles, they are now regarded as a means to achieve the decisive results hitherto thought possible only with nuclear weapons.

Contemporary Soviet Theater Strategy

Emerging Soviet military technologies — longer-range, highly accurate, dual-capable delivery systems in particular — foreshadow the capacity to furnish conventional solutions for nuclear problems. Pre-

[8] David Holloway, "Doctrine and Technology in Soviet Armaments Policy," in *Soviet Military Thinking*, edited by Derek Leebaert (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981), p. 266.

[9] For a detailed discussion of these factors, see Dennis M. Gormley, et al., *Soviet Perceptions of and Responses to U.S. Nuclear Weapon Development and Deployment*, Pacific-Sierra Research Corporation, PSR Report 1211, June 1982.

[10] Edward L. Warner, *The Military in Contemporary Soviet Politics* (New York: Praeger, 1977), pp. 153-55 and 175-88.

[11] N. V. Ogarkov, *Always in Readiness to Defend the Fatherland* (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1982), p. 83.

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venting NATO from employing nuclear weapons, the threat that constitutes the heart of NATO's deterrent strategy, forms the crux of the Soviet problem. The solution to this operational conundrum lies in the Soviet force development process. The deployment of enough new weapons in the 1960s enabled Soviet military theoreticians to perfect new forms and methods of combat operations, giving hope that a war could be conducted by stages; a new phase in the process of force development now offers the prospect of conducting decisive missions (such as preventing NATO's nuclear riposte) without using nuclear weapons. Then Minister of Defense A. A. Grechko reflected on the process in his 1975 book when he suggested that

> due to a *qualitative* improvement in conventional means of destruction and the *increase in units and formations,* there has been a great improvement in the fire, shock and maneuver capabilities of troops, which permits assigning them very decisive missions on the battlefield which they are capable of accomplishing without resorting to nuclear weapons.[12] (Emphasis added.)

Yet, the quality and quantity of new conventional weapons represent necessary, if insufficient, conditions to bring the latest phase in the force development process full cycle. At least two additional conditions seemed in order: the necessity, first, to modify and improve operational concepts of war that would materially capitalize on the availability of new and better conventional weapons and, second, to reshape the Soviet armed forces to enable them to execute these newly accommodated operational concepts.

To that end, the Soviet military instituted the following operational and organizational changes in the mid- to late 1970s:

(1) Soviet planners reorganized the air force and air defense force to provide greater flexibility in employing long-range strike aircraft, organic close-air support, and air defense of the ground forces. Consistent with these changes, they refined the air operation, which, in effect, substitutes for an initial mass nuclear strike against high-value military targets throughout the depth of NATO's defense.[13]

(2) They revised the World War II "mobile group" concept in the guise of operational maneuver groups (OMG). Broadly speaking, the function of the OMG is to penetrate NATO lines rapidly, create

[12] A. A. Grechko, *The Armed Forces of the Soviet State* (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1975), translated by U.S. Air Force, Soviet Military Thought Series, No. 12 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, n.d., pp. 147-48).

[13] See, for example, Tommy L. Whetton, "The Changing Role of Air Power in Soviet Combined-Arms Doctrine," an unpublished paper presented at the Fourteenth Annual Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, October 15, 1982, especially pp. 8-10.

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paralysis and eventually complete collapse before NATO can employ nuclear weapons.[14]

(3) They streamlined logistics command and control and pre-stocked large quantities of ammunition (sixty to ninety days), fuel (ninety days), and other war supplies in forward areas. In the past, NATO could count on detecting an impending offensive by monitoring the movement of supplies from rear-area dumps to forward positions. Such an expectation is no longer the case.[15]

(4) Major improvements in the mobility and firepower of Soviet airborne divisions coupled with helicopter-borne air-assault brigades suggested a highly coordinated approach to deep-penetration attacks against NATO high-value targets.

(5) Now that front commanders possessed weapons with ranges capable of influence well beyond a front's area of interest, the general staff saw the need to coordinate the activities of several fronts. To that end, Soviet planners re-established the concept of the High Command in the TVD, which is designed to control the complex timing and execution of multifront air, missile, airborne, and ground activity of a conventional strategic offensive in a continental TVD.[16] This command and control feature, together with the restructuring of air and air defense forces, places Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces in a more streamlined posture to respond to modern war conditions. Principally, those conditions dictate surprise and pre-emptive action.

The operational objectives of contemporary Soviet theater strategy are simple to conceive but complex to execute. The massive nuclear and escalating contingencies held a straightforward solution to the problem of disrupting NATO's nuclear weapons, air forces, and command and control centers: massive missile- and air-delivered nuclear weapons employed pre-emptively at the start, or soon after the start, of war. A conventional solution to a nuclear problem would require a qualitatively new role for a front commander's short-range delivery systems (especially missiles) if Soviet planners were to be confident of success.

The Soviet notion of a strategic operation in the Western TVD envisions a decisive period of conventional operations causing a rapid collapse of Western defenses, especially NATO's ability to escalate to the

[14] For a more detailed discussion, see Phillip H. Petersen and John G. Hines. "The Conventional Offensive in Soviet Theater Strategy," ORBIS, Fall 1983, pp. 695-739.

[15] Changes in the Warsaw Pact logistics structure are reported in U.S. Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power 1985* (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1985), pp. 65-66. The value of Warsaw Pact logistics activity as a warning indicator is discussed in William J. Lewis, *The Warsaw Pact: Arms, Doctrine, and Strategy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Institute for Foreign Analysis, 1982), p. 234.

[16] For a detailed discussion, see Gregory C. Baird, "Glavnoe Kommandovanie: The Soviet Theater Command," *Naval War College Review,* May-June 1980, pp. 40-48; and "The Soviet Theatre Command — An Update," NWCR, November-December 1981, pp. 90-94.

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nuclear level. How much of NATO's nuclear capability must necessarily be disrupted to achieve disintegration of NATO's political will is unknowable; presumably, the higher the percentage the lower the NATO incentive to escalate. Soviet expectations of executing such a bold strategy hinge on employment of a formula that not only exploits improved mobility, firepower, and weapon accuracy but also denies NATO the use of its own improved military capabilities before they can be fully mobilized.

The Soviet operational concept entails employment of division- and perhaps army-sized OMGs to prevent NATO from organizing a coherent in-depth defense. Emphasizing surprise and high-speed advances, OMGs would attempt to penetrate deep into NATO's rear to disrupt or destroy nuclear weapons, aircraft, logistic support, command and control centers, and reserve and withdrawal forces. Success would depend on important variables, most critically winning the counter-air campaign. The effective commitment of OMGs early in a theaterwide campaign presupposes a successful air operation against NATO to reduce the chance of air attacks on OMGs before, during, and after their insertion. Soviet planners view NATO's air assets as having the requisite speed and firepower to react decisively to OMG penetrations. Equally important, the air operation would be expected to disrupt NATO's air defense network to enable friendly fighter-bombers, helicopters, and transport aircraft to accompany or follow OMG penetrations. Airborne and helicopter assaults simply cannot be executed until the air battle is won.

Many skeptical Western analysts question whether the Warsaw Pact could achieve the air superiority needed to enable deep raids behind NATO's forward lines and whether a Soviet junior officer corps practiced in conformity to predetermined war plans possesses the initiative and flexibility to react decisively under such complex battle conditions.[17] However legitimate, these questions focus on the kind of contingency the Soviet Union least prefers: one in which NATO has had sufficient time to mobilize its superior military potential. Soviet military planners share the skeptics' doubts over Warsaw Pact prospects under these conditions. Their solution lies in exploiting the "initial period of war" when the number of installations (targets) that must be attacked to achieve decisive results is relatively small compared with the targeting requirements of the post-mobilization period. In his 1974 book, *Initial Period of War,* General S. P. Ivanov emphasizes the role of surprise

> to inflict a decisive defeat on the enemy's first strategic echelon; and then, by continuing with a speedy offensive into the depths of his territory, to complete

[17] These doubts were expressed by Lt. Col. Gunter Lippert at the German Strategy Forum held in June 1984, as reported in Elizabeth Pond, "Hints of Soviet Fast-Strike Force Make NATO Think Twice on Europe Defense," *Christian Science Monitor,* July 10, 1984.

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his total defeat before he was able to mobilize and make use of his military and economic potential.[18]

A short, decisive campaign also helps to compensate for shortcomings in the flexibility of the officer corps' lower ranks (through intensive pre-planning) and the uncertain reliability of the Soviet Union's Warsaw Pact allies (as a short war reduces their opportunities to opt out).[19]

What are the constituents of this decisive, pre-emptive attack during the initial period of war? In the late 1970s, Western analysts accorded much attention to the role of Soviet Frontal Aviation in conducting a massive conventional air operation against NATO's nuclear forces, command posts, and airfields at the beginning of hostilities.[20] To be sure, the 1970s brought dramatic improvements to Frontal Aviation's assets: nearly a doubling in offensive load capacity and 70 percent more versatility over the preceding generation of aircraft.[21] By 1978, the Central Intelligence Agency estimated that Frontal Aviation's share of Soviet defense spending was about twice that of the Strategic Rocket Forces, a figure aptly reflecting the increased burden assumed by the operational front commander for furnishing pre-emptive shock power at the outset.[22]

But it is shortsighted to view Frontal Aviation as the linchpin of Soviet theater warfare strategy.[23] Although the air operation does substitute for the initial mass nuclear strike of the massive nuclear and escalatory contingencies, its constituents are more varied and complex than is implied by its appellation. Indeed, before Frontal Aviation's attack through selected NATO air defense sectors, tactical and operational-tactical missile forces would strike NATO's air defenses and other high-priority NATO targets with improved conventional munitions, while electronic warfare aircraft would disrupt the NATO air defense radar and communications network. After Frontal Aviation's attack, longer-range aircraft of the Supreme High Command (including SU-24 Fencers and TU-26 Backfires, for example) would attack high-priority targets to the depth of the theater. This panoply of missile and air activity would precede and thereby enable, having achieved air superiority, the initiation of warfare on the ground by an equally varied mix of airborne, air assault, and

[18] S. P. Ivanov, *Initial Period of War* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1974) as cited in P. H. Vigor, *Soviet Blitzkrieg Theory* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), p. viii.

[19] A. Ross Johnson, Robert W. Dean, and Alexander Alexiev, *East European Military Establishments: The Warsaw Pact Northern Tier* (New York: Crane-Russak, 1982), p. 148.

[20] For more details see Phillip A. Petersen, *Soviet Air Power and the Pursuit of New Military Options,* Studies in Communist Affairs, Vol. 3 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979), passim.

[21] Berman, *Soviet Air Power in Transition,* p. 31.

[22] Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, *Estimated Soviet Defense Spending: Trends and Prospects* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978), pp. 3-4.

[23] For example, see Epstein, *Measuring Military Power,* pp. 5-7. Epstein's work was completed prior to widespread recognition of the emergence of dual-capable short-range ballistic missiles.

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OMG formations.[24] If any part of the air operation's force constituents merits the epithet "linchpin," it is the emerging force of highly accurate short-range ballistic missiles now being deployed in increasing numbers with Soviet ground-force units in Eastern Europe.

The Role of Soviet Short-Range Missiles

Growing Soviet confidence in the shorter-range theater forces became evident in the mid-1970s. Lectures at the Soviet General Staff Academy during this period reveal that Soviet planners thought limited nuclear war feasible even in central Europe.[25] Such a conflict would be limited in that only front-subordinated short-range nuclear systems—not the entire arsenal or even limited portions of the strategic arsenal—would be used initially after an indeterminate period of conventional warfare. The prospects for escalation to strategic nuclear conflict, especially in the Western TVD, were viewed as strong. Confidence that operational-tactical nuclear pre-emption could be conducted as a separate phase grew largely out of the significant improvement in the number, combat radius, and offensive load capacity of dual-capable Frontal Aviation. Moreover, Frontal Aviation was expected to bear the brunt of conventional strike missions during the conventional phase of operation.

In contrast, the tactical and operational-tactical missile force experienced hardly any development during the 1960s. A recent examination of the pattern of Soviet land-based missile development programs for 1950 to 1976 reveals a consistent growth pattern with one important exception: a hiatus in development activity from 1962 to 1971, accounted for by termination of upgrade programs for short-range missiles.[26] While the Frog-7 (the last of the tactical free-flight rockets deployed in 1965) and Scud-B (operational-tactical ballistic missile deployed also in 1965) had demonstrated modest range improvements over their predecessors, poor accuracies prevented their playing an active role in the nascent conventional pre-emption phase. The accuracy dilemma also held true for the SS-12 Scaleboard, which was deployed in 1968 exclusively in the Soviet Union despite its operational-tactical designation and organic relationship to fronts. Without a solution to the accuracy dilemma — a technologically challenging task indeed — Soviet defense decision makers probably saw little purpose in further development work simply to improve

[24] Petersen and Hines, "Soviet Theater Strategy," pp. 708-709.

[25] As cited in Notra Trulock III, "Weapons of Mass Destruction in Soviet Military Strategy," an unpublished paper presented at the Joint Conference on Soviet Military Strategy in Europe, sponsored by the Boston Foreign Affairs Group and the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies on September 24-25, 1984, Oxford, England, pp. 77-78.

[26] Stephen M. Meyer, "Soviet Theatre Nuclear Forces, Part II: Capabilities and Implications," *Adelphi Papers*, No. 188 (London: IISS, 1983/84), p. 2.

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operational-tactical missile range, reliability, and readiness, especially during a decade of significant growth in resources for the Strategic Rocket Forces.

Having skipped a new generation of short-range missiles in the 1960s, the Soviet Union initiated new development programs in earnest beginning in 1971 (SS-21) and continuing into the decade (SS-22 in 1973 and the SS-23 in 1975).[27] It appears that the initial version of all three missiles did not possess the terminal effectiveness (a combination of high accuracy and tailored munitions) needed for full-scale conventional use.[28] But by the end of the decade, follow-on versions apparently demonstrated major improvements in guidance and munition effectiveness. A 1979 partially declassified threat briefing by the U.S. Tactical Air Command reports that

> previously, Soviet SRBMs [short-range ballistic missiles] were considered primarily a nuclear threat. However, recent evidence indicates the Soviets may be developing a credible conventional SRBM capability against a variety of threats, including airfields.[29]

More recently, NATO officials revealed that the Soviet military is developing submunition payloads for the SS-22 and SS-23 missiles, while the SS-21 is already deployed with such a conventional payload.[30] As far as improved accuracy is concerned, the U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering recently disclosed that upgraded models of the SS-21, SS-22, and SS-23 have accuracies permitting their payloads to hit within thirty meters of their targets.[31] This increase represents an advancement over their predecessors (Frog, Scaleboard, and Scud) by roughly a factor of twenty-five.[32] And by no means would this force represent a terminal point in force development. In discussing evolutionary improvements in conventional weapons in general, one senior

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[27] Ibid., p. 56. Midpoint on the uncertainty scale has been selected as the starting point.

[28] Ibid., p. 54. The author reports CEP accuracies (averaged) of 200, 300, and 400 meters for the SS-21, SS-22, and SS-23, respectively.

[29] Quoted in William Arkin and Jeffrey T. Sands, "The Soviet Nuclear Stockpile," *Arms Control Today,* June 1984, p. 5.

[30] Soviet improved conventional munitions for the SS-21, SS-22 and SS-23 are reported in *International Defense Review,* Vol. 4, 1984, p. 373. See also *Soviet Military Power 1985,* n. 15, p. 38.

[31] The defense official was Richard D. DeLauer, as reported by Walter Andrews, "Allies' Weapons Said to be Inadequate to Threat of New Soviet Missile Power," *Washington Times,* November 1, 1984. An accuracy of fifty yards is reported for the SS-21 in "Missile Deployment Strains U.S.-European Alliance, Tass Claims," *Washington Times,* May 30, 1984. Terminal guidance for ballistic missiles such as the Pershing II produce accuracies on the order of thirty to fifty meters. Moreover, current U.S. developmental programs for cruise missiles promise CEPs of three meters or less. See *Armed Forces Journal International,* March 1983, p. 80.

[32] Frog, Scaleboard, and Scud accuracy estimates (800, 463-927, and 570-900 meters, respectively) are derived from Secretary of Defense, *The Effectiveness of United States Military Aid to Israel (ISMILAID),* Vol. 1, December 1974, declassified, p. IV 80; and Department of State, *Memorandum for the Verification Panel Working Group,* October 2, 1972, declassified, p. 23.

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Soviet military observer expects "that the new generation of armaments will be superior to the previous in terms of range several times over, in power tens of times, and in accuracy hundreds of times."[33]

The emerging capacity of new Soviet missiles has been obscured by political events surrounding their introduction into the Soviet forces in Eastern Europe. In October 1983, Moscow announced that the Soviet Union would deploy "enhanced range operational-tactical missile complexes" in East Germany and Czechoslovakia in retaliation for NATO's deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles. Although the Western response mistakenly (or perhaps intentionally) described the Soviet retaliation as including SS-21, SS-22, and SS-23 missiles (when, in fact, the tag "enhanced range operational-tactical" probably refers to the SS-22, or possibly the SS-23, but certainly not the "tactical" SS-21), it avoided any mention of the new conventional role for these missiles; instead it drew attention to and confirmed the Soviet admission that nuclear warheads are stored routinely with Soviet units in Eastern Europe.[34]

The 120-kilometer range SS-21 ballistic missile is replacing the 70-kilometer range Frog-7 in Soviet divisions. All of the seventy-six Soviet Frog launchers with Soviet divisions in East Germany have apparently been replaced by the SS-21 system at a reported rate of four per month.[35] Another 240 or so Frog launchers are deployed elsewhere in Eastern Europe.

The army- and front-level SS-23 missile is slated to succeed the Scud missile. About 300 Scud launchers are deployed throughout Eastern Europe. If deployment of the SS-23 begins there in 1986 at a pace similar to the SS-21's, all Soviet Scud brigades in East Germany could be fully converted to the new missile by 1989. The new missile's 500-kilometer range is 200 kilometers greater than that of the Scud.

The front-level, 900-kilometer range SS-22 missile replaces the SS-12 Scaleboard. It appears that the SS-22 does not represent a wholesale generational change over the SS-12, in that it uses the same launcher and has no reported improvement in range.[36] This missile probably embodies the heart of the Soviet retaliation for Pershing and cruise missile deployments. The full extent of its deployment to East Germany and Czechoslovakia is unclear, but it signals the first time that missiles of this range have been located outside Soviet borders. From launch locations in East

[33] General-Major I. Vorob'ev, "Modern Weapons and Tactics," *Krasnaya Zvezda,* September 15, 1984, p. 2.

[34] "U.S.: Nuclear Warheads in E. Europe," *Washington Post,* June 4, 1983.

[35] Michael Getler, "New Generation of Soviet Arms Near Deployment," *Washington Post,* October 11, 1983. Getler notes that the Soviets were adding four new SS-21 missile launchers per month in East Germany, and that thirty to fifty were believed deployed at that time. Assuming that rate was continued, all units in CSFG should currently have SS-21 (vice Frog-7) launchers.

[36] *International Defense Review,* see n. 30.

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Germany, the SS-22 extends Soviet operational-tactical missile coverage to NATO Europe's rear areas; its movement forward also avoids the loss of surprise that would result from the 700-kilometer trek from the western USSR into Eastern Europe.

In addition to the qualitative improvements, evidence shows an increase in the number of launchers organic to a Soviet front. Army- and front-subordinated Scud brigades are now equipped with twelve to eighteen launchers; the higher number represents the addition of another two-launcher battery to each of the brigade's three battalions.[37] This growth appears similar to the incremental approach employed to expand Scud brigades from six to nine launchers during the 1960s and from nine to twelve launchers during the 1970s.[38] Such growth in short-range missile launchers would serve two closely related purposes: not only would it increase the number of launchers available for conventional missions, but it would compensate for the need to withhold perhaps one-third of the force to enable a rapid transition from conventional to nuclear warfare. Just as with dual-purpose Frontal Aviation, the advent of truly dual-capable missiles implies a need to deal with the transition dilemma. And despite strong Soviet interest in a conventional-only contingency, Soviet planners remain resolute in conveying the threat of pre-emptive theaterwide use of nuclear weapons should NATO be seen fit to employ what remains of its own nuclear capability after a conventional campaign.[39]

Soviet military planners view the mass introduction of qualitatively new missiles into Soviet ground-force formations as the means to achieve the kind of decisive effects previously the exclusive domain of nuclear weapons. When still chief of the General Staff, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov described the implications of this "qualitative leap" in conventional weapon effectiveness in a May 9, 1984, interview in the Soviet military newspaper *Krasnaya Zvezda:*

> Raid changes in the development of conventional means of destruction and the emergence in the developed countries of automated search and destroy complexes, long-range high-accuracy terminally guided combat systems, unmanned flying machines and qualitatively new electronic control systems make many types of weapons global and make it possible to sharply increase (by at least one order of magnitude) the destructive potential of conventional weapons, bringing them closer, so to speak, to weapons of mass destruction in terms of effectiveness. The sharply increased range of conventional weapons makes it possible immediately to extend active combat operations . . . to the whole country's territory, which

[37] FM-100-2-3, *Soviet Army Troops Organization and Equipment,* Coordinating Draft, August 1982, pp. 4-177. Launcher expansion is also reported in *Soviet Military Power 1985,* see n. 15, p. 38.

[38] *Development of the Soviet Forces in Our Sphere of Interest During the Past 20 Years,* Headquarters, Norwegian Defense Command, March 8, 1985, translated by the Norwegian Embassy, Washington, D.C.

[39] CPT 1st Rank L. I. Ol'shtynskiy, *Cooperation of the Army and Navy* (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1983), p. 7.

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was not possible in past wars. This qualitative leap in the development of conventional means of destruction will inevitably entail a change in the nature of the preparation and conduct of operations. This, in turn, predetermines the possibility of conducting military operations using conventional systems in qualitatively new, incomparable, more destructive forms than before. There is a sharp expansion in the zone of possible combat operations and the role and significance of the initial period of the war and its first operations become incomparably greater.[40]

The Soviet force development process dictates that qualitatively new means deployed in sufficient quantities ought to engender changes in the forms and methods of combat operations. Of special note here is Ogarkov's belief that long-range conventional weapons can immediately — in the first operations of the initial period of war (that is, before the enemy has fully mobilized) — achieve levels of effectiveness aproaching those of nuclear weapons.

The necessity to exploit the initial period of war is dominated by the requirements of the air operation. No longer can forward-based short-range missiles remain dormant during the early hours of war, as was the expectation for such forces during the 1960s and 1970s. The modern air operation has become, in effect, an operational surrogate for the initial mass nuclear strike; the success of subsequent ground operations rests on the air operation's achieving pre-emptive shock effect on an unprepared NATO. In this regard, an air operation's timing is crucial. In fact, the first shots of a war in Europe today would likely consist of an air operation's leading edge attacks by conventionally armed short-range missiles. And the overall operation would *precede* any contact between first-echelon Warsaw Pact ground units and NATO covering forces by at least a couple of hours.[41]

Pre-emptive incentives are also manifest in changes in Soviet fire-support concepts. To exploit the effectiveness of new conventional missiles, especially as they act in concert with improved air- and artillery-delivered conventional firepower, Soviet military planners have introduced a new conventional fire-support concept. Soviet fire-support doctrine traditionally included three phases: "fire preparation of the attack," initiated shortly before Soviet forces engage enemy defenses; "fire support of the attack," undertaken as Soviet forces penetrate enemy defenses; and "fire accompaniment," to support increasingly deeper exploitation of the enemy's rear areas.[42]

But, in view of the potential impact that new longer-range conventional weapons can have at the very beginning of war, Soviet

[40] N. V. Ogarkov, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, May 9, 1984, translated by BBC Monitoring Service (SU/7/639/C/10), May 9, 1984.
[41] Petersen and Hines "Soviet Theater Strategy," p. 709.
[42] Ibid., pp. 711-714.

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planners have adopted a new, preliminary fire-support phase called "fire support of advance from the depths." This new phase calls for conventional strikes against deep-based NATO aircraft and nuclear systems immediately as Warsaw Pact forces depart their initial assembly areas and move to the front where they can begin to engage enemy defenses.[43]

This new conventional fire-support phase is strikingly similar in design to a pre-emptive nuclear strike. Indeed, because Soviet planners see many new conventional weapons drawing closer to nuclear weapons in effectiveness, the launching of pre-emptive conventional fire strikes against equally potent enemy weapons is increasingly important.[44] Accordingly, an offensive operation would begin with

> strikes of all types of weapons and the resolute attack of tank and motorized rifle subunits. . . . It [a fire strike] is executed on the march or from a position of direct contact with the opponent. If nuclear weapons are used, the first way [that is, immediately after departure from assembly areas] is the basic one. *It is also advantageous when highly accurate conventional weapons are widely used,* since it permits maintaining to a great degree the combat capability of troops until the beginning of the attack.[45] (Emphasis added.)

Thus, the need to achieve operational surprise (and, thereby, pre-emption of the enemy's nuclear and advanced conventional systems) appears among the primary motivations for recent changes in Soviet fire-support concepts.

Of operational significance to surprise is Defense Minister Ustinov's 1982 declaration of the highest peacetime readiness norm ("combat alert duty") for "troops and naval forces stationed on the forward edge of our motherland and the socialist community."[46] Previously, only the Strategic Rocket Forces and, occasionally, SSBNs and the National Air Defense Troops have been singled out for the performance of combat alert duty.[47] Upgrading ground force readiness presumably includes corresponding improvements in organic missile readiness. Indeed, a segment of Soviet nuclear forces in Eastern Europe has reportedly been placed on "quick alert" for the first time.[48] This change in Soviet operational planning may relate to the introduction of new enhanced-range missiles into Eastern Europe in late 1983; it would roughly correspond to the quick-reaction alert status of a portion of NATO's Pershing missiles and dual-capable aircraft. Nonetheless, short-range missiles (nu-

[43] Ibid., p. 712.

[44] This point is made by Vorob'ev, "Modern Weapons and Tactics."

[45] Colonel P. Konoplis and Colonel A. Mal'shev, "Modern Offensive Battle," *Military Herald,* February 1984, as translated in *Strategic Review,* Spring 1984, p. 96.

[46] D. F. Ustinov, *We Serve the Motherland and the Cause of Communism* (Moscow, 1982), p. 82, as cited in James M. McConnell, "The Soviet Shift in Emphasis from Nuclear to Conventional," *Center for Naval Analyses, CRC 490-Vol II, June 1983, pp. 27-28.*

[47] Ibid., p. 27.

[48] Jay Mallin, Sr., "Russia at High Level of Battle Readiness," *Washington Times,* July 26, 1984.

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clear *and* conventional) on alert status would serve Soviet planners admirably in their quest to achieve pre-emptive surprise in the air operation and to furnish "fire support of advance from the depths." Such changes, of course, are wholly consistent with Marshal Ogarkov's emphasis on the exigencies of the initial period of war.

In sum, the Soviet Union is investing heavily in a new generation of short-range ballistic missiles to enable missiles based in Eastern Europe to participate fully in conventional pre-emption. To the extent that this force can contribute to the goal, Soviet planning confidence in executing the conventional-only contingency will grow. In fact, emerging missile improvements represent only the latest addition to the current cycle in the Soviet force development process: while Frontal Aviation's new weapon systems and technologies motivated the development of improved forms and methods of combat operations (conventional pre-emption via the air operation), highly accurate operational-tactical missiles are influencing the perfection of these operational concepts.

Emerging Nuclear and Nonnuclear Attack Options

A quick look at a map of Europe reveals why the combination of increased range, high accuracy, and rising launcher numbers for an emerging force of missiles based in Eastern Europe could make a substantial difference in Soviet war planning. Most of the West's highest value military installations in NATO'S central region are clustered within 500 kilometers of the inter-German border. As illustrated in figure 1, new Soviet missiles based in East Germany and Czechoslovakia could easily reach nearly all of these installations. To draw attention to an increasingly unstable set of NATO vulnerabilities, the remainder of this article describes NATO targets of greatest interest to Soviet planners and then illustrates possible Soviet attack options.

NATO's Nuclear Weapons

Perhaps the greatest difference between the NATO and Warsaw Pact approaches to targeting lies in NATO's intentional avoidance of striking the Pact's nuclear weapons during conventional operations (for fear of creating insurmountable escalatory incentives), while the Warasw Pact places NATO's nuclear arsenal at the top of its target list.[49] For the NATO central region (West Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium), the

[49] See, for example, Col. (DPL.) Pilot Aleksander Musial, "The Character and the Importance of Air Operations in Modern Warfare," *Polish Air Force Air Defense Review,* No. 2, 1982, translated by the Soviet Studies Research Centre, Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, UKTRANS No. 138, p. 3.

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Figure 1
Range Arcs of New Soviet Missiles Stationed in Eastern Europe



target set comprises roughly fifty nuclear storage sites, ten air bases with dual-capable fighter-bombers and collocated nuclear bombs, and roughly twenty garrisons housing Pershing, Lance, and ground-launched cruise missile systems.[50] But Soviet planners do not view each of these eighty installations with equal gravity because they select the main kinds or nodes in various target sets for priority attention.[51] Plausibly, the most threatening of the fifty nuclear storage sites (for example, those stockpiling Pershing and GLCM warheads) and missiles and aircraft on quick-reaction alert status might be singled out for special attack consideration.

[50] Various sources, including Meyer, "Soviet Theater Nuclear Forces," p. 24; map entitled "Nuclear Arms in West Germany," in *Washington Post*, November 1, 1981; *The Military Balance* (London: IISS, 1983-84), pp. 9-10 and 25-42.

[51] W. T. Lee, "Trends in Soviet Strategic Ballistic Missile Forces," paper presented at a conference sponsored by the USAF Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, "The Soviet Union: What Lies Ahead? Military-Political Affairs in the 1980's," September 25-27, 1980, p. 13.

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The vulnerability of NATO's nuclear deterrent is most sensitive to whether Western decision makers act in time to disperse nuclear weapons, aircraft, and missiles from their peacetime bases. For example, dispersal in the central region would render Soviet pre-emptive strike calculations dubious at best by multiplying the nuclear target set from eighty fixed installations to well over 300 mobile (and thus more survivable) field units.[52] For this reason, many view the rapid achievement of nuclear dispersal as the most sensible course for NATO decision makers; such an act would at once produce substantially greater survivability for nuclear forces and lessen pressures for early nuclear use.[53]

Others are not so sanguine. They deem the alert and dispersal of nuclear weapons so provocative as to create uncontrollable incentives for the Warsaw Pact to attack in a crisis.[54] Critics maintain that nuclear dispersal provokes attack because the widespread distribution of nuclear warheads throughout NATO forces is fundamentally no different than a delegation of authority to lower-level military authorities to use such weapons.[55]

A complicating factor is the lengthy time it could take to complete the nuclear dispersal process. Because of the perceived sensitivity of nuclear dispersal, NATO forces are not practiced in its execution. Preparing, outloading, and dispatching large numbers of nuclear weapons could take nearly a full day. Most important, nuclear force survivability is materially threatened during dispersal, a process which exposes many weapons and places truck convoys, handling equipment, and personnel at risk. Even light conventional missile attacks would do enormous damage during this period simply by delaying the dispersal process.

NATO's Air Defenses

Mastery of the air is essential to achievement of Soviet objectives in a major contingency in Central Europe. The NATO air defense system in the central region embodies air defense forces (surface-to-air missiles and interceptors), surveillance capabilities, and the command, control, and communications (C^3) network. Measured in sheer numbers, the air defense forces dominate the overall target set, but the Achilles' heel lies in the C^3 network.

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[52] The proliferation of NATO nuclear units results from the distribution of nuclear weapons from fifty storage sites to numerous firing units, such as individual firing batteries of dual-capable artillery battalions.

[53] Walter Slocombe, review of *Command and Control of Nuclear Forces* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983), by Paul Bracken, *Survival*, September/October 1984, p. 240.

[54] *Lab News*, Sandia National Laboratories, Vol. 37, No. 8, April 26, 1985, p. 9.

[55] Bracken, *Command and Control*, passim.

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Roughly fifteen C^3 sites form the most vulnerable link in the central region's air defenses. Headquarters, Allied Air Forces, Central Europe (AAFCE), whose static war location is Irwin Bunker, some sixty kilometers northwest of Ramstein Air Base in West Germany, provides overall general direction.[56] The two Allied Tactical Air Force (ATAF) commands (two ATAF supporting the Northern Army Group and four ATAF supporting the Central Army Group) divide regional direction of the Center's air defense forces and surveillance assets. Perhaps of greatest importance to cohesive air defense operations are three Sector Operations Centers (SOCs), whose loss could be equated with the loss of air traffic control at a major international airport. Finally, nine fixed Control and Reporting Centers (CRCs) link surveillance, warning, and air defense activities into a management scheme consisting of engagement zones within which interceptors and SAMs are allocated. It would appear that CRCs could furnish some back-up support should SOCs come under effective attack.

A system of fixed and mobile surveillance radars provides vital early warning of enemy air attack. The NATO Air Defense Ground Environment (NADGE) surveillance system consists of at least five 412L fixed radar sites, suported by sixteen mobile 407L Control and Reporting Posts (CRPs). A network of mobile radars, operated by the German defense forces, also supplies radar coverage near the inter-German border. Although major portions of the warning and surveillance network are vulnerable (either because their positions are fixed or because active electronic emitters attract attention), NATO's Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) will partially offset this shortcoming through its more survivable mode of deployment.

The Central Region's air defense forces include two major components: (1) interceptor aircraft, based at roughly ten airfields (capable of dispersing to other airfields, if necessary), each of which has some level of air defense support to cope with enemy aircraft attacks; and (2) high- and low-altitude SAMs forming the Nike-Hercules (being replaced by Patriot) and Hawk air defense belts. The Hawk belt has nearly 500 launchers while the Nike-Hercules has some 450.[57] For targeting, however, a Soviet planner might view the entire Hawk belt as eighty-three battery-sized targets. Applying this same formula to the Nike-Hercules belt would result in forty-nine battery-sized targets. All targets are not of

[56] The discussion of NATO air defense is based largely on Dan Boyle, "C^3 — The Essential Ingredient to Air Defense," *International Defense Review*, 1978, pp. 860-64.

[57] *The Military Balance*, pp. 9, 26-38. The counting rule formula for Hawk is six launchers per battery times three battalions or eighteen launchers per battalion. Nike-Hercules is nine launchers per battery times four batteries per battalion. Counting rules are found in Epstein, *Measuring Military Power*, p. 192.

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equal value; the Soviet air operation would attempt to establish perhaps as many as five corridors, making large-scale suppression of the NATO air defense system unnecessary.

Major NATO Command and Control Facilities

Two parallel command structures direct NATO combat operations above corps level. One supports national C^2 needs; in the case of the United States, this section includes the U.S. European Command, U.S. Air Force Europe, and U.S. Army Europe. The other — Allied Command Europe — is headed by the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), and includes Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT), Allied Air Forces Central Europe (AAFCE), the Northern and Central Army Groups and their corresponding allied tactical air forces (two and four ATAF respectively). In wartime, each of these ten major commands deploys to an alternate, hardened command post, perhaps best illustrated by Irwin Bunker, which houses both AFCENT and AAFCE.[58]

Mobilization and Logistics

The aim of the Warsaw Pact air operation is not simply to achieve mastery of air but to exploit that achievement to destroy NATO's will to resist. Besides denying NATO its ability to threaten any Soviet-led invasion with a nuclear riposte, perhaps the most important objective is to sever NATO's reinforcement potential. Both Soviet and Western planners are intimately acquainted with the extent to which NATO's conventional defense hinges on early response to strategic warning. Studies of changing NATO / Warsaw Pact force ratios resulting from competitive mobilization demonstrate that the West's prospects (albeit only a bean count) materially improve with ten to thirty days of reinforcement.[59]

Unfortunately, NATO's reinforcement process invites attack for reasons quite separate from an attack's inherent operational value. For one, reinforcement facilities are few (perhaps a couple of dozen installations) and soft in constitution (military equipment in warehouses). Equally important, massive airlifting of troops and mating with prepositioned equipment are complex activities under the best conditions, no less in time of crisis or war. Opportunities abound to disrupt and delay such intricate activities.

[58] Boyle, "The Essential Ingredient," p. 862.

[59] For more details see Pat Hillier and Nora Slatkin, "U.S. Ground Forces: Design and Cost Alternatives for NATO and Non-NATO Contingencies," Congressional Budget Office, 1980, especially Figure 24.

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Prepositioned equipment for reinforcing U.S. divisions is concentrated in a cluster of facilities in West Germany. Currently, there are POMCUS (prepositioned overseas materiel configured to unit sets) depots for four division sets, with two additional undergoing completion.[60] Moreover, the central region's lifeline from the continental United States depends on the freedom to operate efficiently at a handful of vulnerable air and sea points of debarkation on the European continent.

Crisis Manipulation

If the Warsaw Pact foolishly chooses to conduct the kind of war NATO is best prepared to cope with, the Alliance's chances of achieving stalemate are good. Such a war is conveniently founded on the canonical ten- to fourteen-day mobilization scenario, in which NATO detects a Warsaw Pact mobilization four days after its start and responds with ten days of its own mobilization before the Warsaw Pact commences an offensive. But catching NATO off balance is essential to Soviet planning objectives. Even under circumstances where political desperation could propel the USSR to war, Soviet planners would seek to avoid initiating conflict at the peak of the crisis, when NATO might be partially mobilized and, thus, more survivable. Rather, Soviet decision makers might commence hostilities only after the crisis was defused, or perhaps even before it reached a peak. One need only recall General Ivanov's admonition about exploiting the initial period of war to appreciate the Soviet-perceived necessity to obtain decisive results before NATO completes its mobilization. Allowing mobilization to occur creates enormous targeting uncertainties for Soviet planners. Conversely, a dilatory NATO response to Warsaw Pact mobilization, which NATO might reason would reassure possibly desperate Soviet decision makers, could foster strong incentives for Soviet decision makers to substitute military for diplomatic action, especially before NATO's inviting vulnerabilities vanish.[61] NATO's weaknesses in this regard are nothing new; what is new is a set of emerging attack options that could dangerously aggravate European crisis stability.

[60] For details on POMCUS, see *Department of Defense Appropriations for FY 85,* Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 98th Cong., 2d sess. (USGPO, 1984), pp. 119-40.

[61] The best treatment of the crisis stability implications of acts of political desperation is found in Richard K. Betts, *Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1982), pp. 153-188. For a brief discussion of the crisis period, see Christopher N. Donnelly, "Soviet Operational Concepts in the 1980s," in *Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe: Proposals for the 1980s* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), p. 113.

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Exemplary Nuclear Attack Option

Even though conventional war variants have greater plausibility (not to mention increasingly robust capabilities), there is danger in ignoring a Soviet attack option that involves nuclear first use. Logic alone suggests that a Soviet decision maker, willing to risk war at all, might be willing to accept the consequences of first use of nuclear weapons — especially if the consequences included attainment of all the Warsaw Pact's attack objectives with a minimum expenditure of attack resources. Moreover, the emerging force of short-range ballistic missiles deployed with Soviet ground units in East Germany and Czechoslovakia alone appears increasingly capable of supporting such an attack strategy. This capability derives from increases in missile range and launcher numbers, and, most important, from dramatic improvements in missile accuracy.

Before the introduction of the new generation of ground force missiles (SS-21, SS-22, and SS-23), Soviet planners could only contemplate massive strikes to achieve their attack objectives in the central region. Figure 2 illustrates the influence of improving missile accuracy on the size (number of strikes and total nuclear yield) of an attack. Most NATO targets are soft; that is, they are less than ten pounds per square inch (PSI) in hardness. As the figure demonstrates, the inaccuracy of Frog, Scud, and Scaleboard missiles meant either the expenditure of several missiles per target if 10-kt warheads were desired or, more likely, a major increase in warhead yields. By contrast, highly accurate SS-21s, SS-22s, and SS-23s, could effectively destroy even much harder targets in a single strike using 10-kt warheads. And for the majority of soft targets, subkiloton yields would be sufficient.

Quantitative increases in missile launchers and improvements in short-range missile coverage (especially as a result of the stationing of the SS-22 in Eastern Europe) suggest that Soviet missiles in Eastern Europe will be able to undertake a substantial portion of the pre-emptive strikes previously the exclusive domain of Soviet strategic nuclear forces based in the USSR.[62] Although the strategic nuclear forces would still be needed to accomplish the requisite number of strikes and to deal with the few targets located beyond the range of operational-tactical missiles — especially if NATO manages to mobilize before a Warsaw Pact decision to strike — it is illuminating for planners to consider precisely what role missiles in Eastern Europe could play in a pre-emptive nuclear attack at the outset of war.

[62] Launcher increases stem from expansion of Scud/SS-23 brigades (twelve to eighteen launchers) and the addition of SS-22 brigades to Soviet ground forces stationed in Eastern Europe. See *Soviet Military Power 1985,* in n. 15, p. 38.

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Figure 2
Number of 10-KT Weapons per 100 × 100 Meter Target to Achieve a Kill Probability of One Assuming a Weapon Reliability of One



SOURCES: "The Effectiveness of United States Military Aid to Israel (ISMILAID)," vol. 1, declassified (U.S. Department of Defense, December 1974), p. IV 80; "Memorandum for the Verification Panel Working Groups, Subject: FBS and Other Non-Central Systems in SALT TWO," declassified (U.S. Department of State, October 1972), p. 23; Walter Andrews, "Allies' Weapons Said to be Inadequate to Threat of New Soviet Missile Power," *Washington Times,* November 1, 1984, p. 3; and "Missile Deployment Strains U.S.-European Alliance, Tass Claims," *Washington Times,* May 30, 1984, p. 6.

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TABLE 1

CRITICAL NATO INSTALLATIONS IN THE CENTRAL REGION

Target Categories	*Number*	*Distance From Inter-German Border*	
		0-100	>100
Theater Nuclear Weapons • Storage Sites • Dual-Capable Airfields • Missile Garrisons	80	15	65
Air Defenses • Major C^3 Headquarters • Sector Operations Centers • Control and Reporting Centers • Interceptor Airfields • Warning/Surveillance	45	5	40
Major C^3 Headquarters	9		9
Reinforcement • POMCUS Depots • Air and Sea Points of Debarkation	25		25

SOURCES: *Washington Post,* November 1, 1981; Stephen M. Meyer, "Soviet Theater Nuclear Forces, Part II: Capabilities and Implications," *Adelphi Papers,* No. 188 (London: IISS, 1983/84), p. 24; *The Military Balance* (London: IISS, 1983/84) pp. 9-10 and 25-42; and Dan Boyle, "C—The Essential Ingredient to Air Defense," *International Defense Review,* No. 6, 1978, pp. 860-64.

At a minimum, such an attack would have to deal with the critical NATO installations in the central region (see table 1) associated with the Warsaw Pact's fundamental attack objectives. These objectives include neutralizing NATO's nuclear option, its superior air capability, its command and control means, and its potential to reinforce. As noted in table 1, most targets (139 of 159) of principal concern to Soviet planners are located beyond 100 kilometers of the inter-German border and thus are candidates for attack by SS-23 or SS-22 missiles. By the turn of the decade, an expanded force of missiles in the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG) (plus an SS-22 brigade in Czechoslovakia) plausibly might consist of seventy-six SS-21 launchers, 144 SS-23 launchers, and fifty-four SS-22 launchers. Beyond the 159 targets noted in table 1, a Soviet target planner would probably also employ ballistic missiles against NATO's SAM belts to insure the creation of penetration corridors for the air operation. (Such an expenditure might be unnecessary if missile attacks against sector operation centers succeed in denying NATO the means of

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controlling complex air defense operations.) As noted earlier, Hawk and Nike-Hercules SAM belts contain roughly eighty-three and forty-nine targets, respectively. Suppressing half (or sixty-six) of these targets would materially aid establishment of perhaps five penetration corridors. Overall, then, some 225 targets (of which sixty-two are within range of seventy-six SS-21 missiles and 163 are within range of 180 SS-23 and SS-22 missiles) constitute the maximum target set.

But would not a ballistic missile attack of this size create enormous collateral damage and destroy the very prize Soviet political authorities desire most — a relatively intact West European industry? Calculations of nuclear yields needed to meet expressed Soviet damage of objectives suggest otherwise.[63] If we assume a missile accuracy of fifty meters CEP (circular error probable), the highest yield needed is ten kt to destroy aircraft in shelters and to neutralize reinforcement operations at sea ports of debarkation.[64] Because they are large area targets, POMCUS depots and missile garrisons require five-kt yields. Small point targets, such as nuclear storage sites and command and control bunkers, require only 300 tons each. Roughly 70 percent of the entire target set can be effectively attacked with weapons of much less than a kiloton in nuclear yield. Indeed, even if we assume that NATO responded to warning of attack by dispersing its nuclear weapons, the execution of such an attack would still cripple the Alliance's ability to control air and ground forces and to reinforce the European continent. By mastering the air, the Warsaw Pact could then freely employ hundreds of aircraft to destroy remaining high-priority targets — principally, dispersed nuclear weapons. Such a nuclear attack, limited in weapon numbers and yields, would not be without immense escalatory risks; however, emerging Soviet military capabilities evaluated in the context of critical NATO vulnerabilities presage a different set of escalatory risks than is popularly perceived today.

Exemplary Nonnuclear Attack Options

Rather than primarily supporting a nuclear attack option, the emerging capabilities appear more pertinent to a major goal in the Soviet

[63] Soviet target planners state a 0.9 probability of kill (P_k) for hard targets and all elements of enemy nuclear forces. Area coverage is used for most soft targets. Damage objectives for area targets are stipulated in terms of percentage of target area covered by overpressure that produces light (neutralization), moderate (destruction), and heavy (annihilation) damage. Percentage of area covered for neutralization is 10 to 30 percent; for annihilation 50 to 70 percent is required. Presumably, destruction falls in between. For more details, see Lee, "Soviet Strategic Ballistic Missile Forces," pp. 31-32. Calculations of yield requirements were performed with the aid of the Defense Nuclear Agency's *Damage Prediction Rule*, VN-1, October 1982. These calculations are not meant to suggest the availability of sub-kiloton nuclear yields for current or projected Soviet short-range missiles; rather, they suggest the potential inherent in highly accurate delivery systems.

[64] CEP is the radius of a circle whose center is the weapon's aimpoint and whose radius is defined so that the probability of the weapon landing inside the circle is 50 percent.

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force development process: turning the *possibility* of a conventional-only contingency into a *probability*.[65] The potential contribution of highly accurate, nonnuclear missiles to winning the air campaign and effectively committing OMGs and airborne forces deep behind NATO lines appears formidable.

Munitions designed with tailored effects are already being introduced into the Soviet missile force structure. Improved area munitions appear ideally suited to deal with air defense batteries and to handle and transport equipment at nuclear storage sites. A recent article in the Polish military literature notes the critical importance of "attacks by missile troops involving the use of cluster charges with conventional weapons."[66] Cluster munitions spread the available energy over a wide area by dividing the overall explosive weight into a number of smaller containers. Another approach is to use fuel-air explosives (FAEs), which disperse an aerosol that mixes with the air and then detonates by a burster charge. FAEs spread the energy uniformly over a large area and produce an explosive effect comparable to that of the smallest nuclear weapons.[67] The Soviet military in Afghanistan has reportedly used FAEs delivered by SU-17 fighter-bombers. They are said to create a crater thirty feet in diameter and eighteen feet in depth and to have a 400-meter radius of effect against personnel.[68]

Even relatively hard targets will not be immune to the effects of highly accurate conventional weapons. Although there is no evidence of Soviet deployment of kinetic-energy or shaped-charge penetrators for conventional applications, such specialized designs appear suited to airfield runways and hardened underground structures. U.S. work on kinetic-energy penetrators designed to explode beneath airfield runways suggests that three missiles could effectively disrupt a main runway or taxiway.[69] At the same time, U.S. research in the mid-1970s on heavy, shaped charges (roughly an 800-kilogram warhead with steel liner) demonstrated a penetration capability of ten meters of concrete.[70] Older, hardened structures in NATO, such as many air defense command and control bunkers and nuclear weapon storage igloos, would be vulnerable to such

[65] This expression is found in Petersen and Hines, "Soviet Theater Strategy," pp. 706-707.

[66] Musial, "Air Operations in Modern Warfare."

[67] Jorma K. Miettinen, "The Effect of New Military Technology on Future Battlefield Tactics and the Structure of Armed Forces," in William Gutteridge and Trevor Taylor, *The Dangers of New Weapon Systems* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), p. 60.

[68] Yossef Bodansky, "Soviets Use Afghanistan to Test 'Liquid Fire'," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, May 26, 1984, p. 819.

[69] Donald R. Cotter, "Potential Future Roles for Conventional and Nuclear Forces in Defense of Western Europe," in *Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe: Proposals for the 1980's* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), p. 238.

[70] Cecil I. Hudson, Jr. and Peter H. Haas, "New Technologies: The Prospects," in *Beyond Nuclear Deterrence*, edited by Johan J. Holst and Uwe Nerlich (New York: Crane, Russak & Co., Inc., 1977), p. 128.

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weapons; one Allied Tactical Operations Center in the Central Region is situated in an old bunker with one meter of concrete and steel and two meters of earth cover.[71] Survivability of even newer underground C^2 bunkers, with two meters of concrete and steel and about four to six meters of earth and rock cover, could be challenged within the coming decade by emerging Soviet conventional systems.[72]

How might such a force of conventional missiles support Soviet wartime strategy? Soviet military planners would likely see a force of 274 launchers (with perhaps three to four missiles per launcher) as primarily furnishing direct support to the air operation.[73] It is important to remember that the air operation is far more complex than some Western analysts have depicted; in addition to conventional ballistic missile attacks, it would feature the use of airborne, air-assault, and special-purpose troops coordinated with the massive employment of frontal and strategic aircraft. The effectiveness of Soviet frontal and strategic aircraft in executing the air operation without the assured-penetration support of ballistic missiles is at best problematic; performance analyses in this regard are highly sensitive to assumptions about aircraft attrition. But new short-range conventional missiles — without concern for active defense attrition — could help free aircraft from the mission of suppressing NATO's air defenses. Before the advent of highly accurate Soviet conventional missiles, Warsaw Pact planners were compelled to devote a high percentage of the air operation's first wave aircraft to NATO air-defense targets merely to open penetration corridors for follow-on waves of aircraft. If conventional missiles were able to perform this mission, aircraft could then attend to the primary mission of neutralizing NATO's nuclear weapons, command and control, and reinforcement potential. In the latter regard, disruptive missile attacks against NATO airfields could pin down aircraft temporarily, thereby greatly increasing their vulnerability to air attacks.

As one possible attack option, Soviet planners might suppress half (or sixty-six firing batteries) of the Hawk and Nike-Hercules air-defense belts in the Central Region by employing two missiles per battery to achieve the Soviet damage criterion for area targets called "neutralization" (i.e., 10 to 30 percent area coverage).[74] The first salvo could also

[71] Boyle, "The Essential Ingredient," pp. 862-863.

[72] Ibid., p. 862.

[73] How many reloads will be available is a matter of conjecture. The Frog tactical rocket reportedly had four rockets per launcher. Given the dramatic accuracy improvements for the new generation of short-range missiles, it seems safe to assume that new Soviet missiles will have at least four reloads per launcher. For information on the predecessor generation of missiles, see Donald R. Cotter, James H. Hansen, Kirk McConnel, "The Nuclear 'Balance' in Europe: Status, Trends, Implications," *USSI Report 83-1* (Washington, D.C.: United States Strategic Institute, 1983), pp. 44-45.

[74] See W. T. Lee, "Soviet Strategic Ballistic Missile Forces," for a discussion of Soviet-perceived targeting factors and damage objectives. Weapon effectiveness calculations for the conventional attack options are based on D. H. Gloeckner, *Conventional Threat Assessment Methodology,* Pacific-Sierra

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include attacks against the ten interceptor airfields (with six missiles per airfield needed to cut the main runway and taxiway) and five Control and Reporting Centers (with two missiles each).[75] Disrupting airfield operations for a minimum of several hours would facilitate follow-up bombing missions by frontal and strategic aviation against pinned-down NATO aircraft. The overall attack would require the expenditure of 202 missiles. Given the assumed availability of 274 launchers, the differential could support the possible need to maintain perhaps 25 percent of the launchers on a nuclear withhold status, while follow-up aircraft missions could compensate for any missile reliability problems.[76]

Alternatively, should NATO decision makers prove dilatory in outloading and dispersing nuclear weapons, a Soviet planner might choose to expend a portion of the initial salvo on high-priority nuclear storage sites, missile garrisons, and quick-reaction alert sites supporting Pershing II and GLCM (two missiles each against perhaps twenty-five targets), as well as the ten airfields in the Central Region supporting dual-capable aircraft (six missiles each). This portion of the attack would require the expenditure of 110 missiles, leaving 164 to suppress NATO's air defenses. The purpose of the attack against the nuclear target set would be simply to disrupt and delay an already cumbersome dispersal process, which depends heavily on the availability of extremely vulnerable handling equipment and transport vehicles. Delaying outloading by several hours increases the probability that penetrating aircraft will succeed in destroying these important targets before they disperse to seek cover. Subsequent missile salvos could then be employed to interrupt NATO's capability to generate aircraft sorties by cratering runways and destroying maintenance and munitions stores and to support OMG and airborne penetrations deep behind NATO's forward lines. The success of the OMG depends critically on the achievement of Warsaw Pact air superiority.

Alternatively, Soviet planners might choose to employ chemical weapons against nuclear weapon storage sites, airfields, and C^2 installations lacking chemical protection. More precise delivery systems enhance the selective employment of chemical weapons in coordination with the movement of Warsaw Pact ground forces. But improved delivery accuracies will not compensate for unpredictable meteorological condi-

Research Corporation, PSR Report 902, July 1979. An accuracy of fifty meters CEP is assumed for all calculations.

[75] This calculation is based on the expectation that Soviet kinetic energy penetrators in the late 1980s will possess roughly equivalent effectiveness to currently available technology reflected in the Martin-Marietta CAM-40. Three CAM-40 missiles would be required for each runway and taxiway. For further details see Cotter, "Defense of Western Europe," pp. 238-40.

[76] The prior generation of operational-tactical ballistic missiles (Scud and Scaleboard) had a 0.75 reliability assigned to it, according to the International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance* (London: IISS, 1981-82), p. 128. A modest improvement for the new generation of missiles would seem a safe assumption.

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tions. Nonetheless, precise missile-delivered chemical attacks on just a few rear-area targets in NATO would produce devastating military effects. The deleterious consequences for NATO air operations are well known. Less familiar are the effects of chemical attacks on NATO reinforcement. According to recent congressional testimony, chemical attacks on POMCUS sites alone would create delays in reinforcement of at least several days and require "most of Europe's decontamination units." Moreover, the rapid supply of incoming units to Europe would undergo serious disruption because POMCUS sites depend heavily on local civilians "who may not have enough equipment and be well trained for operations in chemical conditions."[77] Even periodic missile strikes employing fuel-air explosives would seriously complicate finely tuned reinforcement procedures.

NATO planners are now compelled to consider what difference 274 missile launchers (for example), capable of delivering perhaps a thousand highly accurate conventional missiles, will make in calculating the conventional balance of forces. And these launcher and missile numbers only account for the front formed out of GSFG (plus one SS-22 brigade in Czechoslovakia). They do *not* include missile launchers organic to follow-on divisions and armies of the second operational and strategic echelons, nor to non-Soviet Warsaw Pact missile units. The important point, however, is that conventional ballistic missiles represent a brand-new factor; unlike high-performance Soviet aircraft, against which NATO is investing heavily in modernized air defenses, ballistic missiles are currently assured of penetrating to their targets, save for faulty missile performance. Successful suppression of selected portions of NATO's air defenses by conventional ballistic missiles would enable Soviet aircraft to conduct interdiction strikes in NATO's rear area with greatly reduced attrition.

In the final analysis, new Soviet short-range missiles challenge NATO's ability to deter through conventional denial. At least two recent studies of the NATO-Warsaw Pact air campaign question the extent of Soviet confidence in the success of their air operations.[78] But neither study considers the emerging contribution of Soviet short-range ballistic missiles. One, for example, concludes that *if* NATO air defenses were not severely degraded, *if* runway repair and aircraft dispersal could prevent extensive damage to NATO air bases, and *if* NATO interceptors and surface-to-air missiles could impose an exchange ratio of at least 2:1, then NATO might possess the capability to defeat the Warsaw Pact air campaign. Moreover,

[77] *Department of Defense Appropriations for FY 85,* see n. 60, p. 129.

[78] Epstein, *Measuring Military Power;* and Lt. Col. D. J. Alberts, "Deterrence in the 1980s: Part II: The Role of Conventional Air Power," *Adelphi Papers,* No. 193 (London: IISS, 1984).

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if NATO air forces could survive the air operation and sustain sortie generation, they could seriously damage the Warsaw Pact ground offensive.[79]

Without the contribution of new short-range missiles, a cautious Soviet war planner would probably not disagree. That reason alone furnishes sufficient impetus for the Soviet Union's significant investment in dual-capable ballistic missiles. Soviet planners no doubt recognize that the success of the U.S. Army's AirLand Battle doctrine and SHAPE's Follow-On Forces Attack strategy (just as their own OMG concept) rests on achieving air superiority. In the context of the air operation, especially under circumstances where tactical surprise is achieved, conventional ballistic missiles can turn doubt into confidence. Indeed, NATO planners have recognized the operational (if not political) value of attacking Warsaw Pact airfields in the first minutes of a war with conventionally armed ballistic missiles.[80] But for reasons of cost (creation of a new force structure equipped with expensive missiles) and adverse policy ramifications (a defensive alliance embarking on what many see as a fundamentally offensive course), NATO is unlikely to field conventional ballistic missiles for the counter-air mission.

No such inhibitions circumscribe Soviet conventional missile deployments. The Warsaw Pact force structure for short-range missiles has been in place for twenty-five years. And the advent of a conventional means to inflict decisive blows throughout the depth of NATO's defense is thoroughly consistent with the historical Soviet offensive style of warfare.

Final Observations

While there is room for argument over precisely where the Soviet Union stands today in its unfolding process of military force development, the direction and contour seem clear. Advanced military technologies — such as those furnishing dramatic improvements in accuracy and terminal effectiveness for new Soviet missiles in Eastern Europe — are being deployed in quantities sufficient to influence the refinement of Soviet force employment concepts meant to exploit the adversary's most conspicuous vulnerabilities. The role of the conventional ballistic missile in supporting the execution of the Warsaw Pact air operation perhaps best illustrates this interrelationship.

[79] Ibid., p. 30.

[80] *Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe: A Program for the 1980s* (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 49-66.

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New technologies and operational concepts, in turn, prompt changes in force structure. For example, the reorganization of Soviet air forces, together with improvements in ground force missile readiness, facilitates a more rapid transition from peace to war. Soviet military planners depend on surprise to achieve their wartime objectives; against a fully prepared NATO (nuclear weapons dispersed and reinforcement completed), Soviet planners cannot be confident of victory. They readily admit to worrisome shortcomings in command and control flexibility, in acquiring dispersed forces, and in sustaining support of increasingly complex aircraft technology.[81] But such operational weaknesses only reinforce the Soviet need to achieve decisive results in an initial pre-emptive air operation. In this regard, the contribution of highly accurate dual-capable missiles to the attack of unprotected and partially dispersed NATO targets could substantially improve Soviet confidence in exploiting the initial period of war.

NATO should immediately consider suitable hedges against this emerging threat. Several possible countermeasures — suppressive fire against Soviet missile launchers and improved dispersal of NATO's tactical nuclear weapons and aircraft — are worthy of study.[82] Unfortunately, some of these could heighten the risks of war during crises for the same reasons that Soviet missiles do. Offensive solutions like suppressive fire create strong hair-trigger incentives for pre-emptive attack, while defensive hedges such as dispersal succeed only if political leaders believe warning signals and react decisively. But history suggests leaders are reluctant to react for fear of provoking attack. NATO's fear of provoking Soviet preemption could inhibit such precautionary measures and create still stronger Soviet incentives to pre-empt, even in purely defensive situations.[83]

By comparison, tactical ballistic missile defenses of the nonnuclear variety are more consistent with the historic premise that NATO is a purely defensive military alliance. And because missile defenses are able to cope with the tension between military response and provocation, they could stabilize otherwise explosive crisis environments. Most important, even if NATO leaders failed to react to warning and the Warsaw

[81] For a useful exposition of Soviet weaknesses in supporting increasingly complex aircraft, see Epstein, *Measuring Military Power*, pp. 43-130.

[82] Other relatively inexpensive measures pertaining only to aircraft survivability include the construction of additional take-off and landing strips and the provision of improved runway repair capabilities at NATO air bases.

[83] In the context of the Stockholm talks on confidence- and security-building measures, consideration should be given to procedures for notification of out-of-garrison activity specifically related to short-range ballistic missile units. At the same time, we should remember the weaknesses of such measures, especially during deep crises. See, for example, Kevin N. Lewis and Mark A. Lorell, "Confidence-Building Measures and Crisis Resolution: Historical Perspectives," ORBIS, Summer 1984, pp. 281-306.

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Pact successfully surprised the Alliance, ballistic-missile defenses could best contend with the consequences of surprise.

NATO's near-term response to its dilemma could consist of either modifications to existing hardware (for example, to provide the Patriot air-defense system with a self-defense capability) or a new anti-tactical ballistic missile system designed in an incremental building-block approach. A modest upgrade of the Patriot would not furnish much area protection, but would help deter conventional war by complicating the delicate timing involved in the Soviet coordination of first-wave conventional missile and follow-up air attacks. Though modest in capability and cost, the dual-mode Patriot could very well deny the Warsaw Pact a decisive edge in a pre-emptive conventional air operation.[84]

Alternatively, the use of a building-block approach for a new ATBM system offers attractive opportunities for European cooperation with the United States. Although the flight times for Soviet short-range ballistic missiles are appreciably shorter than for intercontinental ballistic missiles, their velocities are much lower, making them especially susceptible to an ATBM system of ground-based interceptors and airborne sensors. The first phase, which the United States might chiefly finance, could consist of only ground-based components: high-acceleration interceptors and supporting radars. European firms might usefully contribute to incremental system growth through work on either an airborne or space-based early-warning sensor. Such an addition to the ground-based components would substantially broaden coverage against a range of Soviet nuclear and nonnuclear attack options.

No terminal point exists in the Soviet force development process; evolutionary improvements in technology, operational concepts, and force structure will further combine to furnish the Soviet political leadership with a broader range of military options to buttress coercive diplomatic needs in peacetime and to produce decisive results in wartime. Arguably, while NATO's threat of escalation may represent the least satisfactory expedient for coping with the coercive potential of growing Warsaw Pact military force, the threat probably will succeed in deterring the outbreak of major hostilities. Nonetheless, prudence alone mandates

[84] NATO could choose to "size" its requirements beyond upgrading the planned Patriot European deployment along the following lines: (1) decide on which military complexes require protection in order to achieve NATO's minimum set of military objectives; (2) determine the temporal requirements for defending these military complexes. Some small number of facilities (e.g., major C^3 headquarters) might require prolonged defense while others (such as nuclear storage sites and missile garrisons) need be defended only until units have departed fixed facilities for safer havens; and (3) deploy only enough launchers and missiles to raise Soviet uncertainty about the success of the conventional air operation. Soviet efforts to overwhelm a small number of defended high-value targets by concentrating an attack might succeed, but only at the expense of sparing other critical targets from the initial missile attack. By so complicating the air operation's planning, such a limited-capability system could shift the burden of escalation to Soviet decision makers, where it belongs.

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preparing appropriate defensive hedges against the uncertainties of crises and the possible failure of deterrence. The issue of sufficiency invariably is contentious — as it ought to be. But what ought to be far less fractious an issue is the direction of the Soviet force development process and its consequences if left unattended.

There is bitter irony in the Soviet coupling of accurate conventional missiles to a truly offensive war strategy: while the threshold between conventional and nuclear war may seemingly be raised, the vital threshold between peace and war may correspondingly be lowered. Under these circumstances, the Alliance can ill-afford to be reticent in dealing with its most inviting vulnerabilities.

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INTELLIGENCE IN THE ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT: COORDINATION AND ERROR IN NATIONAL ESTIMATES*

by Bruce D. Berkowitz

Every year between 1957 and 1972, the U.S. intelligence community attempted to predict how many intercontinental ballistic missiles the Soviet Union would deploy two, three, or even five years into the future. This forecast was just one part of the intelligence community's annual analysis of Soviet strategic forces, the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). Yet, no other part of the Soviet estimate was so controversial for so long a time. Looking back, one can see why: missiles were a basic currency of the arms race and Soviet-American competition in the Cold War, and almost everyone who watched this contest wanted to know the score. The fact that the United States might be required to spend billions of dollars in response to Soviet deployments probably also helped keep interest focused on the Soviet estimate.

Because these forecasts were so important, many people have studied not only the score in the arms race, but the performance of the scorekeepers as well. The forecasts of Soviet ICBM deployments were often off the mark. Although several writers have tried to explain why these mistakes occurred, few have examined the actual forecasting process, or the procedures to reconcile differences of opinion within the intelligence community. In examining the effects of this process on the accuracy of intelligence forecasts, I have focused on the coordination of estimates—the process through which the various opinions of the members of the intelligence community are compromised, merged, and weeded out in order to arrive at the final set of predictions that appears in the national estimate. By doing so, I hope to demonstrate two points:

* Many thanks are due to John Aldrich, B. J. Dombey, Raymond Garthoff, John Prados, Ray Robinson, Henry S. Rowen, and Phillip Schrodt for their comments on earlier versions of this paper, and, most especially, to all of the individuals who cooperated in its production. This paper was written with the support of a National Fellowship from the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace at Stanford University. The author was formerly an analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency. This material has been reviewed by the CIA to assist the author in eliminating classified material, if any. However, that review neither constitutes CIA authentication of the material as factual nor implies CIA endorsement of the author's views.

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first, in some cases, the coordination process was at least as much to blame for forecasting errors as were the judgments of individual analysts. In some cases, at least one member of the intelligence community *did* make a correct forecast but was unsuccessful in convincing the community to adopt this prediction for the national estimate. Therefore, in these cases the errors in the NIE were more than a problem of poor data or of inept analysis. Rather, the error was in part a problem of the coordination process: it filtered out the correct forecast and admitted the wrong one.

Second, some of the organizational problems that have led to intelligence errors such as those in the forecasts of Soviet missile deployments may be beyond our ability to solve. Coordinating opinions within the intelligence community is actually just one version of a more general problem—the difficulty of devising a procedure for assimilating the views of individual members of a group into the views of the group as a whole. As we shall see, it is probably impossible to find a procedure for coordinating estimates that can entertain all reasonable points of view held by all members of the intelligence community, while being certain that the procedure will select the most accurate forecast from among these opinions.

Forecasts and Performance

U.S. Forecasts of Soviet ICBM Deployments and Development

Cases in which the U.S. intelligence community "blows a forecast" draw much attention from the public when they are revealed. This is to be expected. Intelligence estimation is a mystery to the general public (by necessity; intelligence sources tend to be perishable, both figuratively and literally). Also, intelligence failures are usually accompanied by foreign policy failures. Consider, for instance, the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor or the fall of the shah of Iran.

Probably the best-known study of intelligence failure is the analysis of the Pearl Harbor disaster by Roberta Wohlstetter.[1] Until Wohlstetter's investigation, most people probably thought that good intelligence was a matter of finding the key piece of information that would reveal an opponent's plans. Yet after the Pearl Harbor attack, official inquiries discovered that some signs of the impending attack could have been culled by correctly piecing together the intercepts of Japanese diplomatic and military cables scattered among the offices of the State, War, and Navy Departments. Wohlstetter's insight was that, at least in this case,

[1] Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1962).

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the problem was not just in finding the key telegram or clandestine report betraying the Japanese plans, but rather in the analyst's difficulty in sifting out alarm signals from the noise of day-to-day events.

More recently, some serious scholars (along with some less serious journalists) have studied the problem of incentive structures within the intelligence community and their effects on the accuracy of forecasts. The writers claim that one reason for forecast error is that analysts are pressured or enticed by their superiors into shaping their estimates to support policy decisions that have long since been made.[2]

One example of misplaced incentives these writers cite is the underestimates by U.S. military intelligence of the strength of the Viet Cong prior to the Tet Offensive of 1967. Another example is the pressure that was supposedly put on Richard Helms to change the U.S. interpretation of the capabilities of the SS-9 ICBM in the 1970 NIE assessment of Soviet strategic intentions. The particular direction in which writers believe U.S. intelligence is biased as a result of these incentives seems to depend on their ideology. Liberals tend to claim that the intelligence community is guilty of "threat inflation," exaggerating Soviet strength in order to obtain more money for the defense budget.[3] Conservatives, on the other hand, tend to claim that U.S. intelligence analysts "mirror image" Soviet intentions. They say that these analysts mistakenly assume that Soviet defense planners share the U.S. goals of stable, non-provocative deterrence, and that the analysts, therefore, consistently underestimate Soviet deployments.[4]

Other explanations for forecasting errors in the intelligence community range from the incentives requiring intelligence analysts to err on the side of caution (the intelligence officer who wakes his superior in the middle of the night to warn him that the Russians are coming is likely to be wrong once and only once), to an analyst's problem in establishing his credibility with policy makers who have many other sources of information.

Most explanations of intelligence failure pose the problem in terms of the individual analyst—the individual's perceptions, the individual's reasoning, and the individual's relationship with the rest of the foreign policy bureaucracy. This is odd, considering that, by and large, intelligence forecasts are produced not by individuals, but by organizations. It stands

[2] For example, see Patrick McGarvey, "Intelligence to Please," *Washington Monthly,* July 1970, pp. 23-9; and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, "Professional Roles for Policy Analysts: A Critical Assessment," *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management,* March 1982, pp. 88-100.

[3] See, for example, James Fallows, *National Defense,* (New York: Macmillan, 1982); and Andrew Cockburn, *The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine* (New York: Macmillan, 1983).

[4] See, for example, William T. Lee, "Debate Over U.S. Strategic Forecasts," *Strategic Review,* September 1980, pp. 44-56.

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Figure 1
Two-Year Forecasts of Soviet ICBM Deployments



to reason that organizational procedures themselves are likely to influence the accuracy of an estimate.

For example, the charts in figures 1 through 3 summarize some of the intelligence community's forecasts for Soviet ICBM deployments that were present in NIEs published between 1957 and 1972. Figure 1 shows the estimates presented in these NIEs for Soviet ICBM deployments two years into the future. Figure 2 shows the estimates made in these NIEs for Soviet deployments three years into the future. Figure 3 shows the estimates made for deployments four or five years into the future. Actual Soviet ICBM deployments have been superimposed over the predictions that were made by the intelligence community.[5]

[5] These data were derived from declassified posture statements made by the secretary of defense

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Figure 2
Three-Year Forecasts of Soviet ICBM Deployments



As one can see, sometimes the intelligence community underestimated, sometimes it overestimated, and sometimes it was correct. The earliest predictions in these charts (published from 1957 to about 1961) are the "missile gap" estimates, famous for their role in the Kennedy-Nixon presidential election. The predictions published between 1961 and 1963 are not too far off the mark, but those published after 1963 show a consistent pattern of underestimation. The underestimates became

between 1962 and 1973, and from declassified Defense Department memoranda. There may be some slight differences between these data and the actual NIE figures because of the format in which the secretary of defense presented these data to Congress. In the case of the estimates from 1957 to 1969, the numbers were attributed by the secretary to the NIE, or were quoted directly from the NIE in a memorandum. In the case of the estimates from 1970 to 1972, the numbers were attributed to the Defense Intelligence Agency, but according to interviews with several former officials, these numbers were not very different from the NIE forecasts.

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Figure 3
Four-and Five-Year Forecasts of Soviet ICBM Deployments



famous as a result of a series of articles written by Albert Wohlstetter, though they had also been circulated earlier within the government via the classified section of Melvin Laird's 1970 posture statement.[6]

The point that concerns us here, however, is not the forecasting errors themselves, but that not all of the estimates portrayed in figures 1 through 3 were produced with exactly the same procedures or under the same conditions. Thus, as we shall see, more than one type of "spin" affected each estimate, depending on the conditions under which it was coordinated. First, though, to appreciate how the coordination process can influence the accuracy of forecasts, we must consider how that

[6] See Albert Wohlstetter, "Legends of the Arms Race," USSI Report 75-1 (Washington, D.C.: United States Strategic Institute, 1974).

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process worked. Then we can examine the errors individually, determine how each estimate was decided, and consider how the errors occurred.

The Coordination Process for National Estimates

Over the past two years, I have interviewed a number of former officials from the intelligence community, the Department of Defense, and the National Security Council staff. In the interviews, I asked these people about their experiences in the coordination of the national intelligence estimates depicted in figures 1 through 3. Each interview ranged from one hour to over five hours in length; I promised anonymity to all participants in order to obtain their cooperation. A complete listing of the individuals (by the posts they held) is given in table 1.

From these interviews, I was able to assemble a reasonably good description of how each estimate was coordinated, the positions taken by each agency, and the strategies each agency pursued in the coordination proceedings, as well as an overview of how the coordination process usually operates.

Drafting National Intelligence Estimates. Somewhere in the bureaucracy of the U.S. government there has always been someone writing about the policies and military capabilities of foreign governments. The practice of writing a formal national intelligence estimate, however, began in 1950 under the direction of then-Director of Central Intelligence Walter Bedell Smith. The purpose of the NIE was to gather all of the intelligence community's knowledge on a topic into a single authoritative document. NIEs have been produced regularly on a number of topics; the first dealt with the Communist threat to countries in East Asia, for example. Since then, NIEs have covered a range of subjects, such as the political situation in Central America or the balance of conventional forces in Europe. NIEs dealing with subjects of continuing interest to U.S. policy makers are usually updated every year or so. The intelligence community's forecast on Soviet ICBM deployments has been published annually in NIE 11-4, 11-8, or 11-3/8, depending on how the different aspects of Soviet military power and strategy were broken down for analysis in a given year.

The final product of the estimation is a paperbound monograph, usually ranging in size from just under 100 to over 400 pages or more. An NIE on Soviet strategic forces reads as a systematic, blow-by-blow description of Soviet weapons and military doctrine. Each chapter deals with a different category of Soviet weaponry. For example, one chapter might deal with long-range missiles, another with bombers, and another with defensive radars and antiaircraft missiles. Along with the

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TABLE 1

INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED FOR THE STUDY

The individuals interviewed for the study held the following positions in government while they participated in the coordination of the NIEs cited in the paper. Numbers in parentheses indicate when more than one person held a particular position (e.g., three Directors of Central Intelligence were interviewed).

Central Intelligence Agency
- Director of Central Intelligence (3)
- Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
- Chairman, Board of National Estimates
- National Intelligence Officer for the USSR (2)
- Deputy Director for Intelligence
- Deputy Director for Science and Technology
- Director, Office of Scientific Intelligence
- Director, Office of Weapons Intelligence
- Senior Analyst (5)
- Analyst (4)

Department of Defense
- Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
- Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (3)
- Director, National Security Agency
- Assistant Chief of Staff, Air Force Intelligence (3)
- Assistant Chief of Staff, Army Intelligence
- Director, Office of Naval Intelligence
- Deputy Director for Estimates, Defense Intelligence Agency
- Analyst, Defense Intelligence Agency (4)

Department of State
- Director, Bureau for Intelligence and Research (2)

National Security Council
- Assistant to the President for National Security
- Senior Staff Member (2)
- Staff Member (3)

Intelligence Community Staff
- (various positions) (2)

Some of the participants cited had served in more than one position during the period the NIEs studied were drafted. When these individuals spoke of their experiences from the perspective of two different positions, they were counted twice in the table above. In all, there were thirty-three individual participants.

description of current Soviet forces, parts of the text will also summarize the intelligence community's projection for future Soviet force levels in a given year and the time that the Soviets are expected to be able to deploy a weapon incorporating a certain technology.

But where does this text come from? The procedure for writing an NIE has evolved over the past thirty years through the bureaucratic pastime of moving boxes around on organizational charts. Still, the typical

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TABLE 2

TYPICAL PRODUCTION SCHEDULE FOR A NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES

Board of National Estimates (BNE) consults with intelligence consumers for reactions to prior year's NIE and suggestions for the coming NIE	December through January
Terms of reference drafted by the BNE member appointed to chair the NIE, assistance given by Office of National Estimates (ONE) staff	April through May
Terms of reference circulated among members of the intelligence community and contributions solicited	Late May
Committees for drafting sections of the NIE are appointed by participating agencies; initial draft composed by ONE representatives under BNE supervision; coordinated with other participants	June through mid-August
Draft NIE reviewed and approved by chairman of the estimate	Late August or early September
Review of draft NIE by United States Intelligence Board (USIB); dissenting footnotes finalized	September or October
Review of NIE by Director of Central Intelligence (DCI); approval and signature given	Immediately following USIB review
Printing and dissemination of the NIE to consumers	November or December

operation of assembling an NIE can be understood by the schedule in table 2, which portrays the process as it operated originally and up through the early 1970s, the period of interest here.[7]

The first step in writing an NIE took place when the Board of National Estimates (BNE) defined the terms of reference for the paper. The BNE was a panel of retired military officers, former diplomats, and academicians who were charged by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) with the task of writing the estimate (officially the DCI was responsible for the NIE, but he usually did not participate until the final stages of production). The board was expected to have discussed with U.S. intelligence consumers their priorities and their opinion of the usefulness of the previous year's NIE. The BNE's terms of reference established the topic to be addressed and the issues and questions to be considered. By agreeing to the terms of reference at the outset, the board ensured the estimate's focus on a topic of interest to the government.

[7] The best history of the estimating process is in John Prados, *The Soviet Estimate* (New York: Dial Press, 1982). Also see Laurence Freedman, *U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat* (London: Macmillan, 1977).

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The terms of reference also limited the debate during coordination to a manageable set of issues.

The support staff for the BNE was drawn from a component of the CIA, the Office of National Estimates (ONE, pronounced as "oh-en-ee," never as "wun"). ONE was originally intended as a center to integrate the contributions that other intelligence agencies and offices within the CIA had written in response to the terms of reference. In time, however, ONE wielded more influence, as it became responsible for the "grunge work" of delineating the terms of reference and the initial draft of the estimate. This meant that the analysts in ONE shaped much of the debate that took place in the coordination of the NIE. Some people (most notably, veterans of the military intelligence services) claim that at times ONE had a dominant role in deciding what to print in the NIE and what to omit. Officially, ONE was supposed to be detached from the CIA in the coordination proceedings. In fact, most analysts in ONE were CIA personnel, and ONE usually represented the mainstream viewpoint of CIA analysts.

After the terms of reference were defined, the estimate was outlined, broken into sections, and then circulated to all member agencies via the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB). USIB (later named the National Foreign Intelligence Board, or NFIB) was a panel consisting of the heads of all member agencies within the intelligence community. In addition to serving as a "board of directors" for the operation of the intelligence community, USIB was responsible for signing off on the final version of the estimate. By doing so, USIB certified that all of the intelligence community supported the estimate as published (although, as we shall see, each member could qualify its support with footnotes to specific passages in the text). The chief of the estimate staff (an analyst for ONE) would then write an initial draft of the NIE, circulate the draft sections among the member agencies of the intelligence community, and convene a series of committee meetings to coordinate each section of the estimate with representatives of each of the other agencies.[8]

These meetings were the setting for most of the maneuver and strategy that determined the final form of the estimate. The representatives at these meetings were line analysts and middle-level officials. For ex-

[8] Until 1961, the members of USIB included CIA, the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), G-2 (Army Intelligence), Air Force Intelligence, the State Department's Bureau for Intelligence and Research (INR), the Atomic Energy Commission, the Department of the Treasury, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Because some members of USIB had little interest in some of the matters presented to the intelligence community, they were not all active in drafting all NIEs (e.g., the FBI was primarily concerned with counterespionage and the smuggling of contraband). The Army, Navy, and Air Force intelligence services were dropped as full members of USIB in 1967, when the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was added to the board. The AEC was replaced by the Department of Energy when it was subsumed into that organization.

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ample, on the committee responsible for the section on Soviet ICBM deployments, the Navy might be represented by a middle-ranking officer who was on rotation to the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). Army intelligence (G-2) would be represented by an analyst of similar rank. The CIA would be represented by two or three analysts from the Directorate of Intelligence (DDI) and the Directorate of Science and Technology (DDS&T); and so on. These representatives argued their positions on the combined basis of what they knew their agency's position to be, their own professional opinions, and an informal give-and-take with their superiors back at their office.

The "rules of the game" in the coordination process were partly informal and partly established by directives issued by the DCI and periodically updated. According to these rules, any member agency of USIB could insert a footnote in the estimate indicating where it disagreed with a particular passage, explaining why it disagreed, and, in some cases, including an alternative paragraph that it would have inserted in its place. Disagreement among USIB members usually surfaced first in the coordination meetings via their representatives. The chief of the estimate, acting on behalf of the BNE, would try to mediate these differences, but if no consensus were reached, the ONE version was kept as originally drafted (or as modified in the course of the meetings) and the dissenting member was invited to write his footnote.

The BNE (as represented by the chairman of the estimate) had incentives to keep the number of footnotes in the NIE to a minimum; too much disagreement in the estimate would make it seem less authoritative and would turn clean, concise findings into ambivalent mush. At the same time, each agency had an incentive not to insert too many footnotes; its opinions would be more effective in the estimate itself (footnotes appear at the bottom of the page in an NIE, and, because dissenters usually were allowed only one or two sentences in these footnotes, their arguments could not be articulated as forcefully as those in the main text).

Therefore, to some degree, any agency would find it worthwhile to moderate its position at least a little in order to have its opinion incorporated as part of the estimate, rather than as a dissent. "Taking a footnote" also carried the stigma of being the contrarian of the intelligence community (the Air Force, the most frequent dissenter, in fact gained this reputation for itself over the years). Finally, in addition to these implicit incentives and counterincentives, there was the formal requirement of the DCI's directive instructing all agencies to indicate where they disagreed with the estimate.

The CIA appears to have had several advantages in these meetings. First, as we have seen, its analysts (from ONE) wrote the pre-

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liminary draft and organized the meetings. This set the tone for much of the debate in the coordination session and forced the other agencies to argue from the CIA view as the starting point.

Second, the CIA usually had more resources. Whereas in the 1950s the Air Force might have had a strong analytical group that followed Soviet ICBM developments, and the Army might have had a number of analysts following Soviet ground forces, the CIA had more people and could cover all of these topics in depth. In some cases, the military intelligence agencies might have just one or two analysts covering some subjects. Often career officers, these military analysts were frequently on the job for only one or two years before they were rotated to another position in the service. Thus, the analysts from the military agencies who were assigned to the NIE committees had just begun to "come up to speed" and become familiar with the issues and procedures connected with the NIE when they were replaced by another officer, who also then entered duty as a novice.

Finally, in addition to all of these advantages, the arbitrator of last resort in the coordination process was the DCI, who was not just the Director of Central Intelligence, but also the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Some participants felt that the DCI favored the CIA too much. In truth, one can cite a number of cases where the DCI actually disagreed with his own analysts in ONE, siding with other members of the intelligence community.

Once the chairman of the estimate was satisfied with the draft, the estimate was reviewed by the BNE and then submitted to USIB itself for review. These USIB meetings took only one or two days; very little substantive analysis occurred. Each section of the paper was presented to the board, as the drafter responsible for the section briefly summarized the arguments that had been made in the committee hearings, and the reasons why any disagreements had been settled as they had. At this point, if any agency had indicated that it wanted to add a dissent to the section, it either confirmed its dissent or was given one last opportunity to back out and compromise (the chief of the estimating staff would try to have some alternate versions of the offending paragraph ready for a last-minute change). Usually the section was adopted as presented. Still, some of these sessions could grow quite heated as each USIB member agency reiterated its position for the official record.

The final step of the coordination process was the approval and signing of the NIE by the Director of Central Intelligence. DCIs took this job seriously, but the amount of participation that a DCI actually contributed to the process varied with the individual. Allen Dulles and Richard Helms had explicit trust in their BNE chairmen, and usually

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deferred to the board's opinion. William Colby often settled individual disputes within the drafting process. George Bush had little intelligence experience and was apt to recommend a "some believe / others believe" construction, in which he would not take a stand and would allow more than one opinion to be expressed within the estimate. Stansfield Turner tended to be involved in the coordination process from the early stages and was known to rewrite entire sections on his own, often contesting the views of much of the intelligence community.

Coordination and Error in Estimates: Two Cases

With this understanding of how the NIEs were produced, we can better appreciate the errors the intelligence community made in forecasting. As an example, let us consider the two cases alluded to earlier: the overestimates of Soviet ICBM deployments that the intelligence community made in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and the underestimates the intelligence community made in the same forecasts during the late 1960s.

The Missile Gap Estimates

According to the participants, during the late 1950s and early 1960s there were essentially three opinions within the intelligence community concerning the question of how many missiles the Soviets would deploy in the near future: the "high" estimate, argued by the Air Force; the "low estimate," argued jointly by the Army and Navy; and an estimate in between, argued by the CIA.[9]

It is understandable that there was disagreement within the intelligence community at this time. The only hard evidence of Soviet missile developments came from photographs taken on U-2 missions flown over the Soviet Union, and there were not nearly enough flights to cover all of the areas in which the Soviets could have deployed missiles. There were some other data, such as the evidence that the Soviets were training missile crews, and the appearance of articles on ICBMs in Soviet military journals, but this evidence was circumstantial and, in any case, it could not reveal the size of a Soviet ICBM force or when it would be in operation. And, if this were not enough, the Soviet government (Khru-

[9] See Laurence C. McQuade, "But Where Did the Missile Gap Go?" Memorandum for Paul H. Nitze, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, declassified July 25, 1979; Edgar M. Bottome, *The Missile Gap* (Rutherford, N.J.: Fairleigh Dickinson Press, 1971); Daniel O. Graham, "The Intelligence Mythology of Washington," *Strategic Review*, Autumn 1976, pp. 59-66; and Laurence Freedman, *U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat* (London: Macmillan, 1977).

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shchev in particular) deliberately campaigned to deceive the West on the rate at which the Soviet Union was actually building ICBMs.

Each of the three arguments presented in the coordination meetings for the NIEs published during this period had its own rationale. The Air Force argument, for example, went as follows: The Soviet Union had proven by its initial tests that it had developed a first-generation ICBM (known in the West by its NATO designation as the "SS-6"). By deploying this missile, the Soviets would have been able to compensate for what they lacked in strategic nuclear forces vis-à-vis the United States, which had a larger bomber force. Since the Soviet military industries could produce up to 500 missiles a year, and because the Soviets had so many incentives to deploy the missile, it seemed reasonable to the Air Force analysts that the Soviets would adopt a crash program, deploying thousands of SS-6s within a few years.

The Army and the Navy disagreed: Although the Soviets had developed the technology for an ICBM, this first-generation missile was huge and unwieldy. In fact, the SS-6 could be transported only by train, and all SS-6 launchers had to be located at the end of railheads. The missile was, thus, not a very efficient weapon. Since the second-generation Soviet ICBMs promised to be a vast improvement over the SS-6, the Army and Navy analysts argued that, the Soviets would cancel the SS-6 missile and accelerate the development of the second-generation missiles. The result would be that the Soviets would deploy very few ICBMs for the next two or three years, although their force might grow in the more distant future.

The CIA position acknowledged both views, but argued that the best strategy for the Soviet Union (and the one they would most likely follow) would be a compromise: deploy a sufficient number of SS-6s to reduce the U.S. advantage in strategic weapons, but limit its production so that the follow-on second-generation missile could be built. In truth, opinion was split evenly within the CIA; line CIA analysts tended toward a slightly lower estimate, while higher-level CIA officials tended toward a slightly higher estimate. The net result was that the CIA arrived at an estimate that was between the two extreme positions taken by the military services.

The CIA estimate was published. According to the military representatives who attended the coordination meetings, the armed service intelligence agencies had to put their own predictions in footnotes. The estimate turned out to be wrong (see the estimates made in 1957-1960 in figures 1 through 3). Only a handful of SS-6 missiles were ever deployed, and the Soviets did not start deploying ICBMs in earnest until the second-generation SS-7 and SS-8 were developed.

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What is most interesting about this case, however, is that the Army and Navy made the correct prediction, but were "coordinated out" of the estimate. If their forecasts had been adopted, estimates such as NIE 11-8-60 would now be cited as classic examples of good intelligence. Still, notice that *all three* of the arguments that were presented at the meetings were logical and had some support from the available evidence. In fact, the only way that one could have confirmed or invalidated any of the three arguments would have been by getting inside the minds of Soviet officials and determining just how they would weight the costs and benefits of each alternative deployment plan. This only serves to show that, under conditions of incomplete data—the quintessential intelligence problem—reasonable analysts can differ, and the coordination process can become more important than ever in determining the accuracy of an estimate.

The "missile gap" disappeared when the United States developed reconnaissance satellites that could efficiently photograph the entire Soviet Union. When U.S. analysts were able to see that very few SS-6 launchers had been built, they revised their estimates downward. They also lowered their expectations for future Soviet ICBM deployments. One fact that many writers have overlooked is that, following these early mistakes, not only did the intelligence community's estimate of current Soviet force levels improve, but so did their forecasts of future Soviet deployments (again, note figures 1 through 3).[10]

Underestimating Soviet Deployments in the 1960s

During the early 1960s, several developments were to change the intelligence coordination process. Some of these changes had to do with the attitudes of the analysts who took part in writing the estimates. Others had to do with the procedures under which the estimates were produced.

Changes in the Attitudes of the Estimators. Many of the analysts who took part in writing the estimates during the late 1950s and early 1960s recall how the missile gap changed many of their beliefs about probable Soviet behavior. As a result, the views that these analysts carried with them into the coordination meetings for the NIE also changed.

Many of the analysts were quite affected by their earlier overestimation of Soviet missile deployments and the new photographic evi-

[10] For example, in his study of the intelligence community's estimates of Soviet strategic forces during the 1960s and 1970s, Albert Wohlstetter began his analysis with the NIE published in 1963. This unfortunately overlooked the fact that the NIEs published in the early 1960s were close to the mark, though, in fairness to Wohlstetter, his intention was to call attention to the underestimates that had not received much publicity before. See Albert Wohlstetter, "Legends of the Arms Race."

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dence that showed them just how far off they had been. Looking back today, these analysts believe that as a result of having been burned once, they were inclined, if anything, to err on the side of underestimation during the 1960s. This was especially true of CIA analysts, though many Air Force analysts (some of whom later joined the Defense Intelligence Agency) eventually came around to this point of view, too.

Also, the CIA analysts in particular believed that the Soviets must have learned a lesson from the missile gap episode. Largely because of the American fear of an impending Soviet advantage in strategic weapons during the missile gap years, the United States had built a very large strategic force of its own (i.e., the Atlas, Titan, and Minuteman ICBMs and the Polaris SLBMs). These new deployments made the Soviet-American balance even more lopsided. The CIA analysts believed that Soviet leaders, having learned the consequences of bluffing the United States into an arms buildup with a bogus threat, would be even less likely to provide the United States with a real provocation.

Changes in the Coordination Process. In addition to the changes in the attitudes held by U.S. analysts, the procedure for producing estimates described above also evolved over the years. For our purposes here, one development in particular is significant.

USIB was reorganized in 1961, during the Kennedy administration. The main changes in the organization of USIB coincided with the creation of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara appears to have wanted greater control over the intelligence produced within the Department of Defense, and one step in achieving this end was to consolidate the intelligence services of the Army, Navy, and Air Force into a single umbrella agency, the DIA. The DIA answered directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and, of course, the Joint Chiefs answered directly to McNamara.

The importance of this development for the coordination of estimates is that, along with the order creating the DIA, McNamara also asked DCI John McCone to drop the Army, Navy, and Air Force representatives from USIB. McCone complied, but, apparently because he did not completely agree, asked the service representatives to remain as non-voting observers on USIB. McCone also continued to include lower-ranking representatives from Army, Navy, and Air Force intelligence on the coordination committee responsible for drafting the estimate.

As a result of being dropped from USIB, the service representatives no longer signed the final version of the NIE; the title page of the estimate now noted that the NIE had been approved by USIB with the *consultation* of the Army, Navy, and Air Force representatives.

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The reorganization of Defense Department intelligence also reduced the size of each of the service intelligence agencies drastically, as personnel left or were transferred to DIA. The loss of manpower meant that the service intelligence agencies no longer had the personnel necessary to conduct the analyses that they would have needed to be fully effective participants in the coordination debates. The net result was that the influence of the services over the content of the NIE waned. The drafters of the NIE did continue to include footnotes submitted by the services (as a courtesy and probably to retain their support as official observers), but the drafters were able to limit the space allocated for these dissents.

Coordination and the Underestimates. The intelligence community began underestimating Soviet ICBM deployments beginning with some of the short-term predictions published in the 1963 NIE. It continued to underestimate Soviet deployments throughout the rest of the decade and until a cap was placed on Soviet ICBMs through the SALT I agreement. Most of the coordination proceedings for these NIEs stuck to a uniform pattern. Generally, the Air Force continued to submit the highest estimates. The State Department's Bureau for Intelligence and Research (INR) usually gave the lowest estimate. The CIA was in the middle of the range, and DIA was usually somewhere in between the CIA and the Air Force. In the first part of this period, the Army and Navy usually submitted estimates slightly below those of the CIA, but toward the end of the period they were usually in the DIA's range.

The CIA had an even greater advantage in resources during this period. The strategic analysis shops of the three armed service intelligence agencies had largely been gutted by the creation of the DIA. The DIA, being a new organization, had difficulty keeping talent at this time. Also, DIA assignments were "purple" billets—they were not connected to any one service. Army, Navy, and Air Force officers thus did not see DIA assignments as being especially "career enhancing," and so the new agency ran into trouble attracting new talent, as well. The CIA estimates were generated as before, through ONE, with the support of analysts from the DDI and the DDS&T. The military agencies relied heavily on outside contractors and the personal judgment of the head of each agency.

The rationales of the various non-CIA analysts during this period were as follows: Unlike the CIA analysts, who assumed that the Soviet Union would not want to incite another expensive round of missile-building, the Air Force analysts argued that the Soviets would build to the limits of their capacity in order to overcome the increased American

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advantage in strategic weapons. Thus, once again, the Air Force estimates were driven mainly by projections of Soviet ICBM production capacity.

The Army and Navy estimates also tended to be driven by Soviet construction capacities during this period. The difference between the Air Force analysts and those of the other military agencies was that the Air Force analysts did not believe that the Soviets would discard their old second-generation ICBMs. The Air Force representatives to the BNE claimed that these SS-7s and SS-8s still had some usefulness, such as being used against urban targets. The Army and the Navy (along with the CIA analysts) believed that the SS-7s and SS-8s were obsolete, and that the Soviets would discard them as a needless cost. The State Department analysts generally (though not always) came in with the least pessimistic view of Soviet plans. Though its rationale is not entirely clear, usually the INR estimate suggested that the Soviets would simply finish building those ICBM silos then observed to be under construction, discard obsolete weapons, and stop there.[11]

The published estimates usually were defined with the low end of the Air Force projection setting the top end of the NIE projection, and the low end of the INR projection setting the low end of the NIE projection. In other words, despite their appearances the ranges published in the NIE during this period were nothing like "confidence intervals" in the statistical sense. If the projections had been confidence intervals, the intelligence community would have settled on a point as the most-likely level of Soviet deployments, and then, given the laws of chance and the information that was available, traced a probable range around that point. Rather, the estimate represented the range of opinion of most of the intelligence community and the fact that all of the voting members of USIB were willing to accept every one of these views. Had the Air Force been a full member of USIB, it probably would have tried to block the INR estimate. Similarly, INR would not have accepted the upper limits of the Air Force projection.

Another fact about these estimates, usually overlooked, also deserves mention. Even though the NIE forecasts for *total* Soviet ICBM deployments were too low, the forecasts for each of the different types of missiles within that force were often on the mark. Much of the error in the forecast and the disagreement among the members of the intelligence community resulted from their different interpretations of Soviet military strategy.

At the time the estimates were written, the Soviets were producing two third-generation ICBMs: a large missile, the SS-9, and a small

[11] As one former NIE drafter put it, "The Air Force always said, 'The Russians are here!'; DIA, Army, and Navy always said, 'The Russians are not here yet, but they are on their way!'; the CIA always said, 'The Russians are coming, but they won't make it,' and State always said 'The Russians? They aren't even trying.' "

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missile, the SS-11. The SS-9 was big enough to destroy U.S. missiles in their silos, despite a variable accuracy (in some of its versions, the SS-9 carried a 20-megaton warhead, sufficient to dig a crater .48 miles in diameter and .1 mile deep). The CIA predicted that the Soviets would build this missile to the limits of their capacity, though this limit would be rather low, since the SS-9 was very expensive. The SS-11 was cheaper than the SS-9, but, being much smaller, it could not destroy American missile silos. CIA analysts thought the SS-11 was, thus, suitable only for attacking cities, and they predicted that the Soviets would not build more than were necessary to destroy most U.S. urban population centers (which numbered only about 200). The military intelligence agencies, skeptical of this logic, claimed there were other sites—factories, depots, transportation choke points, and military bases in the United States—that were included as targets for missiles such as the SS-11 according to Soviet military doctrine.

For the most part, the predictions for SS-9 deployments were accurate. The reason for the overall error in the forecast was the underestimation of SS-11 deployments. The CIA estimate for these deployments was too low, but one should note that the military intelligence agencies, even with their broader definition of targets for which the SS-11 would be suitable, were also usually on the low side.

The question that concerns us, however, is not so much who was to blame for these errors as whether these errors could have been avoided. The first set of errors, the early overestimates of Soviet deployments, seems to have been the result of the coordination process filtering out a correct estimate (the Army-Navy forecast) and adopting an incorrect estimate (the CIA estimate). The second set of errors, the underestimates of the 1960s, seems to have resulted from a combination of (a) a general shift in opinion in the intelligence community as a whole toward an overly conservative view of Soviet plans, and (b) a reorganization of USIB that reduced the influence of the analysts who had the most "hawkish" views.

These two misestimates had a profound effect on U.S. policy. However, entirely aside from their effects, the errors of the intelligence community pose a question that may be even more important: If the coordination process was at least partly responsible for the intelligence failures outlined here, is there any way to organize the intelligence community so that such mistakes are less likely to occur in the future?

Organizational Choice and Its Implications for Intelligence

The coordination of intelligence estimates shares much with the decision-making problems other kinds of organizations encounter. The problem lies in reconciling two incompatible goals: Allowing the

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organization to be "democratic" enough to consider a variety of views, while also making sure that the organization will not overlook a "best" estimate, if one is presented.

When he played a key role in establishing the intelligence community's analysis shops, Sherman Kent apparently believed that a free competition of ideas within the intelligence community (or, to use the Communist vernacular, "criticism and self-criticism") would eventually allow the "best truth" to emerge. One might expect Kent to view the coordination process in this way, as this belief was consistent with the thinking of early twentieth-century historiography. Yet, it neglects the political aspect of intelligence coordination.

As one former participant recalls quite bluntly, "The goal of each participant in the coordination process was to try to give up as little as possible and make the NIE resemble his own view as closely as possible." In other words, intelligence analysts may be objective seekers of truth when conducting their own analyses, but they are fierce political animals in coordination meetings, each defending his original point of view. As a result, much of the action in a coordination meeting is bargaining—analysts posturing and trying to cut deals with their colleagues so that, if they are unable to make the NIE match their views exactly, at least it will come close.

Indeed, some of this maneuvering becomes quite sophisticated at times, and intelligence analysts seem (at least implicitly) to understand the political game very well. For example, some analysts within Army intelligence and the DIA appreciated the advantage that writing the first draft of the NIE offered. They pressed the director of the DIA and then-Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird to persuade Richard Helms to appoint military personnel as chief drafters of the NIE on Soviet strategic forces. ONE and BNE members understood the ploy, resisted, and eventually the DCI turned down the request.

Similarly, the DIA has tried since the early 1970s to maintain a solid Defense Department position in coordination sessions. To do so, the DIA director has coordinated its own estimate with Army, Navy, and Air Force representatives before entering the USIB meetings. In order to maintain solidarity, the DIA often has allowed the individual services to make their own arguments on subjects about which they are especially sensitive (e.g., the Navy is usually allowed to present an assessment of Soviet antisubmarine capabilities that is always more optimistic than those of the other agencies).

CIA analysts admit that they often tried to play off one military agency against another when they knew the Defense Department was

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divided on a particular issue. The consensus, incidentally, suggests that CIA analysts were the best tacticians in these coordination battles.

There are essentially three devices available to reduce the effects of bureaucratic politics on the outcome of the coordination process:

- Centralizing authority over the final version of the estimate in a single official or agency, e.g., appointing a strong, active DCI and giving him final say over the NIE;
- Restricting the range of viewpoints that can be introduced in the coordination process, e.g., creating institutional norms that render some opinions as socially absurd prima facie; and
- Restricting the membership of the participants in the coordination process so that the opinions in the intelligence community are relatively homogeneous.[12]

Unless at least one of these three conditions holds for the coordination process, the debate will be so free-ranging that an incorrect estimate will be able to defeat a correct estimate. Of course, any collective decision-making process has *some* features that incorporate these restrictions. No one really wants an intelligence community that is open to *all* points of view; otherwise, coordination meetings might become hung on issues such as whether or not the Soviet Union is in fact deploying mind-control machines. However, the point that is important here is that, to whatever extent the coordination process restricts debate, the process incorporates bias that can cause an estimate to err; and yet, to whatever extent a coordination process does not restrict debate, the process permits error by political maneuver.

The problem with any of the three devices is that each stacks the deck in favor of one point of view. The first condition, for example, would bias the estimate in favor of the point of view of the strong official. The second condition would bias the estimate against those opinions that were inadmissible at face value. And the third condition would bias the estimate against whichever agencies or analysts were deleted from the coordination process. But, because there is no way of knowing beforehand which agency or which point of view should in fact be favored, there is no rule of thumb telling us the direction in which the coordination process *should* be biased. After all, if we did know this, there would be no need for intelligence in the first place; we would already know how the estimate should read.

[12] Some readers might note the similarity of these conditions to a concept from social choice and economic theory, namely the conditions necessary for a collective choice equilibrium. See Kenneth Arrow, *Social Choice and Individual Values,* 2nd ed. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1963); and Amartya K. Sen, *Collective Choice and Social Welfare* (San Francisco: Holden-Day, 1970).

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Thus, any official responsible for organizing the intelligence community is left with a no-win situation—either the official can make the intelligence community "democratic," in which case all of the members have an equal say in the estimate, all points of view are tolerated, and no member is excluded; or the official can restrict the coordination process. In the first case, the official will have left the estimate open to the whimsy of the maneuver and shennanigans of competing agencies. In the second case, the estimate will be biased, possibly in the wrong direction.

Re-examining the Forecasting Errors of the NIEs

Consider again the missile gap error. From the accounts of the participants, one of two kinds of error seems to have occurred. According to some analysts (former Air Force representatives), the CIA had virtually unchecked discretion over the views included in the NIE. If so, then it would seem that the first condition listed above held, and the error was due to bias, i.e., that of the CIA. This view of the CIA's influence seems to be a minority view.

A more common view (held by former Army and CIA representatives) is that the CIA was able to out-maneuver the other agencies. According to this interpretation, the CIA was able to play the Air Force off against the Army and Navy so that, after having adjusted its position somewhat to accommodate the other members of the intelligence community, the CIA was able to see its original position published as the main estimate.

The underestimates of the mid-to-late 1960s, on the other hand, definitely appear to have been caused by a different type of problem. The combination of the reorganization of USIB in 1962 and the fallout of the missile gap episode produced a homogeneous viewpoint among the effective actors in the coordination process, and this viewpoint turned out to be biased.

The reorganization of military intelligence in 1962 eliminated the Air Force, Army, and Navy from full membership on USIB. This action resulted in the military intelligence agencies being unable to hold out against the lower estimates offered by the other intelligence agencies. It also permitted the CIA, DIA, and INR to disregard the estimates offered by the Air Force as the "worst case" scenario for Soviet ICBM deployments. The published estimate during most of the years following 1962 consisted of the lowest figure submitted by INR and the lowest figure submitted by the Air Force. As we have seen, this projection was too low. If the Air Force's range had been accepted in toto, then the high

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end of the official estimate would often have been on the mark for actual Soviet deployments. Of course, this would have also resulted in the estimate having a much larger range, making it less useful to the intelligence consumer.

The point here is not that any one agency was to blame for errors in recent U.S. intelligence. Indeed, in other estimates the roles have been reversed, and it was the CIA that was most correct and the Air Force that was most wrong. For example, throughout the 1960s, Air Force analysts, much to the consternation of their CIA counterparts, argued that the Soviet Union was about to deploy a new intercontinental bomber. The main text of the NIE never included this Air Force estimate (though the Air Force argued its position in footnotes in some years), and the Soviets never deployed such an aircraft during the time frame of the estimate.[13]

Rather, the important point here is that the coordination process itself can cause forecasts to go wrong, and, furthermore, there does not seem to be a satisfactory solution to the problem. One seems forced to accept either the chance of error by bias, or the chance of error by bureaucratic politics.

Conclusions

This investigation into the coordination of some actual intelligence estimates brings additional insight to one of the long-standing debates of the foreign policy community. For most of the post-World War II era, experts have debated whether the United States should have a highly centralized intelligence community or a more collegial intelligence community.[14]

Those who argue for centralization claim that a single agency or official should have total control over the content of intelligence. These writers believe that, unless there is a decisive "guru," the intelligence product will simply reflect the "lowest common denominator" of consensus within the intelligence community. Usually these writers suggest that collegial systems tend to be overly conservative, in part because a subtle warning indicator might not be able to survive the skepticism of several analysts (in part by definition; otherwise the indicator would not

[13] Since this paper was originally written, *Jane's All the World's Aircraft* has published Soviet photographs of a prototype heavy bomber that was test-flown by the Sukhoi Design Bureau during the 1960s. The aircraft resembles a North American XB-70, except that the Soviet bomber was equipped with a single dorsal fin. So perhaps there was some basis to the Air Force estimates after all.

[14] For example, see the discussions on this issue by Sherman Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1949); and Roger Hilsman, *Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions* (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1956).

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be subtle). An intelligence community, these writers argue, must be bold, and boldness is an attribute of individuals, not groups.[15]

Other analysts disagree. Those who believe that the intelligence community should be more collegial fear that if one official is overly dominant—or one point of view, if the intelligence community becomes too inbred—then intelligence estimates will fail whenever the "guru" fails.

This centralization, these writers claim, can be imposed by either of two means. A single agency within the intelligence community (e.g., the CIA) might become too powerful; this seems to be the criticism of the military intelligence officials who felt shut out of the coordination process during the 1960s. Or, the appointment of a highly influential official responsible for passing the intelligence product to the policy-making consumers can itself impose centralization; this seems to be the charge of the critics of Henry Kissinger when he was Assistant for National Security to Richard Nixon.[16]

Unfortunately, each of these organizational principles has its own problems, and there seems to be no way to avoid the shortcomings of one organizational scheme without encountering those of the other. If the coordination process for reconciling these differences is truly collegial and open, then theoretically any agency should have an equal opportunity at having its position adopted. In such situations in which "all opinions are created equal," the final estimate is susceptible to being swayed by the maneuvering of several agencies, each trying to shape the estimate in its own world view. This situation is likely to lead to the estimate being shaped at least as much by the bureaucratic political skills of the actors within the intelligence community as it is by objective reality.

On the other hand, any measure reducing the range of debate within the intelligence community necessarily introduces bias into the

[15] Probably the best-known example of a single decisive individual overruling the consensus of the intelligence community and arriving at a successful estimate is the assessment given by John McCone during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The intelligence community's consensus in August 1962 was that the Soviets would not deploy offensive weapons in Cuba; McCone disagreed, and submitted his own assessment to the president. McCone, of course, was later proven correct. See Arthur Krock, *Memoirs,* (New York: Macmillan, 1968), p. 378; Theodore Sorenson, *Kennedy* (New York: Bantam Books, 1966), p. 670; Elie Abel, *The Missile Crisis* (New York: Bantam Books, 1966), pp. 17-18; and Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), p. 190.

[16] For example, see Ray S. Cline, "Policy Without Intelligence," *Foreign Policy* (Winter, 1974), pp. 121-135.

To be fair, not all students of the Nixon years share Cline's opinion of Kissinger's role as an intelligence "gatekeeper"; even some of the officials who are said to have been "victimized" by Henry Kissinger's acquisition of influence do not agree with this view. William Colby, for example, acknowledges that Kissinger was pivotal in providing Nixon with foreign policy information, but he also has a much more measured view of Kissinger's role than does Cline (see his *Honorable Men* [New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978], pp. 372-376). Richard Helms does not seem to have made a public statement on this issue, but it is interesting that Kissinger acknowledges Helms in the preface to the first volume of the Kissinger memoirs, (*White House Years* [Boston: Little, Brown, 1979], p. xxiii). Most of the interviews conducted for this paper tended to support the Colby view of the extent of Kissinger's influence.

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coordination process. By declaring a point of view "absurd," or an opinion "outrageous," one excludes them from the final estimate. The problem with such biases, of course, is that no one knows *before* the estimate is written what the biases should be.

What is most frustrating about this problem is that it cannot simply be wished away. One cannot eliminate the coordination process. Estimates will always have to be coordinated within a bureaucracy, if only because the intelligence product is beyond the abilities of a single person and, as long as there is more than one analyst, there is likely to be more than one opinion within the intelligence community. Even when good data are available (an unusual occurrence), analysts may disagree on their interpretation. Indeed, even if intelligence is left "uncoordinated," so that a variety of viewpoints are submitted to policy-making officials, these higher officials will still have to sort out the different opinions before they can make policy. Thus, by ignoring the coordination problem within the intelligence community, one only raises the problem to a higher level in the foreign-policy bureaucracy.

Still, there are reasons for selecting one organizational scheme over another, though the choice has little to do with improving the accuracy of estimates. In a truly decentralized, "democratic" intelligence community, the estimate is likely to be a fluke of the coordination process; in fact, any number of estimates could have been made, and the estimate that was selected reflects the bargaining skills of the members of the intelligence community as much as it reflects their analytical abilities. In this type of system, it is difficult to fault the intelligence community as a whole for an error; the coordination process is simply unequipped to pick out a right estimate from a range of wrong ones.

On the other hand, if one were to appoint a strong DCI to act as a "guru" and choose a national estimate from the various opinions presented to him, then one would at least have a person to whom credit (or blame) for intelligence can be assigned. Even though one could not guarantee that the NIE would be any more *accurate* than before, at least there would be somebody who was *politically responsible* for the estimate. A strong DCI, closely associated with the president, could be held accountable for the quality of intelligence. If his forecasts were wrong, then voters could crank this factor into their calculations when they decide whether or not to return the administration to office in the next election.

The most important point of this paper, however, is to put intelligence estimates into a better perspective. It is important to understand the limits of the ability of organizations such as the intelligence community to predict the future, because many of these limits are totally separate from methods and data, and, to some degree, seem to be in-

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soluble. The intelligence community—and, for that matter, any other bureaucracy responsible for making forecasts—arrives at its opinion through some method of aggregating the opinion of individuals. Any such method will unavoidably be open to some amount of error. Policy makers and the public would both do well to remember that the intelligence they receive is limited by the nature of the organizations that produce it.

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PERSPECTIVES ON THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR

by Alvin Z. Rubinstein

The war between Iran and Iraq is in its sixth year with no end in sight. The see-saw campaigns of the first two years have settled into a bitter war of attrition. Losses on both sides are heavy, and estimates of battle dead run as high as one million.[1] At present, neither side is strong enough to achieve a decisive breakthrough on the battlefield. Iraq's defense in depth and ample supplies of advanced weaponry are sufficient to offset Iran's substantial advantage in manpower, and probably combat motivation. Ayatollah Khomeini's refusal to sanction negotiations for a settlement on terms that Iraq's strongman, Saddam Hussein, could accept suggests that the conflict will drag on until domestic developments in one of the two countries create a new situation, permitting a move to the diplomatic table.

Unlike most wars in the Third World, the Iran-Iraq conflict has not prompted outside parties to generate strong pressure for a cease-fire, much less a settlement. The reasons for this lack of initiative are diverse, but they stem from a perception shared by most of the non-belligerents who are directly affected that the war and the consequent stalemate have brought unexpected benefits. Considering the dire predictions that passed for conventional wisdom when the war broke out on September 22, 1980, the consequences have been surprising. Looking back, one is struck by the number of faulty assumptions that pervaded Western thinking; and by the unanticipated ways that the conflict affected the positions of the key regional actors and the two superpowers.

Faulty Assumptions

First, the war did not result in regional destabilization. It did not weaken existing governments or cause social, economic, political, or religious unrest in the Gulf. On the contrary, the opposite occurred. Iran,

[1] Drew Middleton reported that the estimates in various NATO capitals "range from 420,000 to 580,000 Iranian dead, with the number of Iraqi dead put at 300,000. Western intelligence officers agree that the number of deaths from wounds is high because most major operations have been carried out in intense heat, which kills the seriously wounded." (*New York Times*, September 23, 1985.)

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in turmoil at the time of the Iraqi attack, mobilized its people and forged a more unified home front than any since the overthrow of the shah. In the domestic struggle for power between the mullahs and the moderates — epitomized by former Prime Minister Abol-Hasan Bani-Sadr who fled Iran in the spring of 1981 and helped form a government-in-exile in Paris — the clergy won out. Khomeini's hold on the masses, the mullahs' ruthlessness and use of terror to destroy the leftist-secularist opposition, the transformation of the Revolutionary Guards from irregulars to well-equipped, ideologically committed shock troops, the establishment of a network of Revolutionary Committees through which the Islamic Republic Party (IRP) consolidated its hold on the administrative structures of government and society, and the mobilizing appeal of nationalism and militant Islam all coalesced to form a viable political system.[2] Out of the crucible of war, the IRP has emerged as Iran's new ruling elite. The military is cowed, and the secular opposition is in disarray, exiled or underground with little prospect of an early comeback.

On the other side of the Gulf, the moderate Arab states ruled by Sunni Muslims — Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) — are now less fearful of Khomeini's revolution and its ability to trigger social upheavals in their domains. In the immediate aftermath of the Iranian Revolution, however, they had good reason for concern. The militant, puritanical Islam preached by Khomeini, which denounced "inequality and injustice" and appealed to "the distressed, dispossessed, and alienated," was giving rise to a "Populist Islam" that looked to bridge the Sunni-Shiite divide and that put "Establishment Islam" on the defensive.[3] The Shiites were restive. Varying in size from 8 percent of the population in Saudi Arabia (though concentrated in the oil-rich Eastern Province) to 25 percent in Kuwait and more than 70 percent in Bahrain, they had long experienced discrimination, low social mobility, and limited prospects for advancement in government. But labor strife in late 1979 in Saudi Arabia and an attempted coup in December 1981 in Bahrain — both linked to Iran — prompted reform. More important perhaps, the longer the war dragged on, the more the gloss rubbed off Khomeini's Revolution: ruthless "suppression of even moderate dissent to clerical rule, more executions than in the rest of the world combined, and a terror of everyday life" were the abrasives that produced a change in political outlook.[4] And with Iran fighting an Arab

[2] See Shaul Bakhash, *The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution* (New York: Basic Books, 1984), chapters 7, 8, 9 passim. Also, Dilip Hiro, *Iran Under the Ayatollahs* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985), passim; and M.B. Naqvi, "A Traveller's Impressions," *Dawn* (Karachi), December 14, 1983.

[3] James A. Bill, "Resurgent Islam in the Persian Gulf," *Foreign Affairs,* Fall 1984, pp. 113-119.

[4] Marvin Zonis, "Gulf Arabs Are Wary," *New York Times,* August 2, 1982.

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state, Khomeinism acquired a self-serving national purpose that limited its trans-Iranian Islamic-religious character.

A second faulty assumption was the belief that Islam would somehow serve as a cohesive force in the Muslim world — a modern-day expression of the perennial Western fascination with the Lawrence of Arabia myth of Arab unity. The varied reactions of the Arab countries indicated, to the contrary, that even in a war between an Arab state and a non-Arab (albeit Muslim) state, national interest transcended religious and racial bonds. Among the Arab countries, Jordan has been Iraq's most openly partisan supporter, with Egypt a close second. Over the years, King Hussein has developed a special relationship with Saddam Hussein rooted in a common fear of Syria and in expanding economic ties: "Long before the war, the Jordanian port of Aqaba had become an important channel for Iraqi imports. Indeed, a part of the port was leased to Iraq for its exclusive use" and Iraq was a major contributor to Jordan's economic development.[5]

From the start, the Arab states of the Gulf, though anxious not to offend Iran, tilted toward Iraq, providing financial and logistical support; and, once it was clear that Iraq would not be victorious, this support grew. Fear of the possible consequences of an Iranian success impelled them to contribute the wherewithal to enable Baghdad to buy the guns to prosecute the war and the butter that would sustain the support of the home front.

Those Arab leaderships hostile to Iraq and friendly to Iran have been mainly Syria, Libya, Algeria, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The Syrian-Iraqi antagonism is rooted in the rivalry between the two wings of the Baath Party and in the deep antipathy between Hafez al-Assad and Saddam Hussein. Syria's President has another compelling reason for courting Iran, namely, Khomeini's intercession with the Shiites of Lebanon on behalf of Syria's policy there. With Syria's deepening involvement since the mid-1970s, especially after Israel's 1982 invasion accelerated communal polarization and the emergence of militant Shiite militias, Lebanon has become very difficult for any intrusive power to manage. Given Khomeini's considerable influence among the Lebanese Shiites, Hafez al-Assad upholds Iran's position vis-á-vis Iraq in return for support of his policy in Lebanon — or at least no open opposition to it. In the case of Libya, Algeria, and the PLO, they are annoyed with Iraq for distracting Arab attention from the Palestinian issue and for adopting hostile positions on sundry intra-Arab world problems, for example, Iraq's support of Morocco on the Polisario issue to the annoyance of Algeria.

[5] G.H. Jansen, "The Attitudes of the Arab Governments Towards the Gulf War," in M.S. El Azhary, ed., *The Iran-Iraq War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), pp. 83-84.

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Third, the expectation that Third World countries would, as a matter of vital self-interest, stand firm in defense of certain principles was rudely disappointed. For one, the inviolability of territorial boundaries proved not to be as inviolable as had once been supposed. Over the past generation or so, as regional conflict increased, most Third World countries have upheld the national boundaries arbitrarily established by the European colonial powers in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, preferring not to raise the lid on pent-up irredentist pressures. Thus, in the early 1960s, they opposed Iraq's attempt to incorporate Kuwait and, in the 1970s, Somalia's grab for the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. Their unwillingness to hold firm in the Iran-Iraq War attenuates the utility of this principle as a constraint on future aggrandizers.

Though Iraq was unmistakably the aggressor, there has been no condemnation, not in the United Nations, not in meetings of the nonaligned movement (NAM), and not in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (a group of forty-two Islamic countries established in 1969, largely on Saudi Arabia's initiative). Baghdad's Arab supporters routinely block Iranian efforts to adopt a resolution critical of Iraq, in effect making the war a non-issue. Iran has denounced U.N. Security Council resolutions calling for a ceasefire, insisting that they do not include "the appropriate conditions for peace," one of which is condemnation of Iraq as an aggressor.[6] U.N. Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cúellar, who is apparently trusted by Iran, has tried a number of personal initiatives, but aside from minor items such as a moratorium on attacks against civilians and improved treatment for POWs, he has not been able to dampen the fighting, much less bring the belligerents to the conference table. In the absence of any ability to restrain the behavior of either side in the hope of inducing the other to negotiate, the secretary-general's personal good will counts for little.

Iran is also bitter over the U.N.'s failure to denounce Iraq for using poison gas. Iraq first introduced chemical weapons in March 1984

[6] A memorandum, "Consequences of the Prolongation of the Armed Conflict Between Iran and Iraq," dated October 19, 1982, and addressed to the U.N. secretary-general, set forth Iran's position. Noting that when Iran liberated Khorramshahr and drove the Iraqi forces from Iranian territory, "the people of Iran expected. . . that the international community would be relieved that Iran had finally succeeded in eliminating one of the biggest obstacles to peace. But again, this did not happen. The revival of the activity of the Security Council with regard to the Iraqi war of aggression turned out to be only an expression of concern for Iraq. Resolution 514 (1982) of the Security Council failed to recognize that an Iraqi armed aggression and occupation had been going on for 22 months. It also failed to condemn the aggressor for having disregarded Articles 33 and 37 of the Charter, and avoided any reference to the deliberate destruction by Iraq of all towns, villages, roads, farms and all other means of life within the areas under their occupation. . . .It also failed to recognize that the barbaric behavior of Iraq in the occupied territories, constituted grave crimes against humanity, for which the Iranian people had an undeniable right to seek justice and reparations. But Resolution 514 (1982) did not fail to attempt to create a shield behind which the criminal government of Iraq could be protected. It was therefore obvious that the people of Iran would reject the resolution." (U.N. General Assembly, Document A/37/555, October 20, 1982, p.4.)

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to blunt a massive Iranian offensive on Iraqi territory. The U.N. was silent. When Iran, however, in response to this escalation of the war, attacked tankers in the Gulf, the Arab countries sought to condemn Iran for its "aggression," without mentioning Iraq's use of poison gas or its attacks on Gulf shipping bound for Iran. Under the circumstances, Iran must regard the U.N. as tilted against it, and its isolation as a sign of the world's indifference and the ultimate corruption of the Gulf Arabs whose aid in excess of $50 billion makes Iraq's war effort possible.

Nor has Iran fared any better in meetings of the nonaligned movement. NAM's fragmentation is such that it has been unable to mitigate or resolve regional conflicts. Not only do member states seek to manipulate the NAM for their own interests and resist crisis-containment that might affect their position or ambitions, but they are not prepared to take violators of regional peace to task, no doubt out of fear that to criticize one party to a regional conflict would be to jeopardize the continued participation of the other. NAM's fixation with maintaining the facade of consensus disqualifies its acting as a disinterested conciliator.

Fourth, fears that the Iran-Iraq War would wreak havoc on the world market have proved unwarranted. The international economy has managed to get along rather well, notwithstanding the sharp decline in the oil production of Iran and Iraq. Indeed, with a glut on the world oil market, the prices of crude petroleum have dropped by about 25 percent since 1980. This is partly the fortuitous result of a downturn in the world economy, the coming on line of new oil fields, the stepped-up pumping of oil by major exporters such as Mexico, Nigeria, and Indonesia in an effort to offset declines in revenue stemming from lower prices, and the effectiveness of energy conservation in the West. Given these developments, and barring a sudden surge in the demand for energy, neither Iraqi nor Iranian oil is essential for the West.

In the spring of 1984, Iraq, increasingly desperate to end the impasse, launched attacks aimed at sharply reducing Iran's oil exports on the assumption that without the $10 to $20 billion in revenue Iran earns from oil, it would be unable to purchase the weapons needed to continue the war. The principal target is the terminal at Kharg Island, which handles more than 90 percent of Iran's crude oil exports. In addition, Iraq has been attacking tankers in the Gulf. Iran's response in kind triggered new fears of "a functional closure of the Gulf," as each side threatens to cut the other's economic lifeline.[7] Since mid-August 1985, Iran's oil exports have dropped by more than 50 percent to about one million barrels of oil per day (bpd).[8]

[7] Mazher Hameed, "The Gulf: Worry, World," *New York Times*, June 3, 1984.

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If Iraq persists and succeeds in crippling Iran's export capacity for any length of time, Teheran would be forced to rethink its options, which could well be reduced to a choice between negotiating a ceasefire and settlement or escalating the war by closing the Strait of Hormuz. In the past, Iranian leaders have warned that if Iran cannot ship oil through the Strait of Hormuz, then neither will any one else.

While all of this is ominous, it is not an economic doomsday scenario. The Gulf region now supplies about eight million bpd — well below the export levels prior to the outbreak of the war. Should the Strait of Hormuz be closed, perhaps half of this total could be made up from non-Gulf oil producers and additional Saudi exports through its pipeline to the Red Sea. Iraq is exporting almost one million bpd, down from the prewar level of 3.5 million bpd, but, nonetheless, an amount generating substantial revenues. Moreover, Iraqi oil is pumped through a relatively secure pipeline from the oil center of Kirkuk north and northwest of Turkey's port of Dortyol on the Mediterranean. Its second pipeline, running through Syria, was closed shortly after the war began, as part of Assad's accommodation with Khomeini.

Furthermore, despite threats, Iran is unlikely to close the Strait of Hormuz: it has neither the military capability to sustain such a move, nor the apparent desire to risk a confrontation with the United States. Even if it should manage to close the Gulf to oil shipping, the combination of surplus productive capacity outside the Gulf region and stepped-up use of available pipeline capacity (additional capacity is under construction in Saudi Arabia and expected to be available by the end of 1986) suggests that the effect on the world economy would not be nearly as disruptive as many experts believe — or as would have been likely a decade ago.

Finally, the Iran-Iraq War has forced reassessment of the previously accepted proposition that all conventional wars in the Third World would, of necessity, be short wars. The ability of both sides to sustain the war at a high level of intensity has been a surprise. Whereas in the Arab-Israeli wars a massive resupply effort by a superpower patron was essential within weeks, even days, of the start of fighting in order to avert defeat, in the Iran-Iraq War each side initially had sufficient stocks of weapons to rely on its own resources. When it became clear that the war would be a long one, each side had little difficulty obtaining arms from a variety of sources, first, because each could pay in hard currency from oil revenues and, second, because the superpowers were not directly involved in defense of a prime client. Iraq's principal suppliers are France, Italy, Poland, Egypt, and the Soviet Union (since late 1982); Iran, though

[8] *New York Times,* August 26, 1985. For a general assessment of the decline of Arab oil power, see Eliyahu Kanovsky, "The Rise and Fall of Arab Oil Power," *Middle East Review* Fall 1985, pp. 5-10.

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more hard-pressed to find reliable suppliers, manages to obtain what it needs from such sources as Libya, North Korea, Czechoslovakia, Syria, and, in the early 1980s, even spare parts from Israel for its Phantom jets in return for permitting the emigration of several thousand Iranian Jews. China sells arms to both sides,[9] and given the free-wheeling nature of the international arms market both sides can buy almost anything they need, provided they can pay top prices. Also, in the case of Iran, it should be remembered that Khomeini reaped the harvest of the shah's substantial investment in a large domestic arms industry. In the early 1970s, the shah contracted with the Soviet Union for the construction of factories producing artillery, armored personnel carriers, small arms, and the like — and these factories began production in late 1978-79, just in time to ensure that Iranian forces would not run low on basic types of weapons. Weapons, not just trained manpower, made possible Iran's stunning rebuff to Iraq.[10]

Unanticipated Consequences

One is always reluctant to talk in terms of "the fruits of war." Yet in most conflicts, however tragic, there are those who gain as well as those who lose. In the Iran-Iraq conflict, though Iraq appears to be a net loser, a conclusive assessment must await the termination of hostilities. But the effects of this war on the nonbelligerent but interested parties have been remarkable. A preliminary and highly tentative assessment would, at minimum, identify four important unanticipated consequences: (1) improved security for the nonbelligerent Arab states of the Gulf; (2) improved prospects for peace and regional stability in the Gulf-Arabian Peninsula region; (3) diminished prospects for Soviet influence in Iran and Iraq; and (4) enhanced status for the United States.

First, the nonbelligerent Arab states of the Gulf have taken advantage of the stalemate between Iran and Iraq to strengthen their own security. Saudi Arabia took the lead in creating the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), formally established in May 1981, the six members being Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and the UAE. Iraq is not a member — a deliberate exclusion intended to ensure Saudi leadership and reassure Iran that the GCC is not directed against any state in the region but seeks only to enhance the security of the member states. The quest for security has been the main catalyst:

[9] *Washington Post,* April 3, 1984.

[10] This fact is usually overlooked in evaluations of Iran's military comeback and capability. For example, in Elaine Sciolino, "Iran's Durable Revolution," *Foreign Affairs,* Spring 1983, pp. 904-908, there is no mention of an Iranian arms industry.

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With the Iran-Iraq war raging barely twenty minutes away from their borders, the need to find a credible and effective means to deal with the problems of security was, of course, among the most compelling reasons for establishing the GCC.[11]

The need for a multilateral security system was given added impetus after the attempted coup in Bahrain in December 1981 by Iranian-backed groups. As a result, the ministers of interior worked out an exchange of intelligence data, "especially on political dissidents," and Saudi Arabia "now has security arrangements with each GCC state separately, except Kuwait which considers such an agreement unnecessary."[12] An arms cache uncovered in February 1984 in a Shiite part of Bahrain is cited by Bahraini authorities as demonstration of their ability to thwart efforts to mount an armed uprising; moreover, Saudi Arabia's subsidization of the construction of a causeway connecting its eastern shore with the island of Bahrain will greatly facilitate the dispatch of security forces in the event of trouble.[13] Internal security is a problem in the Gulf, but one that seems manageable.

For the foreseeable future, the main external threat to members of the GCC is from Iran. Since 1983-84 concern over attacks on oil tankers in the Gulf has prompted the Saudis to upgrade their air defense system, an important component of which are the four U.S. AWACs aircraft that were seconded to the Saudis in October 1980. On June 5, 1984, Saudi F-15s downed an Iranian F-4 fighter plane in a dogfight over what Saudi Arabia said were its territorial waters. The incident was significant because it showed "Saudi political resolve," a willingness to use military force to defend their territory.[14] Six months later, the GCC agreed to establish a two-brigade (about 10,000 to 12,000 men) force to augment their security forces. This decision to create a rapid deployment force is symptomatic of a gradually developing internal cohesion in the GCC, and of the active steps under way to foster defense planning and cooperation, a coherent weapons procurement policy, and a regional armaments industry — all intended to increase their independent capability for self-defense. These moves, coupled with the ever present U.S. naval power, have, for example, stimulated expectations that the GCC would be prepared to escort tanker traffic down the coast to the open sea in the event

[11] John Duke Anthony, "The Gulf Cooperation Council," in Robert G. Darius, John W. Amos, II, and Ralph H. Magnus, eds., *Gulf Security Into the 1980s: Perceptual and Strategic Dimensions* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1984), p. 84. See also Nadav Safran, *Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), p.365.

[12] Salamat Ali and Derek Davies, "The Gulf '83," *Far Eastern Economic Review,* March 3, 1983, p. 41.

[13] *New York Times,* July 7, 1984. Bahrain is the largest island in an archipelago of thirty-three small islands lying off the coast of Saudi Arabia.

[14] R.K. Ramazani, "Iran's Islamic Revolution and the Persian Gulf," *Current History,* January 1985, p. 41.

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that Iran tried to block the Strait of Hormuz. They act to make the Iranians pause before plunging ahead on such a course.

A second unanticipated consequence of the Iran-Iraq War has been the improved prospect for peace and regional stability in the Gulf region. Before the war, the military build up and hegemonic ambitions of Iran and Iraq had caused widespread fear among the other Gulf states. Having worked hard to reach an accommodation with the shah, they were shocked by his overthrow and felt threatened by Iran's militant efforts to export Khomeini's Islamic Revolution which "openly proclaimed its hostility to the 'corrupt' rulers and societies across the Gulf."[15] Similarly, Iraq's Baath Party had espoused a secular brand of Arabism that aimed at subverting the traditionalist monarchies of the Lower Gulf.

But the war has changed this and transformed the strategic environment. Exhausted powers do not expand. They need time to rebuild — and in the process they presumably reassess their foreign policy objectives. Iran is without friends in the region. Isolated and beset by enemies — Iraq, the USSR, and a Soviet-dominated Afghanistan — its only normal relations in the region are with Turkey and Pakistan, neither of which would lift a finger to defend it. (Indeed, Pakistan has about 20,000 troops in Saudi Arabia serving to protect that regime from external threats such as the one posed by Iran.) No Iranian victory, which might stir up the Shiites in Bahrain, Kuwait, or Saudi Arabia, is likely. As for Iraq, chastened and dependent on the largesse of the other Gulf Arabs, it signed an agreement with Saudi Arabia in December 1981 ending a long-simmering border dispute that was a legacy of arbitrary British map-making in 1922.[16] Far from being a threat to the Arab sheikdoms, it seeks their continued support.

The long-term interest of the Gulf Arabs is a situation in which "neither Iran or Iraq achieves a clear-cut victory."[17] Their preferred outcome is probably one of peaceful stalemate, but, lacking that, they are not disturbed by a war that drags on, nor are they made more vulnerable by it:

> Neither the superpowers nor the Arab world would be unhappy to see Iran and Iraq continue to divert and exhaust each other on the battlefield. The war is in just about everyone's interest — everyone except the populations of Iran and Iraq.[18]

When the fighting stops, the region should settle down to a period of wary but long-term coexistence.

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[15] Michael Sterner, "The Iran-Iraq War," *Foreign Affairs,* Fall 1984, p. 135.
[16] *New York Times,* December 28, 1981.
[17] Sterner, "The Iran-Iraq War."
[18] Elaine Sciolino, "Iran-Iraq Drags On," *New York Times,* August 17, 1983.

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Third, Soviet influence has declined sharply. Moscow has been a major loser in the competition for a secure presence and for influence in the region. As a marginal actor in the Gulf having diplomatic relations only with Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, and Oman since September 1985 (see below), the Soviet Union sought in the 1960s and early 1970s to weaken the ties between the Gulf states and the West and to foster a diplomatic environment congenial to the promotion of its objectives. By the end of the 1970s, its basic aims seemed within its grasp. A friendship treaty concluded with Iraq in 1972 and the fall of the shah in January 1979 brought the Soviet Union a new salience in the region, particularly after its forces occupied Afghanistan, prompting President Mohammed Zia ul-Haq of Pakistan to observe: "You can't live in the sea and create enmity with whales. You have to be friendly with them. The Soviet Union is on our doorstep. The USA is 10,000 miles away."[19] Recognition of this new geostrategic situation may have been one of the factors that prompted Oman to take the diplomatic plunge. However, in this instance, a more likely explanation is that a combination of the Sultan's dissatisfaction with Washington's economic and military aid packages and his desire to show the Saudis that he is not to be taken for granted led him to act as he did. In any event, after secret discussions at the United Nations, Oman and the USSR established formal diplomatic relations on September 26, 1985, and agreed to exchange diplomatic missions in the near future.[20] Moscow, acting as if the event were "a normal occurrence in the field of international relations," is clearly pleased with this unexpected turn in the Gulf.[21]

With the outbreak of the war between Iran and Iraq, Moscow again discovered, as it did with Egypt in the 1970s, that in the Middle East nothing fails like success. It hoped to maintain good relations with both countries, but found that it was "damned if it did, and damned if it didn't." It was unable to push its courtship of Iran, because of Khomeini's conviction that Moscow was meddling in Iranian domestic affairs, his hostility to Communism, and his condemnation of the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan, and because of the USSR's ties to Iraq. Rebuffed by Iran, Moscow found relations with Iraq difficult, because of Saddam Hussein's suspicions that it preferred Iran to Iraq and his dissatisfaction with the level and reliability of Soviet arms deliveries. Notwithstanding strenuous efforts to retain existing ties with Iran and Iraq and forestall a shift by either toward the United States, the USSR instead found relations with

[19] Quoted in *Los Angeles Times,* January 16, 1980.

[20] Foreign Language Broadcast Service/USSR (hereafter referred to as FBIS/USSR), September 26, 1985, H 1. In November 1985, the United Arab Emirates announced its intention to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. (*New York Times,* November 16, 1985.)

[21] FBIS/USSR, September 30, 1985, H 1.

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both worsening and Baghdad manifesting a greater interest in improved relations with the United States. Unable to play the role of "honest broker," Moscow watches its position in the Gulf erode and that of the United States develop ever more solidly.

Finally, the enhanced position of the United States in the Gulf is perhaps the most unexpected and significant of the unanticipated consequences of the war. Saudi Arabia has generally found the United States responsive to its security situation and timely in its dispatch of essential weapons, from AWACs in 1980 to Stinger short-range air defense missiles in 1984. (True, the Saudis have not obtained every weapons system they think they need, and have turned to Britain for some advanced aircraft, but the Saudi arsenal remains heavily American in origin and character nonetheless.)

Despite periodic efforts to obtain air facilities, the United States has been content to keep its naval power over-the-horizon, thus showing political sensitivity for the domestic situation of the Gulf rulers, while careful to avoid unnecessary provocation to Iran. The result is a marked improvement in the Gulf's perception of U.S. credibility in a crisis. Since the war began, U.S. relations with the Gulf states have been strengthened; and a greater confidence, a clearer appreciation of the constraints under which each operates, has developed on both sides. The increased manifestations of Gulf self-confidence have not been unrelated to the growing belief in America's tenacity of purpose and military capability. There are problems, to be sure, but these are fewer and less damaging to U.S. relations with the Gulf states than was the case in 1980.

Iraq, too, has sought greater security in improved relations with the United States. In November 1984, it re-established diplomatic ties with the United States after a seventeen-year hiatus. Implicit in this restoration of relations is Baghdad's mitigation of its former hostility to U.S. policy in the Middle East and Washington's interest in seeing that Iraq is not defeated by Iran. Somewhere in this complex and evolving relationship is the basis for understandings that will contribute to regional stability.

For its part, Iran is now at least as anti-Soviet as it is anti-American, and it has become internally stronger, less apt to disintegrate, and more capable of resisting Soviet domination. The United States, though understandably bitter toward the Khomeini regime, has no cause to fight Iran. It is important to remember that a key U.S. aim in the Gulf region is to see that Iran does not become a Soviet puppet. Keeping aloof from the Iran-Iraq War and encouraging interested third parties to push mediation efforts are in the U.S. long-term interest. Though unlikely to seek better relations with the United States soon (certainly, not as long

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as Khomeini is alive), Iran's leaders sense the permanent threat from Moscow, and this has brought a greater realism in foreign affairs — and, hence, a diminished threat to the Arab regimes of the Gulf. A prudent and low-profile U.S. policy has helped make all this possible.

The lesson for Washington would appear to be, act not in haste, lest you repent at leisure. When the Reagan administration adopted an activist policy in Lebanon and in the Arab-Israeli sector and intervened directly to bring about changes when no vital U.S. interests were threatened, it was frustrated, and came away empty-handed, with political black eyes. However, when it watched, when it resorted to quiet diplomacy, informing friendly governments privately that U.S. power would be available if needed, but refraining from trying to "exploit opportunities" or "bring peace," U.S. interests and those of its friends were better served.

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DIRECTIONS IN INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS

by Jonathan Dean

Two years ago, as the confrontation over deployment of the new American intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) missiles, focusing on the decisive struggle in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), was nearing its peak, many in Western Europe and the United States were astounded as the relationship between Federal Germany and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) suddenly emerged from the obscurity of agreements on autobahn repairs and clean up of polluted rivers and took on a dramatic political life of its own.

In the summer of 1983, Franz-Josef Strauss, long the most prominent Christian Democratic opponent of the Communist East German regime, bearing with him the peace gift of a large government-guaranteed loan to East Germany, led an unprecedented succession of Christian Democratic notables on pilgrimages to East Berlin for visits with Erich Honecker and other leaders of that regime. The visitors included the highly respected mayor of West Berlin, Richard von Weizaecker, who has since become president of the Federal Republic. This full-blown Christian Democratic conversion to cultivation of the inner-German relationship was reciprocated in East Berlin. General Secretary Honecker agreed to come to the Federal Republic for the first visit every by a leader of the German Democratic Republic.

The drama intensified as Soviet negotiators withdrew from the nuclear arms talks in Geneva after the Bundestag voted in November 1983 to confirm the NATO decision to deploy American Pershing and cruise missiles. Honecker, who had threatened an "ice age" in inner-German relations if the deployment were carried out, instead said that the duty of both German states was to salvage what they could from the situation and to continue to develop their relationship. He met with Chancellor Kohl at Andropov's funeral in February 1984 and agreed with him that, in times of international tension, both German states had a special responsibility to nuture peace and East-West understanding. Enthusiastically supported by the populations of both German states, their governments seemed to be developing a protected oasis of their own in

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an increasingly barren East-West desert. In March 1984, Honecker said he would come to the Federal Republic that September. In July 1984 came another large loan to the GDR guaranteed by the Federal German government.

But there was agitation in Western capitals, where leaders worried about a basic shift in Federal German allegiance to the West. And in May last year, warning drums silent for over a decade began to sound in Moscow in a heavy media attack on the "revanchist" Federal Republic, which Moscow accused of plotting once again to overturn the postwar status quo in Eastern Europe. In July and August, the public attack from Moscow turned to the other Germans, to Honecker and the Socialist Unity Party (SED) leadership, who were accused of selling political concessions to the Federal Republic in return for Federal German bank loans, a dangerous policy which could undermine the GDR.[1] And on September 4, 1984, came the announcement from East Berlin that the Honecker visit to Federal Germany was postponed. After recriminations between the two German governments over blame for the postponement, a chill gripped the inner-German relationship; its most intense flowering since the division of Germany seemed abruptly frozen.

But there was more to come. This analysis seeks to forecast the development of the relationship between the two German states, what Federal Germans call the inner-German relationship, over the next decade or more. How will that relationship look at the end of this century? What will be its significance for East-West relations, for the international position of the two German states and for their positions in their respective NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances? Which German state will achieve dominance in the relationship? And, the central question, will the evolving inner-German relationship ultimately change the political map of Europe?

Answers to these questions require an examination of the following major variables in the inner-German relationship and an estimate of the development of each over the next decade: (1) the durability and intensity of Federal German interest in developing the relationship; (2) the durability of the GDR interest; (3) whether the FRG's NATO allies will or can put the brakes on the relationship; and (4) the Soviet attitude.

The Inner-German Relationship Today

The resumption of the U.S.-Soviet arms control dialogue last January and the reopening of the Geneva negotiations in March have, in

[1] Public Soviet commentary on this issue was extensive. See for example FBIS for the Soviet Union of July 27, 1937, and August 8, 1944; also, Serge Schmemann, "Chill in Bloc: Soviet Chides Germans," *New York Times,* August 6, 1984; and Dusko Doder, "Soviets Fear Effects of a German Detente," *Washington Post,* August 11, 1984.

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direct causal connection, resulted in a rapid thaw from the period of low-profile down-playing of the inner-German relationship by the GDR leadership, which followed the postponement of the Honecker visit — and in resumed receptivity of the GDR leadership to inner-German political contacts.

The first important signal followed Foreign Minister Gromyko's October 1984 visit to Washington. In December 1984, Wolfgang Schaeuble, the senior official in Chancellor Kohl's office charged with responsibility for inner-German matters, was received by GDR Foreign Minister Fischer and by Politburo member Herbert Haeber in East Berlin. In February, Socialist Unity Party Politburo member Hermann Axen went to Bonn, ostensibly to meet with leaders of the Social Democratic (SPD) opposition on the SPD-SED project to ban storage of chemical weapons in Central Europe. But Axen also met with Minister Schaeuble and with Federal Foreign Minister Genscher. In March 1985, on the day of Moscow's official announcement of Chernenko's death, Honecker visited the exhibit of the Federal German Hoesch company at the Leipzig trade fair and expressed his desire to further develop inner-German ties. Federal German Economics Minister Bangemann was then received by Honecker and by Politburo member Guenther Mittag in the first visit to East Berlin by a member of the Federal German cabinet in a year.

A few days later, on March 13, Chancellor Kohl and General Secretary Honecker, in Moscow for the Chernenko funeral, met and issued a communiqué documenting their desire to continue to develop the inner-German relationship.[2] And at the beginning of March, Foreign Minister Genscher succeeded in breaking out of the year-long quarantine that the Soviet Union had imposed on FRG relations with Warsaw Pact states, after the Soviets withdrew from Geneva to underline their displeasure with the FRG's agreement to Pershing deployment. Genscher, who used his Moscow visit to gain favorable publicity for himself and his Free Democratic Party just before the important Land elections in the SAAR and West Berlin, was received by Andrei Gromyko, then still Soviet Foreign Minister, for a discussion of the Reagan administration's ballistic missile defense program and of the inner-German relationship. He also made the visits to Poland and Bulgaria that had been postponed as part of the "quarantine."

Legal emigration from the GDR to the Federal Republic has resumed at about 1,000 per month, the usual rate of past years, save for the exceptional 1984 total of nearly 40,000 in the GDR's unsuccessful effort to rid itself of malcontents. Negotiations on measures to reduce the GDR's potash waste pollution of the Werra River on the inner-German

[2] See *Der Spiegel*, NR12 / 1985, pp. 19-20.

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border are continuing and probably will conclude in an agreement where the Federal Republic will pay for the installation of purification systems. Discussion is under way on repairs to the autobahn from Hof in Bavaria to Berlin.

On a political plane, the Kohl government remains interested in a Honecker visit to Bonn, though GDR leaders are noncommittal. A Honecker visit is possible sometime after the November U.S.-Soviet summit, perhaps at the turn of the year or next spring. If the Honecker visit occurs, it will be a media event despite GDR efforts, abetted by Federal Germany, to play down its political significance so that it is not exaggerated by allies of both German states.

At Issue Between the Two Germanies

Although a Honecker visit to Bonn would have considerable symbolic significance, it is unlikely to mark the resolution of any major political issues. Both German states implicitly base their positions on the continuation of Soviet opposition to a change in status of the GDR and on continuing Soviet capacity to prevent such change through military power if needed. But from this point on, their fundamental positions are diametrically opposed. Viewed objectively, the Federal Republic has a revisionist position, though not with the usual negative connotations of this term. It wishes to keep open the "German question" for change by peaceful means; more specifically, to keep open the possibility of change in the status of the GDR through self-determination by the East German population.[3]

The leaders of the German Democratic Republic on the other hand wish to make permanent its position as a separate state controlled by the Communist Socialist Unity party. Although a few East German leaders may dream that some day the Federal Republic will become a Communist state, for the GDR there is no "German question."

These divergent basic positions are articulated in a number of specific issues which will remain at the core of the inner-German relationship over the next decade. For the GDR, they are four issues, which Honecker originally raised in a 1980 speech in the East German city of Gera, known as the "Gera demands": (1) recognition by the Federal Republic of separate GDR citizenship, instead of the present Federal German position that all ethnic Germans from the GDR or elsewhere

[3] In practical terms, the concept of "Keeping the German Question Open" in Federal German usage is also a shorthand reference to maintaining the rights and responsibilities of the four allies of World War II — the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union — for Berlin and Germany as a whole; inter alia, these rights are the basis for the Soviet commitment to unrestricted civilian access to Berlin in the 1971 Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin.

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have an automatic right to Federal German citizenship; (2) raising the GDR and FRG missions in Bonn and East Berlin to the status of foreign embassies; (3) acceptance of the GDR position that the inner-German border on the Elbe river goes midway down the course of the river rather than along the eastern bank as claimed by Federal Germany; and (4) closing the West German information center at Salzgitter which, since the peak of the Cold War, has collected reports of human rights abuses by the GDR against its own citizens. All of these demands have to do directly with the GDR's concept of sovereignty and separateness. Although the GDR has not made fulfillment of the Gera demands a precondition for improvement of inner-German relations, they are central and the GDR will continue to press vigorously for their fulfillment.

Ironically, had the Honecker visit taken place as scheduled in September 1984, the GDR might have obtained some Federal German concessions toward closing the Salzgitter center and toward an Elbe border settlement under the heady momentum of combined resistance by the two German states to the worsening of East-West relations. It might even have obtained statements of Federal German "respect" for GDR citizenship, but not agreement to embassy status for the Bonn and East Berlin missions. This step would mean the formal relinquishment by the Federal Republic of its tenet that a special relationship exists between the two German states as parts of a single Germany, a special relationship which is not the same as normal diplomatic relations between any two countries.

Since the postponement of the Honecker visit, the positions of both sides have hardened. The future may bring some Federal German action on the issue of the Salzgitter center and on the Elbe River border. But the GDR demands for Federal German acceptance of separate citizenship for Germans in the GDR and for Federal German relinquishment of the all-German concept through converting the Bonn and East Berlin missions to embassies seem likely to remain unresolved in the decade to come, at least in their absolute form. The GDR's efforts to eliminate or at least restrict the concept of automatic FRG citizenship for all Germans represent a GDR desire to obtain Federal German cooperation in solving the GDR's main domestic problem: the desire of the vast majority of its citizens to travel freely to the Federal Republic and the desire of millions of its best-trained citizens to move there permanently. In essence, what the GDR wants is the Federal Republic's help in controlling the GDR population. Ideally, the GDR would like the FRG to close its borders to East Germans, or, failing that, to adopt a quota system or to place restrictions on acceptance of East Germans in the Federal Republic as Federal German citizens with full rights. For example, the FRG might be

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persuaded to adopt a policy similar to U.S. policy toward refugees from Central America, accepting *only* a genuine *political* motivation while refusing to accept those who have economic motives in wishing to emigrate. Paradoxically, the main East German leverage in seeking Federal German cooperation to restrict East German emigration to the Federal Republic is, of course, the Federal German desire to broaden the freedom of GDR residents to visit the Federal Republic. If the FRG complied, the GDR would probably respond by permitting more of its citizens to travel to the FRG on a short-term basis, relying on FRG authorities to send them back when their visas expire.

This is a tough problem. The concept of automatic citizenship for all ethnic Germans, anchored in the Federal German constitution, has strong support in the Federal German government and public. Automatic citizenship for all Germans symbolizes both German unity and the moral obligation of the Federal Republic to help less fortunate Germans. It provides the legal basis for repatriation of the thousands of ethnic Germans from the Soviet Union, Poland, and Rumania whom Federal Germany has in effect been buying out year after year, as well as for entry of Germans from the GDR and for the economic subsidies that these new German residents receive from the Federal German government. In this time of low economic growth and high unemployment in the FRG, there has been some public grumbling, not yet serious, over these economic subsidies.

So, desiring greater freedom of movement for East Germans, Federal German leaders are snared by conflicting motives. Each move toward the GDR position on separate citizenship for GDR residents will be followed by GDR proposals for further restrictions. Federal Germany sympathizes with the GDR's desire to bring its citizens to stay at home voluntarily. Federal German leaders have stressed that it is neither their interest nor their objective to depopulate the GDR, and there are economic and political reasons why such declarations should be taken seriously. Yet, Federal German authorities try to meet GDR desires for the sake of the overall relationship and to increase freedom of movement. In the next ten or fifteen years, the Federal Republic is unlikely to accept that Germans from the GDR should lose their right to Federal German citizenship, but it may cumulatively adopt regulations making immigration more difficult in the practical sense. At the same time, the priority Federal German objective in the inner-German relationship for the next decade will remain the effort to increase the two-way freedom of travel between the Federal Republic and the GDR.

The problems for the inner-German relationship caused by East Germans trying to escape illegally from the GDR to the Federal

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Republic have been partially solved by more effective GDR controls. The automatic shooting devices have been removed from the inner-German border, but they have been replaced by more impervious fences further back and out of sight. Access by East Germans to Federal German embassies in East Berlin, Prague, and elsewhere in Eastern Europe, where determined East Germans went on hunger strikes until given assurance of permission to emigrate to the Federal Republic, has become increasingly restricted both by local authorities and by the Federal German embassies. But this merely masks the problem, making it more seemly.

In connection with the 1983 and 1984 loans to the GDR guaranteed by the Federal German government, the FRG obtained minor East German concessions on travel by East Germans to the Federal Republic, among them reduction in the GDR requirement for compulsory daily exchange of twenty-five hard currency West German marks for young West Germans visiting the GDR, and lengthening the period of stay in the FRG for GDR pensioners from forty-five to sixty days. The compulsory exchange requirement has cut back Federal German and West Berlin visits from their high point of eight million a year to a level of about five million and has provided the GDR with an effortless hard currency income of two hundred million Deutsche marks per year. In coming years, the FRG will continue to press for a reduction of the age at which GDR pensioners are allowed to visit the FRG or remain there. The Federal Republic also wants a more liberal policy from East Germany permitting GDR residents to join family members already in the Federal Republic. It will also press for expanded youth, cultural, and sport exchanges.

For years, negotiations for a cultural exchange agreement between the Federal Republic and the GDR have been stalled by "The Battle over Nefertiti's Head," the question of ownership of cultural objects now located in West Berlin or Federal Germany, but originally owned by museums located in East Germany. The famous Amarna-period bust of the sister-bride of Pharaoh Akhenaton was brought to Berlin in 1912 after its discovery by a German Egyptologist. In addition, the FRG-GDR cultural agreement has been blocked by the problem of the status of the Western sectors of Berlin in the agreement. In parallel Federal German negotiations on a Federal German-Soviet cultural exchange agreement, Moscow has thus far refused to accept the Federal Republic as the representative of the Western sectors of Berlin in cultural exchanges with the USSR, although this is provided for in the 1971 Quadripartite agreement. An intra-German agreement on scientific and technological exchange has been delayed for the same reason. Despite this, some

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movement towards a practical solution of these inner-German agreements has been made in recent months.

As noted, the large government-guaranteed loans of 1983 and 1984 to the GDR brought only minor reductions of the restrictive GDR currency requirements for travelers from the Federal Republic. Unobtrusive efforts by the Federal Republic to offer more generous credit arrangements for inner-German trade, the so-called "swing," in return for further GDR concessions on compulsory currency exchange do not appear to have succeeded — the 1983-84 Federal government-assured loans put the GDR on its feet economically and made it possible for the GDR to raise two further large private bank loans without requirement of guarantees in late 1984 and early 1985. Its immediate need is no longer so great.

Future dealings between the FRG and the GDR will include further environmental protection agreements and improvements in road, rail, and postal service links. Most of these aspects of the inner-German relationship have a characteristic pattern. The starting point is the Federal German desire to improve access to the population of East Germany, as well as to Berlin, through better roads, better postal service, easing exchange requirements, and easing the restrictions governing travel of GDR residents to the Federal Republic. In response, the GDR splits each issue into numerous sub-components, selling each for the maximum FRG subsidy. The GDR is being paid, and paid well, to permit access to its citizens by Federal Germans and to permit some of its older citizens to visit the Federal Republic. There is no doubt about who will continue to be the major economic beneficiary of the inner-German relationship. These Federal German payments have been vital to the economic and political health of the GDR government, making it solvent in time of economic need and preventing emergence of discontent and unrest in the GDR population.

Issues like these are the lifeblood of the inner-German relationship and will remain so for decades. Yet to the outsider, except for specialists, the specific questions central to the inner-German relationship, significant as they are to Germans on both sides, appear pedestrian and ordinary. Humdrum issues of this kind, no matter how they are resolved, do not appear to have the potential to change the inner-German relationship fundamentally or to cause dramatic East-West shifts. What is really going on here? To assess the possibility of fundamental change, should the two German states continue on the same path for the next decade or two, requires us to assess future developments in those states and in their principal allies.

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The Federal Republic

From the outset of the inner-German relationship, the Federal Republic has in almost every instance been the initiator of specific projects for improving inner-German relations as well as the financier of these improvements. Official German figures show annual payments to the GDR at an annual rate of about 1.2 billion Deutsche marks, including in recent years a lump sum payment of DM 500 million for transit fees to Berlin; DM 200 million for postal payments; DM 50 million for road tolls for travel within the GDR; DM 200 million as income from the obligatory currency exchanges; and DM 100 million for sewer and waste disposal for the Western sectors of Berlin. To this must be added payments of DM 1 billion in earnings of foreign currency shops through personal remittances by Federal Germans to GDR residents; the guaranteed credit or swing in inner-German trade, worth DM 600 million a year or more in the past four years and increased in the agreement of July 1985 to DM 850 million per year for the period 1986-1990; and Federal German ransoming of political prisoners in the GDR at DM 200 million annually.[4] It is not feasible to make a founded estimate of the economic benefit to the GDR of its DM 15 billion annual exports to the Federal Republic. But like all East European states, the GDR's main difficulty is in selling its production for hard currency to import modern products not available from the Soviet Union. If the GDR had to look elsewhere for buyers, without this favored relationship, it would sell considerably less of its production for Western hard currency and would be unable to sustain its present imports of up-to-date machinery, its main purchase in the Federal Republic. Rather arbitrarily, we can set a minimum gain of DM 1 billion to take account of this advantage; the actual value is probably much higher. Adding loans over the past three years averaging at least DM 700 million per year, one can estimate an annual total of about DM 5 billion as the net hard currency gain for the GDR arising from the inner-German relationship.

The direct FRG payments included in the estimated total represent a considerable sum. It is clear from this review that the payoff in terms of GDR concessions has not been great. Can these subsidies continue indefinitely and will they bring more tangible benefits for the FRG? The persistence of Federal German interest in effecting a change in the situation of the GDR is the key aspect of the long-term equation; for as

[4] Most of these figures come from compilations published by Dr. Heinrich Machowski, German Economic Research Institute, Berlin, in *Die Zeit,* Hamburg, July 13, 1984. They are regularly published in Bundestag reports.

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matters now stand, only Federal Germany has both the durable interest and the potential to achieve change in Central Europe.

The substance of Federal German inner-German policy is to improve relations with the GDR to the extent feasible in order to promote personal contacts on the individual level and to draw the East German government into an increasingly cooperative position. This policy is now a nonpartisan effort, supported by all major political parties in the Federal Republic and by a large majority of public opinion.

But this was not always the case. The Christian Democrats opposed the policy during the Social Democratic governments of Chancellors Brandt and Schmidt from 1969 to 1982. Even today, a strong inner opposition of about one-third of the CDU / CSU Bundestag Faktion headed by CDU faction leader Dregger (and including Herbert Hupka and Herbert Cjaja, leaders of German associations of refugees from former German territories in Eastern Europe), though not voting against the policy, strongly question whether the Federal Republic is getting GDR concessions commensurate with the large economic benefits it gives the GDR. Public opinion polls show that, while the German public supports the government's policy, it also shares this skepticism.

In these circumstances, it is reasonable to question whether the Federal German political system will indefinitely support a policy whose rewards in terms of GDR moves are almost certain to remain incremental. Federal German officials charged with implementing inner-German policy in the Chancellor's office and in the Ministry of Inner German Affairs are themselves worried about the question of continuing public support and especially about the low interest of Federal German youth in the GDR and its future. An Infra Test poll of 1981 showed that about a half of West German youth between the ages of fourteen and twenty-one considered the GDR a foreign country. Some Federal German experts believe that Federal Germany is increasingly developing a separate national identity in which issues like German unity play a decreasing role as mainly historical questions belonging to the past.[5] They consider that practical-minded Germans have recognized the impossibility of German reunification, have written it off, and increasingly are interested in the GDR merely as a neighboring German state. If correct, this conclusion implies long-term decline in Federal German interest in inner-German relations.

In the opposing view, pursuit of an improved relationship with the GDR is an integral part of the emerging Federal German sense of identity; an identity that combines strong Atlantic and West European ties

[5] See for example Gebhard Schweigler, *West German Foreign Policy; The Domestic Setting*, Washington Papers 106, Praeger 1984.

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with an enduring German interest in the countries to the East, first and foremost, the GDR.

The second interpretation appears to be the correct one. In his February 1985 State of the Nation speech—in West German usage, the term "State of the Nation" refers to the condition of the entire German nation and to inner-German relations as a component part—Chancellor Kohl noted that, over the thirty-five years since the division of Germany was formalized in the establishment of the two German states, it had become increasingly clear that there was in fact "a special relationship" between the two German states whose substance included a common language, common culture, strong human bonds, and a common history.

As the years have gone by, and the division of Germany has continued, and an increasingly powerful Soviet Union has made evident by acts of military force its determination to maintain the status quo in Eastern Europe, most Germans have lost hope of reunification. Polling information developed by the Allensbach organization shows that, in the 1950s and 1960s, about 30 percent of the Federal German population thought reunification was the most urgent problem facing the Federal Republic. The decline of that figure, now at less than 1 percent, gives a clear reading of the German public's perception of what is feasible here. Indeed, polls repeatedly show that large majorities think reunification, in the formal sense of joining the two German states under a single government, is not possible. By 1970, 65 percent thought reunification impossible, only 15 percent that it was possible. In 1984, 21 percent (a perceptible increase which we must ascribe to Bonn's *Ostpolitik*) thought reunification ultimately possible, but a solid majority of 54 percent still thought it excluded under all circumstances.

But if the question is posed another way, the result is different. Asked in 1984 whether the "German question" was closed for good, 50 percent said no and only 20 percent yes. An EMNID poll published in *Der Spiegel* in October 1984[6] touched what appears to be the essence of the German attitude: 40 percent believed there was no chance of reunification, but 58 percent replied yes when asked whether they believed the reunification issue must be kept open. In a later EMNID poll taken in December 1984 with a smaller sample, 89 percent said they doubted German reunification would take place, but 73% also said they nonetheless *hoped* it would take place.[7]

The recurrent nightmare of Western political leaders is that the Soviet Union might someday propose some form of German reunification in return for the military neutrality of the Federal Republic and

[6] *Der Spiegel*, 44/1984 October 29, 1984, p. 43.
[7] Published in *Géopolitique*, Paris, Winter 1984-85, emphasis added.

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that, pushed by its public opinion, the Federal Republic would accept. In terms of West German public opinion, these fears are well founded in one sense, but baseless in a more important one. Most polls over the years, including that published in the October 1984 *Der Spiegel* show that a strong minority of about one-third favors neutral status for the Federal Republic, independent of the reunification issue. But when West Germans are asked whether they would accept a neutral reunified Germany with free elections, the picture changes. Allensbach figures show that in 1978, about a third of respondents were prepared to accept this solution. In 1979 — here we have the negative impact of the INF controversy — the figure rose to 49 percent and in the spring of 1984, to 53 percent.[8] The December 1984 *Géopolitique* poll asked whether respondents would accept German reunification under conditions of neutrality for Germany and Western Europe; 67 percent said yes and only 31 percent no.

These figures appear to confirm the worst fears of Western leaders about the susceptibility of German public opinion. Yet in the same *Géopolitique* poll, 88 percent answered no when asked whether they would be prepared to accept German reunification with fewer political freedoms; similar figures have repeatedly shown up in Allensbach polls.

Polling results like these show a sense of realism in the German public. Increased acceptance of neutral status for a reunified Germany reflects sharply decreased German fears of military attack by the Soviet Union and the direction that German desires would take in an ideal world. But the results also reflect total aversion to sacrificing the political and economic system of the Federal Republic in some reunification scheme and extreme skepticism that the Soviet Union would offer reunification on terms of internal freedom for the GDR as well as the FRG.

At the same time, these figures thoroughly refute the view that Federal Germans are resigned to the division of Germany and consider the GDR as an ordinary neighboring state with which it is preferable to have normal relations. They show that Federal Germans strongly desire a change in the status quo in East Germany. We can see from these indications that the insistence of both the German public and government on keeping the German question open is an uneasy compromise between the German desire to change the status quo and the recognition that this cannot be done on acceptable conditions because of Soviet opposition. These surveys confirm personal observation that most Germans do have a strong interest in improving inner-German relations, in self-determination for all Germans, German unity, German reunification, or "the German

[8] Unpublished lecture by Dr. Gerhard Herdegen, November 8, 1984, at the Wilson Center, Washington, D.C.

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question," whatever term from an extensive and changing vocabulary may be used to describe this interest.

Interest in reunification has had great durability during the nearly forty years of division of Germany and it is likely to continue indefinitely as a major factor in Federal German politics and policies. Former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, a highly qualified witness, said in a speech at Yale in early April 1985 that German desires to reunify Germany would persist indefinitely; he compared German attitudes to those of the Poles, who persevered for centuries in the desire to restore the unity of their nation.[9] Despite the low interest of West German youth in the GDR, over four million Federal Germans come from the GDR. Over 20 percent of Federal Germans have relatives there. All the main institutions of Federal German society — political parties, trade unions, and churches — manifest strong interest in inner-German links and will communicate it to young Germans as the latter mature, and a number of them develop greater interest in politics. Seven thousand West German companies are engaged in trade with the GDR, though most are small ones. In periods of less salient public interest in inner-German relations, like that between 1975 and 1982 and in the years between the modest beginnings of the inner-German policy under the Erhard government in 1966 and the Brandt government in 1969, a few devoted officials are able to provide all the impetus needed to maintain a policy of engagement with the GDR as long as there is not active opposition to the policy in its broadest denominator, helping less-fortunate fellow Germans who must live in the GDR.

The intense controversy over deployment of American Pershing missiles in Germany has tapped two strong new sources of interest in inner-German relations. One is the peace issue. For many Germans in both German states, pursuit of inner-German relations has become identified with progress toward peace and security. There is also a moral commitment here to make some form of restitution by Germans for the harm that Hitler's Germany inflicted on the world. The second source is national feeling itself. A mounting feeling of frustrated powerlessness in the face of the great powers has been a major attitudinal by-product of the Euromissile controversy. It has found an outlet in both German states in the idea that there is a special contribution that Germans, and no one else, can make to peace; moreover, that to some extent, Germans can make this contribution independent of the great powers, and irrespective of their desires. The Kohl-Honecker collaboration to try to salvage the inner-German relationship and even to intensity it at the time of the missile

[9] Cited in "At Yale, World According to Schmidt," by Colin Campbell, *New York Times,* April 6, 1985.

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crisis, the development that so amazed outside opinion, received overwhelming approval from the public in both German states. For example, a SINUS poll in 1981 found 72 percent of West Germans answering yes to the question of whether the Federal Republic should continue its program of inner-German relations in situations of East-West tension. In mid-1983, as the missile crisis peaked, the total of those answering yes to the same question had increased to 86 percent. Since both the peace issue and the feeling of German powerlessness and dependence on the actions of the great powers result from an East-West confrontation that seems likely to last indefinitely, these sources of continuing interest in the inner-German relationship appear to be enduring.

The GDR

Part of the fascination of the inner-German relationship for outside experts who follow it closely is the interplay of motives between the two German states as both follow their own policies of selective engagement, each struggling to influence the other. For its part, the GDR leadership has two enduring motivations for pursuing the inner-German relationship: the desires of its population and the self-interest of the GDR leadership in its own continued rule over that population.

That the majority of the East German population regards the Federal German system as more attractive than the GDR system is evident. All the efforts of the GDR to develop a separate historical tradition and to play on negative aspects of Federal German society will not in the foreseeable future be successful in developing positive loyalty among GDR residents to the GDR system. Far into the future, Federal Germany will remain more attractive. Television coverage will keep the greater attractions of West German society before the East German population and maintain pressures from it on the GDR government for easier access to the Federal Republic and for easier access of Federal German residents to the GDR.

These continuing pressures will sustain the GDR leadership's motivation to pursue its policy of inner-German engagement. The GDR leadership realizes the value of the inner-German contacts as a palliative for the discontents of its population, both political and economic. Without the Federal German subsidies described above, it is improbable that the GDR would be able to maintain the highest living standard in the Warsaw Pact, and the still wider difference between its performance and that of the FRG system would be a dangerous source of discontent.

The GDR has had a surplus in its trade accounts with non-Communist countries since 1982, and 1984 was a very good year in the

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GDR economy. But it was loans and subsidies from the FRG which largely made this surplus possible. Thanks in part to officially backed FRG loans, the GDR has been able to re-establish its credit worthiness after the slump of the early 1980s. In late 1984, it had no difficulty in raising a Western private bank loan of DM 400 million, followed by a second private loan of DM 500 million in early 1985. While FRG trade with the GDR is only 2 percent of total FRG imports and exports, the value of GDR trade with the FRG, its second largest trading partner after the Soviet Union, now at about DM 15 billion a year,[10] is already about 12 percent of the GDR's total foreign trade. This figure will probably increase by several percentage points over the next decade.

The fact that hard times remain ahead for the GDR will maintain the leadership's interest. Since 1981, the Soviet Union has refused to increase its deliveries to the GDR of raw materials, including oil, has increased the price of oil deliveries to the world market price, and has imposed less favorable trading terms on the GDR for its exports of finished goods to the Soviet Union in return for these raw materials. There will be new negotiations soon for the 1986-1991 five-year period. Given the Soviet Union's own economic difficulties, the hardening trend will probably continue.

GDR policy toward Federal Germany is not without risks, especially risk of increases in public demands for freedom of movement and access, which GDR leaders cannot afford to meet without serious loss of control over the GDR population. But the leadership calculates that the net advantage is on its side. A leading GDR academician told an American audience in 1984 that the GDR leadership was well aware that the motivation of the FRG's inner-German policy was, as he put it, to destabilize the GDR, but that the reverse was true and the GDR calculated to gain at least 5 percent of the long-term advantage in this contest for influence.

For the longer term, the GDR hopes that the discrepancy between its living standard and that of the FRG will be decreased through improvements in the GDR economy and, as described earlier, that it can also persuade the Federal Republic cumulatively to place limitations on GDR emigration to the FRG. And the GDR has the new theme of the unique German contribution to world peace as a device to gain somewhat greater freedom of maneuver from the Soviet Union and greater influence over Federal German public opinion and government.

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[10] Commodity breakdown for inner-German trade can be found in the bulletin of the Bundesministerium Füer Wirtschaft, Bonn, March 3, 1985.

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The Outside Environment

It is a requirement of the inner-German policy of both the FRG and the GDR that they cannot permit that policy to become a serious source of friction with their allies. Until 1984, they had succeeded remarkably well. This German objective is directly related to the fundamental axiom of the inner-German relationship as it concerns outside states: The inner-German relationship will be supported or at least tolerated by the respective allies of the German states as long as those allies do not believe that the relationship can change the status quo in Europe — but only for so long.

The truth of this principle was vividly illustrated in the West by the nervous response of the French government to the efforts of the two German governments in 1984 to maintain their relationship even after the Geneva negotiations had collapsed; that effort was wrongly interpreted in France as a move toward neutralism by the Federal Republic.

As far as Federal Germany's NATO allies are concerned, the situation is complex: Militarily, Federal Germany is the most important European member of NATO. Its allies realize that the inner-German relationship is important to it and approve efforts to encourage evolutionary change in the GDR and Eastern Europe generally — as long as the net effect appears to diminish Soviet control over the area. Like each of the two German states, the NATO states are hoping for at least 51 percent of the total advantage from relations of the NATO states with Eastern Europe. Federal Germany's allies also realize that frontal efforts to bring the Federal Germans to relinquish their inner-German interests could have negative consequences. For its part, Federal Germany wishes to avoid having its inner-Germany policy create friction in its alliance relations.

The result is mutual restraint and a general tendency by Federal Germany to downplay its inner-German activities, almost surreptitiously moving ahead so as not to worry either NATO allies, the GDR, or the Soviet Union. In 1983-84, the Kohl government deliberately departed from this discreet approach to play up publicly its active inner-German policy in order to cope with a dismaying drop in the FRG public's confidence in the government following Soviet withdrawal from the Geneva talks. It discovered that this prominence had considerable costs in activating suspicions in East and West; the action will not be repeated soon.

Of Federal Germany's allies, only the United States has the power to put a stop to Federal German policy toward East Germany. Given its fear of expanding Soviet influence in Europe as elsewhere, the Reagan administration is likely to be as unsympathetic and suspicious

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about the aims of Federal German policy as any probable American administration of the next decade. Yet the Reagan administration has come to terms with Federal German policy toward East Germany and officially supports it. In practical terms, it is doubtful that any Western ally can any longer put a definitive end to West Germany's policy toward the GDR. That policy is too deeply rooted in Federal Germany's perceptions of its own interests. In the final analysis, Germany's dark history and the fears of her allies that attempts at radical surgery could provoke similar trends provide effective insulation against interference. From time to time, Federal German officials and academicians warn that the interest of the FRG's population in improved relations with East Germany, and in keeping open the ultimate possibility of self-determination for inhabitants of the GDR, "needs" to be articulated by the Federal German political system or it could take a "less constructive" form.

The net result over time is likely to be mutual restraint over inner-German relations between Federal Germany and its allies, accompanied by occasional outbreaks of friction and suspicion.

The Soviet Union

The Soviet Union has a strong interest in the continuation of the inner-German relationship. It wants the GDR to become a strong, self-sustaining society. In this sense, it approves the GDR's economic ties to the FRG and GDR loans from the FRG. Presumably, it understands that the GDR policy on human contacts with the population of the FRG contributes to political stability in the GDR. Unlike Federal Germany's Western allies, the Soviet Union probably has it in its capacity to sever completely the GDR-FRG relationship by bringing the GDR to relinquish it. But it is clear that the attendant political cost would be so prohibitively high in terms of damage to the GDR's political and economic viability and of the long-term reaction in the Federal Republic that the Soviet Union will not so act.

Yet, clearly something happened between early March last year, when Honecker told then Federal Economics Minister Graf Lambsdorff at the Leipzig Fair that he would come to Bonn that September, and the September 4, 1984, announcement of the postponement of the Honecker visit. There seems no doubt that Soviet pressure forced the visit's postponement. For a short time after the November 1983 Bundestag vote confirming the Pershing deployment in Federal Germany, Soviet policy and propaganda treated Federal Germany as the victim of American INF policy rather than as a co-conspirator with the Americans. Soviet leaders apparently hoped that German public opinion would yet force a

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pause in INF deployment in reaction to the Soviet pull-out from the Geneva talks and to heavy Soviet hints that a pause in missile deployment could bring them back to the negotiating table. But, by early May of 1984, the Soviets apparently had given up this hope and had launched a strong attack on the Federal Republic as "revanchist," meaning irredentist. A highly publicized Honecker visit to the FRG would have been wholly inconsistent with this "punish the FRG" campaign. Moreover, there is a certain protocol in East-West contacts: the Honecker visit could not occur while the GDR's superpower protector had imposed a freeze in its own high-level contacts with the United States following Soviet withdrawal from the missile talks.

But the more serious Soviet motive for intervention in the Honecker visit appears to have been the very one that motivated French concern over the inner-German relationship — the fear that, somehow, the developing relationship threatened to destabilize the postwar status quo. There is some evidence that this was the Soviet motive, and that Foreign Minister Gromyko initiated the adverse reaction. Lev Bezymenskiy, the author of the first *Pravda* attacks on GDR handling of the FRG loan in July 1984, has long-time connections with the Soviet Foreign Ministry. In September 1984, Gorbachev, then speaking as "second man" in the Soviet hierarchy, warned in Sofia about "differentiated" Western policies that based rewards to Warsaw Pact countries on the degree to which their foreign policy was independent of Moscow. The reference was to the vocabulary of American policy toward Eastern Europe, which in fact has been based on such a differentiation; the policy was set forth in a much noted and perhaps excessively candid 1983 speech by Vice President Bush in Vienna. But Gorbachev's warning was pertinent both to FRG dealings with the GDR and to American policy toward Eastern Europe, because the Soviets evidently connected the two. In his visit to Washington in October 1984, Foreign Minister Gromyko apparently accused administration leaders of wishing to overthrow the post-World War II status quo in Eastern Europe and of colluding with the Germans to do this. And in Gromyko's March 1985 discussion with Foreign Minister Genscher in Moscow, Gromyko reportedly expressed concern that Federal German policy toward the GDR could affect the GDR's political system and orientation.[11]

It seems probable that similar negative pressures will be applied in the future if Soviet leaders become apprehensive that events which could precipitate a change of status are in the offing. Indeed, similar issues have been raised again in an article published under the pseudonym of O. Vladimirov in *Pravda* of June 21, 1985. But, some may think, now

[11] Celestine Bohlen, "Gromyko Lectures Genscher," *Washington Post*, March 5, 1985.

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that Andrei Gromyko and the old guard are being retired to the Soviet Union, perhaps this is just a rearguard action. Over the long-term, under the more modern leadership of Gorbachev, a group of Soviet officials who are believed to favor a strategy of giving priority to Soviet relations with Western Europe and Japan over relations with the United States — Zamyatin, Zagladin, Falin are some of them — may become more influential in shaping Soviet policy. As a consequence, some believe, the Soviet leadership might, in theory, begin to show some flexibility in adjusting the postwar status quo — for example, urging that the two German states leave their respective alliances to form a confederation. As noted above, some version of this possibility is feared by many Western political leaders, and is the ultimate source of their anxious interest in the inner-German relationship.

However, seriously intended moves of this kind appear wholly excluded for the indefinite future. Soviet control over East Germany is the keystone of Soviet control over Eastern Europe; relinquishment of control over Eastern Europe would bring shattering disconfirmation of the validity of the Soviet system itself. Fears of World War II's Germany remain active enough to make any form of German unity wholly unpalatable. Soviet release of East Germany would be an action so momentous that it would have to be preceded by radical change in the Soviet system itself of which, regrettably, there is at present no sign whatever. Parenthetically, if such change ever occurred, it would be so important a development that it would probably overshadow in significance any movement toward reunification.

Assuming continuity in the Soviet system in roughly its present form, the conclusion seems justified that, however far inner-German relations may develop in the next twenty years or more, that development will not include far-reaching, Soviet-approved changes in the nature of the Communist system of the GDR. Gradual, unobtrusive change is possible and will occur, for the most part with Soviet approval, as the GDR government adjusts to changing circumstances and continues its efforts to become more viable. But these changes will not alter the GDR's status as a member of the Warsaw Pact.

The Inner-German Security Dialogue

When Chancellor Kohl and Erich Honecker met in Moscow in March 1985 at the Chernenko funeral, they stressed the special German responsibility for maintaining peace and pledged that not war but peace must emanate from German soil. A few weeks later, a joint statement of the Federation of Evangelical Germans in the GDR and the Council of

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German Protestant churches in the FRG stated that war must never again emanate from German soil. The statement of the churches stressed the special German responsibility for peace and for creation of a European peace order. In the Social Democratic resolution of February 1985 submitted for the annual Bundestag debate on the "State of the Nation," the Social Democrats emphasize the "contribution of both German states to the consolidation of peace in Europe." They call for new initiatives for peace, arms control, and disarmament which transcend the military-blocs.[12]

These statements provide the conceptual foundation for what in the long term could be an important phase of the inner-German relationship, the inner-German dialogue on security issues, a phase that is likely to make Federal Germany's Western allies decidedly nervous, though its long-term significance may be more positive.

The German Social Democrats have already taken the first of the alliance-transcending initiatives urged in their resolution. A series of meetings between the East German Socialist Unity Party Politburo and the Social Democratic leadership culminated in June 1985, in publication of a draft agreement prohibiting storage of chemical weapons on the territory of Federal Germany, the GDR, and Czechoslovakia.[13] The Social Democrats successfully insisted that the agreement contain provision for verification by on-site inspection after a discussion of reason for doubt about compliance. The Federal German government has responded to publication of the draft agreement to the effect that it is working in the Geneva United Nations Committee on Disarmament on an even more basic agreement to prohibit production of chemical weapons throughout the world. Yet results from the Geneva Committee on Disarmament talks are in the far distant future at best. Public opinion in Federal Germany, and even opinion in the Bundeswehr, which is forbidden them, is strongly opposed to chemical weapons. This issue could become the focus of intense political controversy in the Federal Republic, possibly generating a great deal of friction with the United States, which believes in the deterrent effect of its own chemical weapons stored in Federal Germany against possible Soviet use.

It appears likely that this Social Democratic intiative on chemical weapons, whatever its specific outcome now, will be only the first of a series of similar enterprises. It has already been agreed to hold a follow-up SPD-SED discussion on a zone where tactical nuclear weapons will be prohibited.

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[12] Text in *Informationen der Sozialdemokratischen Bundestagsfraktion*, #353, February 26, 1985.
[13] The text is in FBIS for Eastern Europe of June 26, 1985.

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One reason for this forecast of future activity is that the progress of East-West arms control, however good, cannot keep pace with the German public's desires. And the prospects for decisive East-West arms control agreements on European issues are, in any case, not good. In the long term, the U.S.-Soviet arms control process is likely to continue to produce only limited results, and controversy over ballistic missile defense seems likely to continue to roil U.S.-European relations for decades to come. At the same time, large-scale negotiated reduction of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe seems excluded for the indefinite future. Soviet troops in Eastern Europe have several functions. Their principal one, at present, is to prop up shaky Pact governments. But these governments are unlikely to become self-sustaining, and Moscow is unlikely to determine that the job can be done with fewer Soviet troops.

The motivations underlying the inner-German security dialogue will in the first instance generate strong continuing pressures for arms control from both German governments on their respective great power allies. Specifically, they will bring ongoing pressure to put more content in the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, called Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), now taking place in Stockholm among the thirty-five states that signed the 1975 Helskinki Accords. That conference is presently focusing on confidence-building measures of limited significance, but successive phases may deal with force reductions. Yet, results from Stockholm and other arms control negotiations on the NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation, like the Vienna force reduction talks, are also likely to be slow and limited. In the long run, the inner-German security dialogue may increasingly appear a substitute for a bogged-down East-West arms control process, or as a supplement for a more active process.

The development and expansion of the dialogue will be supported by a very strong combination of convergent motives. From the viewpoint of GDR and Soviet leaders, FRG-GDR discussion on security issues involves little risk of change in GDR status. It gives the GDR leadership an important singular role and function in the Warsaw Pact. Soviet leaders will be interested in the contribution of the inner-German dialogue to long-term Soviet security goals in Western Europe: (1) decreasing the NATO military potential and American influence in Europe, and (2) more active East-West economic collaboration. The dialogue may further shorter-term Soviet goals of mobilizing peace sentiment in the Federal Republic and causing friction between the United States and its European allies. And the inner-German security dialogue will receive sustained support from public opinion in both German states annoyed

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with slow progress in arms control and frustrated over German dependence on the great power relationship.

Inner-German collaboration on security issues is at present limited to the Social Democratic opposition and to the East German SED in its role of leading political party of the GDR. A broad security dialogue between the two German governments would be far more significant. The Bonn government has taken the initiative to launch such a dialogue but the outcome thus far has been limited to rather stylized discussion of the arms control position of both sides and to largely unreciprocated Federal German initiatives to keep the East Germans informed on Federal German talks with the Soviet Union. Until recently, the East German leadership has been reserved about translating Honecker's declarations into a detailed dialogue on security matters. This is likely to change and the GDR is increasingly likely to initiate new topics for the dialogue. Given strong public sentiment in both German states for inner-German discussion of security issues, the Federal German government may experience considerable pressure in coming years to expand this security dialogue at the governmental level, and it may well be inclined to do so.

The selection of topics for the dialogue — so as not to risk alienating respective great power protectors — will be difficult. When the projected September 1984 Honecker visit was under discussion, the U.S. government reacted sourly to Foreign Minister Genscher's public suggestion that Chancellor Kohl and Honecker discuss the idea of an inner-German commitment on non-use of force. Such matters, the administration advised, were better left to the CDE negotiations in Stockholm, where a multilateral East-West commitment on non-use of force was already under study; an independent German dialogue could weaken the unity of NATO's negotiating position. In addition to the chemical-weapon-free zone and the projected agreement on tactical nuclear weapons, the GDR is likely to introduce topics like constraints on the size of out-of-garrison movements, zones completely free of nuclear weapons, and no first use of nuclear weapons — the kind of topic that the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact have introduced, thus far unsuccessfully, at the Stockholm CDE. Fearing adverse reaction from NATO allies, Federal German authorities will resist inner-German discussion, and there will be continuing search for appropriate topics. Sooner or later, the search is likely to succeed.

If, as is likely in the decade-long period of this survey, the trend toward an inner-German dialogue on security issues becomes more established, there is likely to be new friction and suspicion between the FRG and the American and other allied governments. These allies would fear increasing Soviet influence on Federal German defense policy, although it is by no means a foregone conclusion that the GDR would have

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the long-term preponderance of advantage in such a dialogue. An expanded inner-German security dialogue might not benefit the East-West relationship in any short-term sense. Yet if this process becomes established, it might in time bring actual benefits. Even minor adjustments damping down the enormous military confrontation in Central Europe could be worthwhile. Moreover, given the strength of German public support for the abstract idea of a security dialogue, outside efforts to suppress the inner-German security dialogue could reinforce anti-NATO trends and nationalist resentment in the Federal Republic. This would be less a trend toward the overt neutralism which some in the West fear from the inner-German relationship, than a tendency on the part of the FRG to stand back from the U.S.-Soviet confrontation. We have already experienced this attitude of reserve in Federal German public and governmental opinion with regard to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the imposition of martial law in Poland.

Conclusions

This review of the major factors which will affect the inner-German relationship over the next ten to twenty years indicates that, during this period, there will be continuing interest on both sides in developing the relationship. It can be predicted that the economic relationship between the two German states will become more close-knit, with the FRG share of total GDR trade slowly going up to 20 percent or more, creating a certain degree of economic dependence on Federal Germany for the GDR. There will be more cooperative ventures like the Volkswagen deal of 1983 which permitted the GDR to produce Volkswagen engines in the GDR. There will be more person-to-person contacts; the years will bring some relaxation on travel into the GDR for residents of the Federal Republic and somewhat better access to the FRG for GDR residents. The Federal Germans may meet some part of the GDR's "Gera demands." There will be more institutionalized exchange arrangements. Dialogue between the two governments on political and security issues is likely to expand. There may be some structured contacts between institutions of the two states, like the contacts between the Federal German Bundestag and the East German Volkskammer which the SPD is currently urging. Increasing contacts between local authorities, courts, trade associations, and trade unions on both sides are probable. There will be an expanding network of contacts between private associations of a cultural nature. All of this will be sharply regulated by the GDR for fear of defections, and its extent will not match Federal German expectations. It will be both expensive and expanding.

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Nonetheless, for the next two decades, experts in both the Federal Republic and the GDR expect the inter-state relationship to continue much as it is now, with successive ups and downs, held together at the difficult moments by the interest of both sides in continuing the relationship, yet with enduring caution by the GDR over engaging in institutionalized cooperation except in selected, important areas.

There seems no prospect of change in the Soviet Union within the next generation that would bring major changes in Soviet determination to hold firmly to Eastern Europe and to prevent any change in the status of the GDR which could threaten that hold. The Soviets seem likely to retain large forces in Eastern Europe indefinitely. Indeed, over the next twenty years, it seems more likely that there may be fairly sizeable reductions in American forces in Central Europe than in Soviet forces — either because of possible changes in American attitudes toward the Soviet Union or American frustrations with their West European NATO allies. The only positive changes the Soviets will permit in the inner-German relationship will be those intended to increase the viability of the GDR economy and to further Soviet interests in Western Europe.

Yet, most evidence indicates that the inner-German relationship will continue, and it will continue to provide those important benefits to stability and security in Europe that are already its products: suppression of friction between the two German states in the area of the world's most intense military confrontation; continued access to Berlin and assurance that this issue will not become a source of East-West conflict; and stabilization of the situation in East Germany, the one area of Central-Eastern Europe where widespread public unrest could also trigger world war.

The future may bring more such benefits, especially if we are wise enough to take advantage of the trends that could produce them. For the next twenty years, then, the developing inner-German relationship seems more likely to improve the security situation in Central Europe than to result in a change of the postwar status quo to the benefit of either side. That is, the inner-German relationship will not in the next decades move toward unification of the two German states, but it may contribute further to tempering the consequences of the East-West military confrontation in Europe. This is a development that the Western states should seek to further, not to stifle.

If we look much further ahead, there is a possibility that the strength and durability of German interest in changing the status quo in Central Europe might outlast and prove greater than the strength and durability of Soviet interest in maintaining that status quo. But if this possibility in fact emerges, its practical effects, good or bad, are more than a generation away and far beyond our sight.

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WORLD POLITICS

The Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative. A Technical, Political and Arms Control Assessment. By Sidney D. Drell, Philip J. Farley, and David Holloway. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1985. 152 pp. $12.95 (paper). Although they do not condemn SDI itself, these three gentlemen from Stanford University's Center for International Security and Arms Control argue a strong case for slowing down "Star Wars" implementation. By focusing their analysis on the arms control implications of SDI, the authors argue that SDI could destroy all that the 1972 ABM Treaty achieved in the past and symbolizes for the future. They attempt to illustrate how SDI, a program intended to mimic the stabilizing features of the ABM Treaty, cannot alone serve as an adequate substitute. If SDI is to be useful, they argue, it must be coupled with arms control agreements that place stringent limits on offensive systems. Whether one agrees with the authors' analyses or not — and this reviewer has problems with many of them — they are thoughtful, informative, and at least seek balance. Unlike the hyperbolic advocacy one usually encounters for and against SDI, these authors appear to have studied the matter before reaching their conclusions. One expects nothing less from any project with which Professor Drell is associated.

Waging Nuclear Peace: The Technology and Politics of Nuclear Weapons. By Robert Ehrlich. Albany: State University of New York, 1985. 397 pp. $39.50 ($12.95, paper). "Overall, the book should anger both hawks and doves, particularly the more self-righteous of each persuasion," writes Robert Ehrlich, a professor of physics, in this textbook of nuclear issues and nuclear debate. Ehrlich's topics range from the effects of nuclear war on people and the environment to the effect of the media on public opinion to different policy options regarding disarmament and proliferation. Such a putatively comprehensive discussion of so many issues suggests a cursory approach, and that is exactly what this is. Although he manages to convey a fairly objective tone in some sections of the text, Ehrlich interjects his opinions relatively often. He sings the praises of civil

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defense over ballistic missile defense and "Star Wars," but without demonstrating mastery of the arguments. Selected chapters might prove useful as an introductory reference (complete with study questions) for the new student of nuclear weapons and policy. For the more advanced and sophisticated reader, Ehrlich's text offers nothing new. Overall, this book should prove to be innocuous to both hawks and doves, even the self-righteous ones.

Totalitarismes. Sous la direction de Guy Hermet, en collaboration avec Pierre Hassner et Jacques Rupnik. Collection Politique Comparée. Paris: Economica, 1984. 254 pp. 125F. While many political scientists, sociologists, and philosophers in the Anglo-Saxon world now tend to avoid the use of the "totalitarian model" in the interpretation of Soviet-style regimes, the contributors to this provocative volume suggest elements for the reassessment of both the concept and practice of totalitarianism. Pierre Hassner offers a balanced survey of the main debates concerning totalitarianism in Western political science, from the fifties, when the concept, considered to explain all, was quite fashionable, to the eighties, when "pluralist-institutional" approaches seem to have diminished its appeal. Jacques Rupnik describes the trajectory of this concept from the viewpoint of East European political realities, its impact on the configuration of the dissident subculture, and the awakening of the critical intelligentsia. All the authors warn against the facile reductionism that ignores basic distinctions between Nazi totalitarianism and Stalinism. The pressure of certain totalitarian mechanisms in the political practice of some Third World regimes, analyzed by Jean-François Boyart and Jean Leca, suggests both the actuality and the relevance of a nondogmatic theory of totalitarianism. On the other hand, that even consistent critics of this paradigm, like Michael Walzer, chose to describe contemporary Soviet-type societies as hypostases of "failed totalitarianism" indicates that going beyond this concept does not mean to do away with it, but rather to accept it as a necessary explanatory step in the interpretation of those sociopolitical phenomena that culminated in Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia.

Staffing for Foreign Affairs: Personnel Systems for the 1980s and 1990s. By William I. Bacchus. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983. 262 pp. $25.00. A carefully written, detailed piece of original research that warns of a possible crisis facing the American Foreign Service in finding and keeping the caliber of personnel required to conduct foreign relations. Bacchus discusses the fundamental problem: the need to devise an improved personnel system equipped to meet the continuing demands of new international and domestic policy-making realities. The analysis

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examines the environment during the eighties and nineties and illuminates the failure of the current system to furnish competent people in three basic areas — diplomatic work, policy development, and political synthesis. Bacchus explores the causes of these systemic weaknesses; deals with the dilemmas of personnel system design, starting from the premise that there is no perfect system; and, thus, advises choosing the approach with fewest liabilities. The author focuses on two recent efforts by the State Department and the Congress to deal directly with the problems identified and then reflects on the Foreign Service Act of 1980. The final chapter, noting that more needs to be done, examines problems that the Foreign Service Act failed to address. In contrast to many previous studies of the Foreign Service that have focused on the individual member, Bacchus emphasizes the system needed to recruit, train, assign, evaluate, and promote members. Truly informative, this book can be read as a study of the difficulties the United States faces in managing its foreign relations and, more broadly, as a prescription for change.

Diplomacy at the U.N. Edited by G. R. Berridge and A. Jennings. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985. 227 pp. $27.50. This volume, a collection of several essays, responds to the dim view held by Western powers in recent years that the U.N. has exacerbated more problems than it has helped solve — that at worst it has become a "dangerous place." The contributors take a fresh look at the U.N., attempt to clarify the diplomatic work of the organization, and say something valuable about its contribution to the diplomatic solution of international problems. Framed by an analysis of the three traditions of diplomacy that continue to find expression in the U.N. (third-party diplomacy, multilateral diplomacy, and bilateral diplomacy), the book examines several case studies that show how the U.N. operates. On balance, this is an informative volume for students of international diplomacy.

Contemporary Western Europe. Edited by Glenda G. Rosenthal and Elliot Zupnick. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984. 488 pp. $39.95 ($19.95, paper). Part of a college-level audio / print course in international studies, this volume was developed by the Global Understanding Project at National Public Radio. The readings were primarily selected to give the reader a broad understanding of the governing processes in contemporary Western Europe, as well as insight into its major policy problems — inflation, unemployment, declining industries, immigration, energy supply and demand, and national security. An additional focus on the growing interdependence among West European nations raises questions of adaptation and cooperation that may determine the quality of life in future

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decades. Unit I presents historical developments that helped shape contemporary European politics. Units II through VI examine various institutions in Western Europe to shed light on different processes of policy formulation, decision making, and policy implementation. Unit VII discusses current problem-solving measures, and Units VIII through XIV focus on specific issues of critical concern to European policy makers today. Unit XV explores how political choices and decisions made by Europeans in dealing with the salient issues of the day affect their relationships with other parts of the world. The seventy-one essays are systematically incorporated into the fifteen units, hang well together, and constitute a book that is highly informative, well-balanced, and useful for those interested in West European issues.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS AND TECHNOLOGY

The French Economy. Theory and Policy. Edited by Jacques Melitz and Charles Wyplosz. Boulder and London: Westview Press (A Westview Special Study), 1985. 386 pp. $30.00. A thought-provoking collection of essays dealing with such major topics as unemployment, the tightening of exchange controls, the nationalization of the banks, and the wage policies of the Socialist government. The macroeconomic perspective serves to highlight the inner dynamics of the French economic system as well as the impact of politically inspired decisions on the functioning of the financial institutions. Both editors are distinguished French economists and the essays gathered in this volume were initially presented at a conference held at the Institut Européen d'Administration des Affaires (INSEAD) at Fontainebleau in July 1982. The conference brought together scholars from France, other parts of Europe, and the United States, who focused on the many problems of the French economy: the financial problem — inflation, budget deficits, public debt accumulation, and the weak franc — and the socioeconomic problem — low profitability, insufficient capital formation, and rising unemployment.

Standing Guard: Protecting Foreign Capital in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. By Charles Lipson. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. 332 pps. $12.00. *Standing Guard* seeks successfully to accomplish two interrelated purposes. It details the evolution of the international capital regime from the nineteenth century until the present.

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In doing so, the book provides a very interesting explanation of that evolution and an illuminating discussion, drawing on the logic of collective action, of the differences existing between the regimes for direct and portfolio investment. Charles Lipson's book also examines and explains postwar U.S. foreign policy toward expropriation, focusing on aid policy and the program of investment guaranties and on the roles of multinational corporations and the state in U.S. policy.

Paths to International Political Economy. Edited by Susan Strange. Winchester, Mass.: Allen & Unwin, Inc., 1985. 209 pps. $25.00 ($10.50, paper). According to its editor, this volume is a "selection of somewhat unconventional views of what modern teachers of politics . . . ought to know if they are to venture . . . beyond the confines of their own national scene into the open prairie of international political economy." The nine contributors represent a variety of academic disciplines, and each of them argues that the study of international political economy ought to embrace his particular field of interest. Thus, for example, Nicholas Demerath asserts that the study of population has much to contribute to the study of political economy, and Roger Williams advocates the study of technology. In the concluding essay, Susan Strange contends that "the most essential and thus least easy foundation to dispense with [in the study of international political economy] is some familiarity or awareness of the habits and customs of states in their relations with one another." The essays are useful for an undergraduate or introductory graduate course.

What is Political Economy? A Study of Social Theory and Underdevelopment. By Martin Staniland. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985. 229 pp. $18.50. This book is, as its author states, "an exploration of theories of 'political economy.' " It establishes what it considers must be the crux of any theory of political economy — "a basic issue in social theory: the relationship between politics and economics." It surveys a variety of efforts to construct and apply theories of political economy in comparative and international politics, including rational choice theory, dependency, interdependence, and neo-Marxism. It is, for the most part, highly skeptical about the ways in which recent work has defined and employed the concept of political economy.

From Adam Smith to the Wealth of America. By Alvin Rabushka. New Brunswick and Oxford: Transaction Books, 1985. 237 pp. $29.95. A senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, the author appeals for the return of laissez faire to the United States. Reviewing at length the salutary influences of the embrace of Adam Smith's doctrines by Britain in the

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nineteenth century, Rabushka argues that the United States would be equally well served in this century if it followed suit. The economic success stories of Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea are briefly reviewed to buttress the argument that "nineteenth-century England was not a unique historical event." Rather, the author argues, "Smith's truths are timeless. Whenever and wherever they have been applied, people have enjoyed prosperity and freedom."

Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe. By Peter J. Katzenstein. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1985. 268 pp. $29.95 ($10.95, paper). Peter Katzenstein analyzes the industrial adjustment strategies of seven small European states: Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, and Switzerland. Because they have neither the option of very large countries to export the costs of economic change nor that of other countries to "preempt the costs of change" through structural adjustment, these states, Katzenstein asserts, have instead pursued a "variety of economic and social policies that prevent the costs of change from causing political eruptions. They live with change by compensating for it." According to Katzenstein, their success in coping with economic change while maintaining political stability owes much to their domestic political structures. Although differing among the seven states, democratic corporatism, reinforced by vulnerability to international economic forces, has enabled these states to respond well to change. Particularly impressive is Katzenstein's explanation of the rise of democratic corporatism in these states: his comparative historical analysis locates the origins of democratic corporatism in the weakness of feudalism and strategies of export specialization pursued by these states. The theoretical arguments, the empirical evidence, and the implicit policy recommendations contained in the book commend it highly to a wide audience of scholars and policy makers alike.

The Growth and Structure of International Trade Since the Second World War. By Lynden Moore. Totowa, N.J.: Barnes and Noble, 1985. 393 pp. $34.95. This volume is a comprehensive analytical survey of the growth and composition of international trade since 1945. It considers trends in overall trade, as well as in particular sectors, including agriculture, fuels, and textiles and clothing. The author, a lecturer in economics at the University of Manchester, surveys the state of theory and empiricism in the controversial areas of terms of trade in primary products and of impacts of foreign direct investment. A basic introduction to trade theory and to the various consequences attributable to commercial policy in-

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struments is also included, as is a wealth of tables documenting trends in trade generally as well as in specific categories.

The Politics of Inflation and Economic Stagnation. Leon N. Lindberg and Charles S. Maier, eds. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1985. 612 pp. $38.95 ($18.95, paper). This volume, the product of a 1978 conference sponsored by Brookings, is an outstanding collection of essays on the political and social origins of inflation. Targeting economists, in particular, for their neglect of non-economic variables that play a role in exacerbating or containing inflation, the contributors examine a variety of factors that they contend are part of the inflationary equation: the organization of trade unions, the role of governmental expenditures, the position of the United States in the world political economy. Particularly and persuasively biting is an essay by Brian Barry, who subjects to scathingly effective criticism the view that democracy and inflation are inevitably linked.

THE SOVIET UNION AND ASIA

USSR Foreign Policies After Detente. By Richard F. Staar. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1985. 300 pp. $26.95 ($10.95 paper). A comprehensive survey of the decision-making processes, instruments, and regional emphases of Soviet foreign and military policy, this volume, far more than the typical academic treatment, focuses attention on the full range of Soviet foreign-policy behavior — propaganda, espionage, "active measures," military strategy and trade — as a political instrument. Soviet policies toward Eastern Europe, Western Europe, the Third World, East Asia, and the United States are covered in separate chapters. Detailed and incisive, the book by the former U.S. ambassador to the MBFR talks should become one of the standard texts on Soviet foreign policy.

The USSR and the Muslim World. Edited by Yaacov Ro'i. London, Boston, Sydney: George Allen and Unwin, 1984. 298 pp. $37.50. A useful collection of fourteen essays on an increasingly portentous subject — the Soviet understanding of the Muslim world within and without its borders and its policies toward it. The first two sections focused on "Socio-Political Aspects" and "The Soviet Domestic Context: Cultural and Ideological Aspects" are the best. The third section, "Foreign Policy

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Aspects," is rather too diffuse, but still contains some good pieces. Within sections there is a certain amount of unevenness: some articles are broadly thematic, others extremely narrow in focus. Nonetheless, the best writers on the subject are here assembled — M. Rywkin, M. Feshbach, P. Henze, A. Bennigsen, M. Bruchis, and Ro'i himself to name only a few — making the volume indispensable to the Soviet specialist, the specialist on Southwest and Central Asia, and the specialist on Islam.

Discreet Partners: Argentina and the USSR Since 1917. By Aldo César Vacs. Translated by Michael Joyce. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1984. 156 pp. $14.95. Using the 1970-1982 period as the focus for his research, an Argentine scholar postulates that "Argentine-Soviet relations are based on complementary needs in trade and production." Vacs examines the multifaceted nature of the relationship and expects trade to increase, due to pressure from "producers and exporters of meat and grain," traditionally the most powerful groups in the Argentine economy.

Modern China: The Mirage of Modernity. By Ian W. Mabbett. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985. 231 pp. $29.95. The author tells us that *Modern China* is written "from the point of view of a historian of traditional Asia, not that of a political scientist, or an economist, or a traveler." The book proposes to show how modern China was shaped by its culture and customs as well as by its high politics. Various aspects of traditional Chinese civilization are described cursorily in the first few chapters, but little emphasis is given to the relevance of traditions and customs to present day China. Potentially central issues such as the problem of population control and China's increasingly "capitalistic" economy are mentioned only in passing. The prose is often confusing; paragraphs lack cohesiveness within and smooth transition from one to the next. The saving grace of Mabbett's work is the discussion of the recent Chinese attempt to modernize its educational system. Unfortunately, no reference is made to recent modernization programs in any other field. Beginning students of modern China would do better to consult other recent works such as *The China Factor,* edited by Richard H. Solomon (1981), and *China's New Development Stragey,* edited by Jack Gray and Gordon White (1982).

The Sino-Japanese Axis: A New Force In Asia? By Robert Taylor. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985. 132 pp. $27.50. *The Sino-Japanese Axis* is an excellent introduction to the political and economic relationship between China and Japan. Taylor identifies China's economic and political

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problems and shows how the Chinese hope to alleviate some of them through increased trade and advanced diplomatic relations with the Japanese. Japan is depicted as a mentor, providing an example to the Chinese of efficient, rapid modernization. The alliance between the two nations is characterized as an effective partnership; the exchange of Chinese raw materials for Japanese technology and goods. Politically, the two nations hope to form an axis by the twenty-first century to block Soviet hegemony in Asia. The volume is concise, well-written, and easily understandable for beginning students of inter-Asian relations.

The Philippines After Marcos. Edited by R. J. May and Francisco Nemenzo. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985. 239 pp. $27.50. The volume is the result of a 1983 conference precipitated by the assassination of Senator Benigno Aquino. Fourteen scholars speculate on the likely future of Philippine politics and society when President Ferdinand Marcos eventually, and inevitably, departs from his post. The first section presents an overview of recent developments and defines the problems inherent in the Marcos regime. Another section investigates the forces likely to play a major role in the post-Marcos governmental reformation, namely the traditional opposition (UNIDO and PDF-Labor), the left opposition, the military, and the church. Other essays analyze the sociological impact of Marcos's rule, particularly on Muslim and tribal Filipinos, the urban poor, and rural dwellers in Negros and Central Luzon. Prospects for the Philippine economy, the expansion of freedom of the press and the possible return to objective journalism, and the evolution of the U.S.-Philippine security relationship after Marcos are also addressed. Nearly all of the authors dislike Marcos, but they also dislike the Communists. Therefore, they share many of official Washington's worst fears about Marcos's replacement, but not its best hopes. Even if the reader dislikes the general slant, the book informs us of what the non-Communist opposition in the Philippines is thinking these days. That ought to be worth something in a sparse field.

THE MIDDLE EAST

The Interrupted System: Israeli Civilians in War and Routine Times. By Baruch Kimmerling. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1985. 188 pp. $24.95. **Israeli Society and Its Defense Establishment:**

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The Social and Political Impact. Edited by Moshe Lissak. New Jersey: Frank Cass and Company, Ltd., 1984. 148 pp. $29.50. Two fine volumes on civil-military relations — in the deepest sense of the phrase — in contemporary Israel. The Lissak volume is a collection of seven essays, all by Israeli academicians, on a variety of topics ranging from party-military relations in a pluralist political system to new immigrants as a special group in Israel's armed forces. All the essays take a socio-anthropological approach to the issues, are critical in the pure academic sense, and are edifying for the expert. However, the authors assume a certain threshold of knowledge on the part of the reader, so beginners beware.

In determining the extent of the sporadic, intense ruptures that war causes in Israeli society, Kimmerling proves himself a master of subtle sociological analysis and method. The book is mainstream sociology in many respects, and its language and style will put off all but a few general readers. But those who have the patience to digest the analysis are well rewarded with insight not only about Israel, but about social analysis at its best, and how people everywhere tend to act under stressful circumstances. It will be interesting to see if Kimmerling's methodology, especially the somewhat unusual data he sees as significant, could be applied to the study of other war-convulsed societies, as well.

Studies in the History of Transjordan, 1920-1949: The Making of a State. By Uriel Dann. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984. 127 pp. $13.50 (paper). **Jordan's Palestinian Challenge, 1948-1983: A Political History.** By Clinton Bailey. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984. 146 pp. $12.95 (paper). Two fine contributions to the small and slowly growing literature on Jordan. Uriel's Dann's study is a series of anecdotal historical vignettes, the central figure of which is the Amir Abdallah. Some of these stories, or their details, are new by dint of the reminiscences of Sir Alec Seath Kirkbride, with whom Dann conversed before Sir Alec's death in 1978. All are well crafted; of special interest, perhaps, is the last essay on the heretofore obscure story of the U.S. recognition of Transjordan in 1949, three years after the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of 1946.

From here Clinton Bailey takes up the parable, giving special attention to that most critical of Hashemite political problems — the volatile demography of the Palestinians within the kingdom. Bailey devotes less energy to the period between 1948 and 1967 than he might have (although others, notably S. Mishal, have done so), and much of the narrative covers familiar ground. But his emphasis on Jordan contributes a new economy to the literature. Bailey's views on contemporary matters are not strictly

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academic in import; he has been and remains one of Israel's most knowledgeable analysts of Jordan and the West Bank, and it is quite likely that he will again be involved in putting some of his analyses into practice.

Ben-Gurion and the Palestinian Arabs: From Peace to War. By Shabtai Teveth. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. 234 pp. $17.95. Shabtai Teveth is David Ben-Gurion's most serious biographer yet. This English language volume represents a slice of a much longer, on-going project in Hebrew — two full volumes of which preceded this one — concentrating on the evolution of Ben Gurion's view of "the Arab question." Teveth examines the full array of Ben-Gurion's writings, policies, and acquaintances. The result is a portrait of Ben-Gurion more complex than his image as an uncompromising militant. Not only did Ben-Gurion's views of the Arab question change through the years, but even at their most mature, they are best characterized as those of a cold-blooded realist and a tempered pragmatist, not those of a tunnel-visioned ideologue or a self-indulgent moralist. Teveth's account rings true, and so casts much light on the early history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. And for once, the retinue of dust-jacket praise — from Cyrus Vance, Bernard Lewis, Eli Kedourie and Abba Eban — is in proper proportion to the merits of the book.

The Dhimmi: Jews and Christians under Islam. By Bat Ye'or. Translated from the French by David Maisel, Paul Fenton, and David Littman. Rutherford, Madison and Teaneck: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1985. 444 pp. $25.00. Virtually everyone concerned with Arab-Israeli and other Middle Eastern problems testifies now and again to the deep historical roots of the varied regional conflicts. It is all the more surprising, therefore, that a vast historical ignorance still pervades much of the debate and the contemporary scholarship over these issues, at least in the United States. On occasion the ignorance has been partially justified by the paucity of good English sources, but with respect to the "dhimmi," the Islamic legal designation for "protected" people living under the domain of Islam (dar-al-Islam), the problem is now largely solved by the appearance in English of an enlarged edition of Bat Ye'or's *Le Dhimmi,* originally published in Paris five years ago. Bat Ye'or, an Egyptian Jewess, tackles the issue first by sketching the checkered and diverse history of Jews and Christians living under Islam. And it is only a sketch, being some sixty-six pages in length. She then proceeds to examine the modern formulations of "dhimmi" — and the related matter of "jihad" or holy struggle — in a variety of settings. At forty-four pages, it too is a sketch, albeit a

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persuasive one. There then follow more than 240 pages of fascinating Islamic jurists' texts. The casual reader would be tempted to skip the documents, but it is within them that the main theses and analyses of the book come alive. Admittedly, the book has a "sting"; it is not sympathetic to the more common view that, all things considered, Jews and Christians fared well under Islam — not that other scholars, Bernard Lewis, S. D. Goitein, and N. Stillman for example, ever described the life of the dhimmi as a cultural picnic. But the presence of such a view does not sully the scholarship of the book and may even be correct. Finally, there is a very substantial and somewhat unusual preface by Jacques Ellul, wherein he defends the English language edition by recalling point and counterpoint of the debate attending the French edition. Ellul's short essay alone is worth the price of admission.

The Emergence of a New Lebanon: Fantasy or Reality? By Edward E. Azar et al. New York: Praeger, 1984. 289 pp. $32.95. Nine essays on aspects of Lebanese society and politics by a group of writers familiar to those who have followed the Lebanese crucible these last ten years. Paul Jureidini and R. D. McLaurin provide an overview since the War of 1982. Azar, Robert J. Pranger, Joyce Starr, and McLaurin discuss in turn Lebanon's political culture, its "pathology of spasm politics," its economy, and its army. Lewis W. Snider then explains the Lebanese Forces's origins, history, and organization; Augustus Richard Norton provides a parallel analysis for Harakat Amal. Jureidini comments on Lebanon's regional policy (as if it had one . . .) and Azar, with Kate Shnayerson, discuss the "pocketful of paradoxes" of U.S.-Lebanese relations. There is nothing especially wrong with this book; any reader could glean useful background from its chapters, for most of the authors draw from history to fortify their analyses. Most of the essays are languid, lacking both special insight and engaging style, and some are vaguely hopeful to the point of distraction. At least the book avoids cant and recrimination — something other writers about Lebanon have found difficult.

What Makes Israel Tick? How Domestic Policy-Makers Cope with Constraints. By Ira Sharkansky. Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1985. 184 pp. $22.95 ($9.95, paper). A series of vignettes about how the Israeli political system adjusts to conditions of resource scarcity, high inflation, and a burdensome defense obligation. The book focuses on the 1977-1983 period, and there is some vivid and edifying detail — even insight — here and there. There are specific chapters on Teddy Kollek's Jerusalem, on religion and politics, and on the surreal habits of government budgeting amid triple-digit inflation. The book is written well; it is almost entertaining

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in places. But the volume somehow does not satisfy; it is not a systematic or an inclusive treatment of any single subject. It lacks analytical rigor, being more informed description. Sharkansky has provided a glimpse of Israel, sharp and interesting, but only a glimpse.

The Roots of Begin's Success: The 1981 Israeli Elections. Edited by Dan Caspi, Abraham Diskin, and Emanuel Gutmann. London: Croom Helm and New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984. 297 pp. $25.00. A generally sophisticated sociopolitical analysis of Israel's 1981 elections, in which Menachem Begin's Likud Bloc was unexpectedly returned to power. The eleven essays use the election to look at broader issues in Israeli politics and society. Topics include: the Jewish ethnic vote, the Arab vote, the religious parties' vote, the press and opinion polling, urban vs. rural voting, and shifts in Israel's security concept. Obviously, one cannot discuss such topics without iterating a broader social and political analysis. Despite its title, the book's authors have no special fondness for Mr. Begin or Likud policies. Their approach is ideologically antiseptic; they take refuge in the neutrality of the sociological method. Those especially interested in Israeli society and politics will find this volume useful.

Lebanon: The Politics of Revolving Doors. By Wadi D. Haddad. Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies and New York: Praeger, 1985. 154 pp. $8.95 (paper). An exposition of Lebanon's crucible by a former adviser on national security affairs to President Amine Gemayel. Haddad has tried to write dispassionately about a passionate subject and, for the most part, he succeeds. His personal experiences add a touch of realism to the volume, but the book does not degenerate into myopic autobiography or diffuse anecdotal narrative. Moreover, it is not interested only in the period since June 1982, as if there had not already been some seven years of civil war. The book takes a perhaps unrealistic view of Saudi "friendship" for Lebanon and makes an equally unrealistic assessment of Lebanon's chances of reintegration and peace, but these are small matters. On balance, the volume is useful, intelligent, and sober.

Studies in Islamic Society: Contributions in Memory of Gabriel Baer. Edited by Gabriel R. Warburg and Gad G. Gilbar. Haifa: Haifa University Press, 1984. 334 pp. $39.00. A dozen esoteric essays on aspects of Islamic culture by Israeli scholars. Of the twelve essays, two concern Mandatory Palestine, four have to do with Egypt, three with aspects of the *waqf* as a social institution, and one each concerns historical Algeria, Syria, and Iraq. All are socioanthropological in style and method, all use

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original sources, and all appear to be of high quality. Moreover, the authors have managed admirably to humanize the subjects with lively crisp prose. Illuminating more than the subject at hand, at least a few of these essays say something profound about human society.

Israel and the Creation of a Palestinian State: A European Perspective. By Joseph Weiler. Dover, N.H.: Croom Helm Ltd., 1985. 160 pp. $27.50. Contrary to what the title suggests, this book is not about European views and diplomacy concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict. Rather, it is a very unconventional proposal for solving the Israeli-Palestinian aspect of the conflict by recourse to a complex, legalistic transnational arrangement modeled on the European Community. Some critics are bound to find this doubly laughable, first because the European Community is at best a mixed success, and second because Europeans must have the utmost audacity to suggest themselves as a model to solve a problem they had a significant hand in creating. There is another problem: the author is a lawyer with an unfortunate tendency to reify legal arguments into substitutes for an apperception of reality. International law is a pre-eminently European concoction; why Middle Easterners should be overcome by a sense of its grandeur is hard to fathom. So critics will chortle yet a third time. Despite all this, Weiler is insightful in places, sincere, balanced, humane, and modest. That a book can have such qualities and still be completely irrelevant to the practical resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict says a lot about the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Peace-Making in the Middle East. Edited by Paul Marantz and Janice Gross Stein. Totowa, N.J.: Barnes and Noble Books, 1985. 244 pp. $26.50. Eight scattered essays on Middle East peace-making. In the first section, there are five essays, one on Israeli-Egyptian relations (Salim Mansur), two on Israeli attitudes toward the problem (Amnon Cohen and Avraham Diskin), one on a Palestinian perspective (Nafez Nazzal), and one on the political and humanitarian aspects of the refugee issue (Howard Adelman). The second section has three essays, one on U.S. policy in the Reagan administration (Bernard Reich and Rosemary Hollis), one on Soviet policy (Robert O. Freedman), and one on a Canadian perspective (David B. Dewitt and John J. Kirton). Finally, there is a conclusion by Stein. Mansur's essay is competent rehash. The Cohen and Diskin essays are for beginners who know little of Israeli society or history; both have done more analytically incisive work elsewhere. The Nazzal essay, touted by editor Stein as an important voice of Palestinian moderation, is filled with anger, cant, and phantasms. Adelman asserts that a humanitarian amelioration of the refugee problems will facilitate political compromise,

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but the argument is so sparse as to virtually disappear in his statistics. The Reich and Hollis essay and that by Freedman both repeat old analyses and are too wedded to "recent" events; the readers squirms with mention of the new leadership of Chernenko and the situation "near the end of Reagan's first term." Stein's conclusion looks to compare past diplomatic efforts. The effort is brief and adds little to existing literature; even Stein admits that her main themes are better developed in Saadia Touval's 1982 volume *The Peace Brokers*. The inclusion of a Canadian viewpoint seems to result from the sensibilities of the editors, both of whom are Canadian and teach at Canadian universities.

The Future of American-Israeli Relations: A Parting of the Ways? By James Lee Ray. Lexington, Ky.: University of Kentucky Press, 1985. 157 pp. $16.00. Only partly concerned with U.S.-Israeli relations despite its title, this book is really about U.S. attitudes and policies toward the Arab-Israeli conflict and the entire Middle East. The bottom line is that unless Israel relinquishes the West Bank (and Gaza), U.S.-Israeli relations will inevitably deteriorate. This is a defensible view, but it can be defended with either more or less sophistication. Ray falls somewhere between; the arguments he musters are not superficial, but neither are they original. One gets the impression that Ray undertook this effort for his own edification. He has clearly brought his own understanding up to an estimable level, and this is meritorious. But the book offers little to the policy professional or the seasoned expert. There is one final problem. Ray has not given proper consideration to factors other than the disposition of the West Bank that may affect the future of U.S.-Israeli relations — but then again, neither have many others. The increasingly Middle Eastern character of Israeli society and political culture, for example, will certainly strain the community of values that today binds Israel and the United States, and Israel and American Jewry, together. In any serious attempt to grapple with this topic, there is an array of subtle sociological factors below the realm of high politics that must be considered. This volume does not do it.

The West Bank: Line of Defense. By Aryeh Shalev, with a historical supplement by Mordechai Gichon. New York: Praeger, 1985. 209 pp. $35.95. The most complete, exhaustively detailed geographical, topographical, and military analysis of the West Bank available so far in English. The book also attempts to draw out the political implications of the West Bank's strategic importance as well as to examine the better-known and not-so-better-known arguments on every side of the issue in Israel with clarity and dispassion. Shalev concludes that, despite the security rele-

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vance of the West Bank to Israel, IDF withdrawal is still possible in the context of demilitarization arrangements, a peace treaty with Jordan, and a lengthy transitional period. Shalev takes the pragmatic view that only in such a fashion will the Palestinians ultimately secure something of an independent national existence. He is probably correct, but the Palestinians that matter politically still do not see it that way. There are shades here of both Mark Heller's *A Palestinian State* (1983) and Shai Feldman's *Israeli Nuclear Deterrence* (1982), and this is not surprising since all three work at the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University. But Shalev is unto himself in the military-topographical sphere. The first four chapters of this book should appeal to anyone seriously interested in geopolitics and military science.

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

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

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

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

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

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